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*The Crusades from the Perspective  
of Byzantium and the Muslim World*

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# Byzantine Trade with Christians and Muslims and the Crusades

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Angeliki E. Laiou,  
with an Appendix by Cécile Morrisson

In May 1192, at a time when the Third Crusade was still in progress, the Byzantine emperor Isaac II sent one of his virtually annual embassies to Saladin, seeking, among other things, an offensive and defensive alliance directed, inevitably, against Western Europeans. In late summer or early autumn of the same year, a Venetian ship carrying the Byzantine ambassadors, Saladin's envoys and gifts to Isaac, and goods and merchandise belonging to Isaac, his brother and future emperor Alexios, an imperial official, and "Greek and Syrian merchants," set sail from Egypt toward Constantinople. Near Rhodes, it was attacked by Pisan and Genoese ships led by the Genoese corsair Guglielmo Grasso. The goods were seized, and the ambassadors and the merchants were killed, or so Isaac said in his letter of complaint to Genoa.<sup>1</sup> Nor were the sums involved negligible. Isaac claimed that the merchandise was valued at 96,000 hyperpyra and 566 nomismata,<sup>2</sup> of which 39,000 hyperpyra and 193 nomismata belonged to merchants of Constantinople.

This affair initiated a series of diplomatic and not-so-diplomatic negotiations that lasted until September 1195. Almost immediately after the attack, in November 1192, Isaac wrote to the Commune of Genoa describing what had happened and seeking satisfaction (ικάνωσις) for the property lost. Otherwise, he said, the Genoese merchants in

I should like to thank my research assistant, Charles Dibble, for his help.

<sup>1</sup> The main information about this incident is contained in G. Bertolotto, *Nuova serie di documenti sulle relazioni di Genova coll'Impero bizantino*, Atti della Società Ligure di storia patria 28.2 (Genoa, 1898), doc. xii, pp. 448–53 (= F. Miklosich and J. Müller, *Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi sacra et profana*, 6 vols. [Vienna, 1860–90], 3:37–40), and doc. xiii, pp. 454–64, and J. Müller, *Documenti sulle relazioni delle città Toscane coll'oriente cristiano e coi Turchi fino all'anno MDXXXI*, Documenti degli archivi toscani (Florence, 1879; repr. Rome, 1966), nos. xxxviii (pp. 61–64) and xli (pp. 66–67). Brief discussions of the affair in C. M. Brand, "The Byzantines and Saladin," *Speculum* 37 (1962): 173–78, and W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen Age*, 2d ed., 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1936; repr. Amsterdam, 1967), 1:233–35. On piracy, cf. H. Ahrweiler, *Byzance et la mer* (Paris, 1966), passim, esp. 288–92, and M. Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, vol. 1 (Rome, 1978), 35.

<sup>2</sup> χιλιάδας ὑπερπύρων ἑννεήκοντα ἕξ, νομίσματα ὅμοια πεντακόσια ἑξήκοντα ἕξ. The two different terms may refer to two different coins: the gold hyperpyron and the electrum "nomisma." The small number of the electrum coins would reflect their limited usefulness for international trade. I owe this observation to C. Morrisson. But see also M. F. Hendy, *Coinage and Money in the Byzantine Empire, 1081–1204*, DOS 12 (Washington, D.C., 1969), 35–37.

Constantinople must sell their goods and deposit the money as a guarantee of the eventual restitution to be made by the Commune.<sup>3</sup> Similar letters, with a similar content, must have been sent to Pisa: although the early phases of negotiations with Pisa elude us, the surviving documentation makes reference to previous embassies. Very soon thereafter, indeed in the same month of November 1192,<sup>4</sup> Isaac did seize the property of Genoese and, undoubtedly, Pisan merchants. The name of a Genoese merchant, Enrico Novitella, who had sailed into Constantinople in November, is specifically mentioned.

In a *sigillion* given to the city of Genoa in October 1193, Isaac explained why he had taken this extraordinary measure. Once again, he recalled Grasso's attack, which had taken place, he reminded the Genoese, shortly after the conclusion of a treaty with Genoa.<sup>5</sup> He was most emphatic on the damages suffered by his merchants, many of whom, he said, were from Constantinople itself, and among the most important merchants in the City (καὶ τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πραγματευτῶν φερομένων). He, Isaac, could not take this lightly, especially since the merchants (or, one assumes, the heirs or creditors of those who were killed) vociferously demanded justice, revenge, and reparation. They had asked to be allowed to get satisfaction from the property of Genoese merchants in Constantinople; the Genoese in question had not responded to the emperor's request that they make reparations, which upset their Byzantine counterparts even more. Isaac held the city of Genoa responsible, even though it had tried to claim that the corsairs were outlaws—expelled from the city—and that therefore the Commune bore no responsibility for their actions. In the second instance, Isaac held responsible the Genoese merchants active in Constantinople. Under heavy pressure from the people,<sup>6</sup> and fearing a riot,<sup>7</sup> but not wanting to take extreme measures such as rescinding the privileges of the Genoese, he had seized a portion of the money and goods of some Genoese merchants and given them to Byzantine “guarantors” (ἐγγυητάς) to hold in deposit (παρακαταθήκη). The sum so deposited was 20,000 hyperpyra, just over half what the Byzantine merchants claimed to have lost; it is legitimate to suppose that the goods of Pisan merchants, which we also know to have been seized,<sup>8</sup> made up the other half. This property was meant to be returned if the Genoese (and Pisan) Commune made reparations. If not, it would be given outright to the Byzantine merchants in reparation (ἰκάνωσις).

Between November 1192 and October 1193, the Genoese (and the Pisans, one assumes) had sent envoys, promising to pursue the corsairs and deliver them into Isaac's hands, and asking that the Commune not be made to suffer for the actions of individuals. Isaac chose to believe that the Commune would make restitution, or else that the prom-

<sup>3</sup> Bertolotto, *Nuova serie*, doc. xii.

<sup>4</sup> For the date, see Bertolotto, *Nuova serie*, p. 457.

<sup>5</sup> For the treaty (April 1192), see F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches*, vol. 1.2 (Munich, 1925), no. 1610; Miklosich and Müller, 3:25–37; Bertolotto, *Nuova serie*, pp. 413–33.

<sup>6</sup> The text uses the word *demos*; must one assume general popular discontent, or the discontent of merchants?

<sup>7</sup> On riots on the part of “the men of the marketplace” during the reign of Alexios III, cf. Niketas Choniates, *Historia*, ed. J. L. van Dieten (Berlin-New York, 1975), 523–26.

<sup>8</sup> Müller, *Documenti*, no. xli, p. 67.

ise itself was sufficient. In any event, although the Genoese did not send the money seized by the corsairs,<sup>9</sup> the Byzantines returned the 20,000 hyperpyra held in deposit. The man who returned it, and who perhaps had held it in deposit, was John Oxeobaphopoulos.<sup>10</sup> The transaction was effected with all the Byzantine legal forms: the Genoese, for example, gave formal assurance that they had, indeed, received the money (*ἀναργυρίαν προβαλέσθαι οὐκ ἔχομεν*). The Genoese Commune agreed not to raise any further claims for damages suffered by its merchants whose goods had been confiscated, not to refer to the matter again, nor to seek revenge. And in return, the emperor issued his *sigillion*, closing the matter, and renewing Genoese privileges.

That the accused neatly turned into accusers is only one of the interesting aspects of the story. Clearly, we are at a crossroads in the development of the law of reprisals, and the principle prevailed that reprisals should not be sought of innocent parties; but in the process, the Byzantine merchants did not receive restitution. It is, I think, unlikely that in closing the matter in this way Isaac II was swayed by arguments regarding the respective responsibilities of individuals and collectivities. For the dispute with Pisa dragged on until 1195. It was, eventually, resolved in a way parallel to the settlement with Genoa, but only because Pisan ships kept harassing the environs of Constantinople, attacking Byzantine ships, seizing goods, and killing people.<sup>11</sup> One wonders whether in the Genoese case as well there was not an element of military or political persuasion.

The origins of the events of 1192–95 were embedded in political affairs: the last effort on the part of Isaac II to ally himself with Saladin against the Crusaders. It has been argued that the corsair attack was also in some degree political, the corsairs being in part bent on creating trouble for Saladin, the great enemy of the Crusader states.<sup>12</sup> The conclusion of the affair was also, it would seem, political, for the capture and murder of the ambassadors ended the close relationship between Isaac and Saladin. That having proved unproductive or even counterproductive, Isaac now made a full turn toward Genoa, Pisa, the pope, and the Normans<sup>13</sup>—which may serve as another explanation of the ease with which Pisan and Genoese goods were returned. Despite the political aspects, however, the role of the merchants is central to the story, and the importance of Constantinopolitan merchants is especially noteworthy. They appear as a large, influential, rich, and dangerous group, and it is no accident that Isaac began by demanding restitution for everyone's goods (including his own, his brother's, and his official's), then very quickly limited his demands to reparations for the goods of the merchants, even though in the end he got nothing.

Modern scholars have given this story scant attention. Yet it cannot be equaled as a

<sup>9</sup> Heyd, *Commerce*, 1:234, says that restitution of the money was, in fact, made, but the documentation nowhere suggests that; he may have misunderstood the text in Bertolotto, *Nuova serie*, p. 457. Brand, "The Byzantines and Saladin," 178, follows Heyd.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. below, 177.

<sup>11</sup> Müller, *Documenti*, no. xlii.

<sup>12</sup> Heyd, *Commerce*, 1:233. Heyd presents this as a hypothesis, suggesting that Isaac's alliance with Saladin and the presence of Egyptian ambassadors aboard this ship made it doubly interesting to the Genoese pirates.

<sup>13</sup> Brand, "The Byzantines and Saladin," 178: "Saladin was disillusioned with Isaac's military capabilities, while Isaac finally realized that Saladin was too distant to protect him from the Latins."

snapshot of conditions in the eastern Mediterranean in the late twelfth century, for it illustrates a number of important developments. For one thing, it makes evident the close connections between the Crusades and the increasingly strong presence of Italian merchants in the eastern Mediterranean. It brings to the fore the Byzantine bankers and merchants, here engaged in international money transactions. It allows us more than a glance into the developing law of the sea regarding issues of paramount importance to merchants, here the question of reparations and reprisals. And it hints at the nature of political and commercial connections between the Byzantine Empire and the Muslims during the time of the Crusades. These topics will be discussed in what follows.

For the Byzantine Empire, the question of the economic influence—if any—of the Crusades is almost inextricably connected with the question of the influence of the Italian merchants on the Byzantine economy, which both predates the crusading movement and becomes closely tied to it, certainly by the time of the Fourth Crusade. Indeed, the presence of Italian merchants on Byzantine soil eventually became dominant, reducing the degrees of freedom of the native merchants, although possibly increasing their opportunities. This is a topic of significance, touching primarily the economy of exchange, and it has been treated by a number of scholars.<sup>14</sup> I will not offer a reconsideration of the question; I simply note the double presence of Italian merchants and Crusaders in many geographic areas, constant but in small numbers in the case of the first; somewhat more sporadic but sometimes in huge numbers in the case of the Crusaders.

The “Crusades” were a frequent phenomenon of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. We are accustomed to taking account of the major crusades, the ones with numbers, but crusading expeditions of one kind or another took place often, and certainly the Christians and Muslims of the area were aware of the fact. The First Crusade, insofar as the Byzantine Empire was concerned, did not end in 1099. It extended from 1096 until 1108 and the Treaty of Devol, which marked the end of Bohemond’s quasi-crusade. And the 1120s were punctuated by crusading expeditions undertaken by Pisans and Genoese by sea, while in 1122 a Venetian Crusader fleet on its way to Palestine attacked Corfu in retaliation for the attempt of John II Komnenos to reduce Venice’s commercial privileges; it pillaged Byzantine lands on the way to and from Palestine and extracted the confirmation and expansion of Venetian commercial privileges in the Byzantine Empire.<sup>15</sup> Thus large armies and small and large fleets often traversed Byzantine lands and waters, presenting the Byzantines with the new problem of dealing, in economic ways too, with theoretical friends in large numbers.

The other general point that should be remembered is the existence of Crusader states

<sup>14</sup> See, most recently, D. Jacoby, “Italian Privileges and Trade in Byzantium before the Fourth Crusade: A Reconsideration,” *Anuario de estudios medievales* 24 (1994): 349–68; A. Laiou, “Byzantium and the Commercial Revolution,” in G. Arnaldi and G. Cavallo, eds., *Europa medievale e mondo bizantino: Contatti effettivi e possibilità di studi comparati*, Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, Nuovi Studi Storici 40 (Rome, 1997), 239–53; M. F. Hendy, “Byzantium, 1081–1204: ‘The Economy Revisited,’ Twenty Years On,” in idem, *The Economy, Fiscal Administration, and Coinage of Byzantium* (Northampton, 1989), no. iii.

<sup>15</sup> J. Riley-Smith, “The Venetian Crusade of 1122–1124,” in G. Arnaldi and B. Kedar, eds., *I comuni italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme*, Jerusalem, 24–28 May 1984, *Collana Storica di Fonti e Studi* 48 (Genoa, 1986), 337–50.

after 1099, which meant that there were three sets of Christians in the eastern Mediterranean: Byzantines, Crusader states, and Italian merchants (not to mention the native Christians of the East, who will not enter this discussion); the interconnections between them will be seen to have been of importance.

That having been said, I should like to pose a few questions that are somewhat different from the questions scholars have been asking. The focus, to the extent possible, and bearing in mind the sometimes inextricable interconnections between Crusaders and merchants, will be on the effects of the Crusades themselves, and of the Crusader states, on Byzantine commercial relations. What new and specific problems and challenges did the Crusaders and the existence of the Crusader states pose to the Byzantine Empire? Did they influence the mechanisms and methods of trade? Did they help bring about any structural changes? Or were they irrelevant, and do the only questions continue to be those associated with the Italian presence and eventual dominance over the commerce of these areas?

I will concentrate here not on the overall canvas (the bird's-eye view), but rather on the worm's-eye view to start with, and then on the point of view of the flying-fish—the middle distance, the structural and institutional developments that took place in Byzantine trade with Christians and Muslims especially during the twelfth century, but also in the later period—connected with conditions in which the Crusades played a role. I will take for granted the *very* large changes after 1204, insofar as Byzantine trade with Western Christians is concerned.

## I. The Byzantine Economy and the Crusades

This is a time when armies and navies passed through the territories of a still relatively intact and prosperous Byzantine Empire. The discussion of the First Crusade will include the expedition of 1100–1101 and end in 1108.<sup>16</sup> There were two major relevant problems: that of provisioning the armies as they crossed Byzantine lands and the related problem of currency exchange.

### A. Provisioning

Major challenges were posed by the large size of the crusading armies. According to the most recent estimates, the Peasant Crusade had around 20,000 participants; the main armies at Nicaea counted approximately 50,000 to 60,000 members including noncombatants. Many had already died on the way to Constantinople. The Crusade of 1101, for which there are huge contemporary estimates, must have been larger.<sup>17</sup> No figures are

<sup>16</sup> J. France, *Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade* (Cambridge–New York, 1994), 142, and J. Flori, “Un problème de méthodologie: La valeur des nombres chez les chroniqueurs du Moyen Âge: A propos des effectifs de la première Croisade,” *Moyen Âge* 99 (1995): 399–422. J. Heers, *Libérer Jérusalem: La première Croisade (1095–1107)* (Paris, 1995), does not give estimates. On the Crusade of 1100–1101, see J. L. Cate, “The Crusade of 1101,” in K. M. Setton, ed., *History of the Crusades*, vol. 1, *The First Hundred Years*, ed. M. W. Baldwin (Madison, Wisc., 1969), 343–67.

<sup>17</sup> Cate, “The Crusade of 1101,” 351.

given for the French and German armies of the Second Crusade, but combined they must have been as large as those of the First Crusade. For the army of Frederick I Barbarossa, we have the figure of 100,000, which includes 20,000 mounted troops.<sup>18</sup> In terms of the problems of provisioning, we might compare these figures with the most recent and persuasive estimates of the size of the Komnenian army on campaign, which is approximately 15,000 to 20,000 men, thus much smaller than the Crusaders' armies.<sup>19</sup> One must also take into account the length of time the Crusaders spent on Byzantine soil; thinking only of the Balkans, I have estimated an average of two to two and a half months for most of the armies of the First Crusade, except for those of Raymond of Toulouse and Bohemond, which took five and a half to six months. The passage of most of the armies, including the Peasant Crusade, was swift: the comparison to locusts, found in both Anna Komnene and Orderic Vitalis,<sup>20</sup> seems apposite. The armies of the Second Crusade took two and a half to three months. But that of Frederick Barbarossa spent almost nine months on Byzantine soil, mostly in southern Bulgaria and Thrace, heavily taxing the resources of the area. As these numbers suggest, the problems of provisioning were ubiquitous; as for questions of exchange, those arose on the ground, and, during the Second and Third Crusades, formed a part of the negotiations for safe passage.

As is well known, the First Crusade was too amorphous and disorganized for formal arrangements to have been made beforehand to assure provisioning, although by 1101 agreements were indeed concluded as the Lombard army was about to enter Bulgaria.<sup>21</sup> Provisions do not seem to have been brought as far as the Byzantine Empire, although one of the chroniclers mentions that the Crusaders carried some provisions with them;<sup>22</sup> these undoubtedly were exhausted before the Crusaders left Western Europe. The Crusaders also brought money and marks of silver with them, presumably to be used to buy provisions.<sup>23</sup>

The problem of provisioning was recurrent during the passage of the armies of the First Crusade and of the subsequent two. The army of Raymond of St. Gilles, passing through Dalmatia, could get neither safe-conduct nor *commercium* until it reached Skoutari, where, in January 1097, Raymond made a pact with the local ruler (Vodin), giving him much money so that the army would be allowed to buy provisions, although Vodin's promises seem to have remained a dead letter.<sup>24</sup> The Crusaders were certainly expected, by the Byzantine authorities, to buy their food: Alexios I, as soon as he heard of the Crusade, had sent generals to Durazzo and Avlona to ensure that there would be *panegyris* (the Latin term is usually *mercatum* or *necessarium negotium*)<sup>25</sup> in all the lands along the

<sup>18</sup> France, *Victory in the East*, 136.

<sup>19</sup> J.-C. Cheynet, "Les effectifs de l'armée byzantine aux Xe–XIe siècle," *CahCM* 38 (1995): 319–35, at 331–32.

<sup>20</sup> *Alexiade* 10.5.7, ed. B. Leib (with P. Gautier), 4 vols. (Paris, 1939–76), 2:208; Orderic Vitalis, *The Ecclesiastical History*, ed. and trans. M. Chibnall, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1969–80), 5.30.

<sup>21</sup> Albert of Aix, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, RHC, HOcc 4 (Paris, 1879), 559; Orderic Vitalis, 5:327.

<sup>22</sup> *Roberti Monachi Historia Iherosolimitana*, RHC, HOcc 3 (Paris, 1866), 744, on Bohemond.

<sup>23</sup> See below, 168–69.

<sup>24</sup> J. Hugh and L. Hill, eds., *Le "Liber" de Raymond d'Aguilers* (Paris, 1969), 37–38; Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, ed. R. Huygens, CC *continuatio mediaevalis* 63–63A (Turnhout, 1986), 2.17 (1:182 ff).

<sup>25</sup> E.g., Orderic Vitalis, 5:31, 33, 43, 49, 69.

way.<sup>26</sup> Some Crusaders, especially the excitable Tancred,<sup>27</sup> thought it too bad that they should have to buy food—and they took different courses of action.<sup>28</sup> The emperor, perhaps in response, seems to have made the availability of provisions contingent on the Crusaders' oath of fealty or friendship, as also happened during the Second and Third Crusades.<sup>29</sup> The Byzantine authorities seem to have been confident that they *could* provide adequate markets, so much so that Niketas Choniates thought that Manuel Komnenos' failure to supply adequate markets to the participants of the Second Crusade was deliberate.

Byzantine armies on campaign normally brought some of their provisions with them, or bought them along the way, as long as they were on friendly territory.<sup>30</sup> But the Crusader armies, especially those of the Second and Third Crusades, which crossed into the Balkans all together, were much larger than a Byzantine army on campaign. In fact, the passage of the crusading armies taxed the productive resources of the area and most particularly the mechanisms of distribution. It is surprising that the system did not significantly break down before the time of Frederick Barbarossa.

The provisioning of the armies of the First Crusade (including that of 1101) on Byzantine territory was carried out in three ways. First, the Crusaders bought food, and a recurrent complaint is that there was no food to be bought or, as in Kastoria, that the inhabitants did not wish to sell, being suspicious of the Crusaders' motives.<sup>31</sup> In the Balkans, in Asia Minor, and also in the Holy Land, much of the provisioning of the crusading army depended on the *purchase* of food (and fodder for the horses), as William of Tyre makes most clearly evident. Indeed, the fact that various crusading chronicles quote prices, mostly at times of famine, proves that food was bought.<sup>32</sup> The second way they found food was from imperial donations—either at times of joint victory or at times of considerable hardship. Alexios I perhaps fed some of the army of Peter the Hermit in Constantinople and promised Hugh of Vermandois not only an adequate market (*copiosum mercatum*) but also alms for the poor.<sup>33</sup> Before the capture of Nicaea,

<sup>26</sup> *Alexiade* 10.5.9 (ed. Leib, 2:209). According to Anna, when Alexios heard of the crusade, he told his officials to πανηγύρεις τε δαμιλεῖς ἐξ ἀπασῶν τῶν χωρῶν κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐξάγειν. Later, Alexios heard about the arrival of more Crusaders, and again he sent word to τὰ ζωαρκῆ τούτοις ἐρχομένοις ἐπιχορηγεῖν ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ τεταγμένοις, ὡς μὴ λαβεῖν αὐτοὺς τὸ παράπαν ἐσχηκέναι. *Alexiade* 10.10.3 (ed. Leib, 2:228). Orderic Vitalis says that during the passage of the crusaders of Walter Sans-Avoir, the *doux* and the officials of Philippopolis allowed them to enter the city “et mercatum concesserunt,” which they had not done before: *Ecclesiastical History*, 5.31 (this information is found nowhere else, according to the editor's note).

<sup>27</sup> R. Hill, ed., *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum* (London, 1962), 10.

<sup>28</sup> See below, 164.

<sup>29</sup> E.g., Robert the Monk, 744, 748, 749. Also William of Tyre, 2.6, 2.12, 2.14 (1:168–69, 175–77, 178–79).

<sup>30</sup> R. Vári, *Leonis imperatoris Tactica*, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1917–22), 1:225.

<sup>31</sup> Robert the Monk, 745: Bohemond tries to get “forum rerum venalium”; cf. Hill, *Gesta Francorum* 8: “quesivimus mercatum.” Cf. Orderic Vitalis, 5.45, 49.

<sup>32</sup> Among the prices, see *Alexiade* 11.4.3 (ed. Leib, 3:20): in Antioch, ἡ κεφαλὴ τοῦ βοῦς ἐπὶ τρισὶ χρυσίοις στατήρσι ἀπεμπολεῖτο. On the fact that food was normally purchased as opposed to donated or acquired by raids, see William of Tyre, 1:142, 143, 148, 164–65, 173, 176, 178, 184.

<sup>33</sup> “[I]mperator iusserat dari mercatum, sicuti erat in civitate”: Hill, *Gesta Francorum* 2; but he uses *mercatum* also to mean a market; cf. Robert the Monk, 732: “mercatum eis habere concedebat, quod etiam in civitate erat.” Orderic Vitalis, 5.43; cf. p. 327 on *ingentia dona* to the leaders of the Crusade of 1101 and p. 335 on ship-

Alexios allowed a ship to bring provisions for purchase; but after the fall of that city, he gave to the poor of the army alms, which Stephen of Blois defines as distributions of food.<sup>34</sup> The third way in which the Crusaders found food was plunder. Relatively limited during the First Crusade, at least on Byzantine territory, despite the depredations of Tancred and Bohemond and those of the Lombard participants in the Crusade of 1101,<sup>35</sup> it became a way of life when the Crusaders entered Turkish territory. Spoils of war, not quite plunder, were also available, as also were large donations by the rulers of various Muslim towns once the Crusaders had entered Syria and Palestine.

As for the Second and Third Crusades, the matter of provisioning was paramount in the eyes of the Crusader leaders, and in the eyes of the Byzantine emperors it had become, along with safe conduct, the most powerful negotiating tool. In his letter to the pope regarding the crusade of Louis VII, Manuel I Komnenos promised safe passage and markets (and suitable exchange: “forum idoneum, concambium competens”), in exchange for an oath of security for his realm.<sup>36</sup> He then sent orders everywhere to have provisions brought to the roads through which the Crusaders would pass.<sup>37</sup> The German army too was promised “hospitality” (ὑποδοχῆς τε ἀπολαύοντας εἰς τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ φιλοφροσύνης τῆς ἄλλης) in exchange for an oath of friendship.<sup>38</sup> The governor of Nish, Michael Branas, was ordered to provide “necessities” (προῦνοεῖτο ἤδη τῶν ἀναγκαίων αὐτοῖς, οὕτω προστεταγμένον αὐτῶ),<sup>39</sup> and similarly in Sofia. In Sofia, at least, it is certain that its governor made sure that Louis VII had the right to buy provisions.<sup>40</sup> Manuel forced the French to reconfirm their oaths in exchange for market privileges several times: most importantly in Constantinople, where he exacted the oath of homage in return for a promise of guides, fair exchange, and markets everywhere,<sup>41</sup> and, later, in Attaleia.<sup>42</sup> When arrangements broke down, either by design on the part of the Byzantines or by chance, or because there was not enough food to feed the Crusaders (as in Attaleia), the Crusaders plundered.<sup>43</sup>

The arrangements with Frederick Barbarossa, as reported by Niketas Choniates, Ansbart and other sources, were almost a point-by-point copy of those made earlier with Conrad and Louis VII—which means that the imperial bureaucracy had learned more

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loads of tatarera given by Alexios to the Crusaders in 1101 to persuade them to cross into Asia Minor. Ekkehard of Aura (*Hierosolymita*, ed. H. Hagenmeyer [Tübingen, 1877], 233–34), also says that in 1100 (1101?) Alexios promised to provide markets and give alms to the poor.

<sup>34</sup> Robert the Monk, 778; First letter of Stephen of Blois to his wife, RHC, HOcc 3:886. According to Stephen, Alexios distributed food to the poor even before the fall of Nicaea, daily. After the capture of the city, “omnia vero victualia peditibus distribuuntur.”

<sup>35</sup> Albert of Aix, 559–60. Cf. the attack on Adrianople in 1101: Ekkehard of Aura, 234–35.

<sup>36</sup> Νέος Ἑλλ. 11 (1914): 111–12; Odo of Deuil, *De profectioe Ludovici VII in orientem*, ed. V. G. Berry (New York, 1948; repr. 1965), 29.

<sup>37</sup> Choniates, ed. van Dieten, 61 ff.

<sup>38</sup> *Ioannis Cinnami Epitome rerum ab Ioanne et Alexio Comnenis gestarum*, ed. A. Meineke (Bonn, 1836), 2.2, p. 68.

<sup>39</sup> Kinnamos (Bonn ed.), 2.13; p. 70.

<sup>40</sup> Odo of Deuil, 45.

<sup>41</sup> Odo of Deuil, 77–83.

<sup>42</sup> Odo of Deuil, 129.

<sup>43</sup> Odo of Deuil, 41, 97; Kinnamos (Bonn ed.), 2.15 ff, pp. 75 ff.

or less what to do, unless it simply means that Choniates is repeating himself. The second eventuality, however, is unlikely, since he had firsthand knowledge of the later arrangements, and the statements of Odo of Deuil (and Ansbert) and Choniates corroborate each other at several points.<sup>44</sup> Once again the quid pro quo was safety for imperial lands in return for markets, although, as is well known, the problem deteriorated into a conflict over imperial titles. Once again the emperor appealed to the provincial governors to “transfer goods from the various regions to where the king would pass.”<sup>45</sup> In the case of the Third Crusade, promises of safe-conduct and *optimi fori* were made in Nuremberg in November 1186, and repeated in Nish and Branitsevo. The question of *iustum concambium* arose in October 1189.<sup>46</sup> But arrangements broke down very soon indeed, and the German army—100,000 of them—found its food by plunder, which must have been very painful for the population. Permission to plunder was solemnized by the Treaty of Adrianople in February 1190. According to Choniates, at the time of the Third Crusade, the Turks of Konya also promised safe-passage and provisions, but broke their promises.<sup>47</sup>

How was this food marketed, and who sold it? In all cases, the emperors gave the original orders, which mandated two courses of action: that markets should be provided to the armies and that provisions should be collected by the governors of the regions.<sup>48</sup> William of Tyre, perhaps not entirely trustworthy on this point, adds that Alexios’ edict regarding the army of Bohemond envisaged the death penalty for anyone who disregarded his orders to “iusto precio et equo pondere ducis exercitui quelibet mercimonia venderentur.” His narrative often reiterates that Alexios not only gave the Crusaders the right to buy and sell, but also ordered that the sale be carried out with correct weights and measures and at a just price.<sup>49</sup> During the Crusade of 1100–1101, permission was given the Crusaders to buy and sell (“emendi et vendendi”) in Rosa (the Rusa of the First Crusade: Xanthe or Komotini), Panidos, Rodosto, Didymoteichon, “castello . . . de Natura,” Selymbria, Adrianople, Philippopolis;<sup>50</sup> some of these towns, like Panidos and Rodosto, were major grain markets.

What content we should give to these statements is another story. In some cases, for example, Alexios’ gratis provisioning of the poor at Nicaea, it is probable that imperial stores were implicated. When it is a matter of markets, *panegyreis, mercatum, fora*, we have to imagine one-time markets, for the most part situated in towns along the way, which

<sup>44</sup> See, for example, the story about the inhabitants of cities carrying out their transactions with the Crusaders by means of ropes thrown down from the walls: Odo of Deuil, 40; Choniates, ed. van Dieten, 66. A further and amazing corroboration: According to both Odo of Deuil (76, 82) and Ansbert (*Historia de expeditione Friderici*, ed. A. Chroust, MGH, *ScriptRerGerm*, n.s., 5 [Berlin, 1928], 65), Manuel and Isaac II respectively agreed that if the army was not able to buy provisions, it had the right to plunder, though not to occupy the territory in question—or, in the case of Frederick I, not to give it to the Turks. This underlines the problems posed by provisioning at politically difficult times: Roger of Sicily was attacking Greece at the time of the Second Crusade.

<sup>45</sup> Choniates, ed. van Dieten, 402.

<sup>46</sup> Ansbert, 15–16, 29, 33, 48.

<sup>47</sup> Ansbert, 25, 26, 37, 39, 44, 59, 66, 71, 73. On the Turks, see Choniates, ed. van Dieten, 412; Ansbert, 69.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Choniates, ed. van Dieten, 402–3, for the Third Crusade.

<sup>49</sup> William of Tyre, 2.12 (1:176); cf. 1.18.54 (1:142), 1.19.12 (1:143); 2.14.15 (1:179).

<sup>50</sup> Albert of Aix, 559.

in any case would have known the institution of the periodic market or fair. The imperial orders would have been to agree to sell to the Crusaders, a somewhat frightening proposition considering the vast numbers of people going through. Imperial officials would do their best to persuade the inhabitants to sell commodities: this was the role given to the *pantepistos* Eustathios Philokales, who was to accompany the army of Frederick I as far as Philadelphia, for exactly that purpose.<sup>51</sup> What the Crusaders “sold” would have been jewels, silver plate, their arms and horses in times of dire need, and money.<sup>52</sup>

There was, undoubtedly, a combination of factors that created a market. Despite the fact that the emperor issued orders regarding provisioning, generally speaking the markets were not, I think, state controlled, but were, rather, composed of producers (both landlords and peasants) and merchants.<sup>53</sup> In other words, as far as we can see, food was not requisitioned by the Byzantine state, nor were imperial or military stores opened. Occasional references allow us a glimpse at the various groups of people who sold food to the Crusaders. Fulcher of Chartres mentions “citizens” of Constantinople, who, by order of the emperor, brought food to sell outside the walls of the city.<sup>54</sup> These were, presumably, merchants. In Attaleia, during the Second Crusade, the food supply depended entirely on maritime trade, for the surrounding territory was in Turkish hands. The grain must have been brought in by merchants.<sup>55</sup>

Direct sale by producers may be deduced from other texts. William of Tyre ascribes the absence of markets at Nish, during the First Crusade, partly to the actions of the Byzantine governor and partly to the fact that the peasants had fled.<sup>56</sup> As the army crossed Macedonia, its escort told the “inhabitants of the land” to bring provisions, the Crusaders not being allowed to enter the cities.<sup>57</sup> These “inhabitants” could be either merchants or direct producers. When Bohemond reached Nicaea, he ordered “maximum mercatum conduci per mare, et pariter utrinque veniebant, ille per terram et ille per mare, et fuit maxima ubertas in tota Christi militia.”<sup>58</sup> Since 50,000 to 60,000 people had to be fed, the sellers can hardly have been peasants: they must have been either merchants or landlords.

Food seems to have been concentrated mostly in cities and towns; the process would have been something like the one that brought to Halmyros, along a west-east axis, Greeks with grain to sell, as reported by Edrisi, writing at approximately the time of the Second Crusade.<sup>59</sup>

Prices seem to have been formed on the ground, although the Crusaders clearly expected state control of both prices and weights and measures. An indication of this, at a

<sup>51</sup> Ansbert, 65.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. below, 167–68, and Odo of Deuil, 75.

<sup>53</sup> See Kinnamos (Bonn ed.), 2.13, pp. 70–71: the Germans apply unjust force “on those offering them food for sale in the market,” in the plains that come after Dacia, i.e., in Bulgaria: τοῖς τε κατ' ἐμπορίαν τὰ ὄνια σφίσιν ἀποδιδούσι χεῖρα ἐπέβαλον ἄδικον.

<sup>54</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana (1095–1127)*, ed. H. Hagenmayer (Heidelberg, 1913), 331.

<sup>55</sup> Odo of Deuil, 129; William of Tyre, 16.26 (2:753).

<sup>56</sup> William of Tyre, 1.19.26–36 (1:143) (army of Walter Sans-Avoir).

<sup>57</sup> *Gesta Francorum* 10.

<sup>58</sup> *Gesta Francorum* 14.

<sup>59</sup> P. A. Jaubert, *La géographie d'Edrisi*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1840), 2:291, 196.

later period to be sure, is offered by the reports of the final accord between Isaac II and Frederick I (the Treaty of Adrianople, February 1190)—namely, that the emperor was obliged to ensure that there would be “good” (i.e., fair) markets (*bona mercata*), selling at a just price (*iusto pretio*), which here seems to be understood as the price that the emperor would have had to pay if he were buying the food.<sup>60</sup> An anonymous letter says that the sale should be at half the price the Crusaders were paying until then.<sup>61</sup> So one job of the imperial officials would have been to guarantee fair prices and stop speculative sales at famine prices. Such, at least, seems to have been the case in 1190, and William of Tyre’s narrative suggests that it was also the case during the First Crusade; but this historian’s insistence on “just prices” may well be anachronistic. Indeed, the great fluctuation in food prices because of scarcity, or because the armies were so large, suggests that fair prices, even if promised, were not delivered.<sup>62</sup> Choniates wrote scathingly about the inhabitants of cities who did not provide adequate markets and seized the opportunity to sell at extravagant prices. They closed their gates, he says, and threw down ropes, to collect the money of the Crusaders and then send down whatever victuals they saw fit—while the worst of them simply took the money and gave nothing in return. They used unjust weights and measures and even tampered with the quality of the food.<sup>63</sup> Finally, during the Third Crusade also, the inhabitants of some cities, such as Philippopolis, refused to sell to the Crusaders.<sup>64</sup> All this shows the limits of imperial control of the situation.

There was an interplay, then, of free-market forces and imperial orders; this was free exchange in which the state was expected to intervene and did intervene to a limited extent. There was some pressure toward increased state control, but it was not very successful.

Freedom for foreigners to buy and sell within the frontiers of the empire was a specific privilege. It was originally granted to the Venetians and was then extended to Crusaders; there are, therefore, formal connections between commercial institutions and the provisioning of the crusading armies. Also, the distribution mechanisms must have been influenced by the problems of provisioning. However, the acute and episodic nature of arrangements for the provisioning of the armies in all probability did not have long-lasting effects on the Byzantine economy. Rather, these arrangements are inscribed in the larger framework of developing commercial mechanisms.

It may be otherwise with questions regarding currency exchange. It must first be stressed that provisioning and currency exchange were closely connected. Even when

<sup>60</sup> The reference is undoubtedly to the ἐξόνησις, the obligatory sale to the state of various products, at fixed prices, on which see N. Oikonomidès, *Fiscalité et exemption fiscale à Byzance (IXe–XIe siècle)* (Athens, 1996), 97–99.

<sup>61</sup> Ansbert, 65–66; K. Hampe, “Ein ungedruckter Bericht über den Vertrag von Adrianopel zwischen Friedrich I. und Isaak Angelos vom Febr. 1190,” *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für deutsche Geschichtskunde* 23 (1898): 400. The editor of the letter thinks that this was impossible and simply the stuff of rumor.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Robert the Monk, 749: the price of bread falls. See also Odo of Deuil, 135, who complains of extremely high prices exacted by the Greeks in Attaleia. Cf. *idem*, p. 97, on the high price of food outside Nicaea, where the sellers demanded cuirasses and swords in payment.

<sup>63</sup> Choniates, ed. van Dielen, 66–67; Odo of Deuil, 41.

<sup>64</sup> Choniates, ed. van Dielen, 403.

sources such as William of Tyre refer to the buying and “selling” by the members of the First Crusade, they may actually be referring to the “sale” of coins, that is, to exchange transactions. It should also be noted that Crusader sources normally quote prices in Western coins, which again raises the problem of currency transactions.

### B. *Currency Exchange*

During the First Crusade, through 1101, not a word is spoken about the problem of currency exchange. The Crusaders brought with them a multiplicity of coins (Raymond of Aguilers mentions seven types, but we know there were many more)—all billon deniers of different intrinsic values (some quite good silver)—and marks of silver. The idea floated by M. Matzke, that perhaps they took a limited and deliberately chosen type of coin does not seem plausible.<sup>65</sup> Some of the great barons, like Godfrey of Bouillon, brought with them considerable quantities of marks of silver. How did the Crusaders fend for themselves, once they had reached the frontiers of the Byzantine Empire?

While the sources of the First Crusade remain mute on the problem of currency exchange, it must have been posed brutally by reality. The problem of “markets” and high prices, omnipresent in the sources, undoubtedly but tacitly includes that of exchange—not only a fair exchange, but, to start with, exchange itself. Who, in the towns along the way, would have been willing to change the Western deniers against Byzantine coins, and at what equivalence? If there was no exchange, how many people would have been willing to accept this unlikely money in payment and, again, at what value? Ingots of silver may have been easier for the locals to accept. While marks of silver were too valuable for small-scale transactions, smaller ingots (not attested in our sources, but possible) may have been used. In this case, one must assume that the Byzantine money changer or merchant would have had the opportunity to give an exchange rate lower than the intrinsic value of the ingot.

The exiguous number of coins datable to the First Crusade that has been found in the Balkans,<sup>66</sup> Asia Minor, and Syria-Palestine could be interpreted in a number of ways: as evidence that the Crusaders did not so much purchase their food as live off the land, which contradicts the rest of the evidence, at least for the Balkans or, more plausibly, as

<sup>65</sup> M. Matzke, “Die sieben Kreuzfahrermünzen und das Papsttum,” *SM* 44 (1994): 13–19, mentioned in D. M. Metcalf, *Coinage of the Crusades and the Latin East in the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford*, 2d ed. (London, 1995), 13–14. As Metcalf says, this proposition depends on the accuracy and completeness of Raymond of Aguilers’ list of coins, which is doubtful. Godfrey of Bouillon got from the bishop of Liège 1,300 or 1,500 marks of silver: *History of the Crusades*, 1.267. At Antioch, Tancred asked for and was promised 400 marks of silver for guarding a castle: *Gesta Francorum* 43. The list of coins appears in Raymond of Aguilers, ed. Hill, 111–12.

<sup>66</sup> The only significant find in terms of numbers is a hoard of 83 coins in Constantinople possibly associated with the First Crusade: Metcalf, *Coinage of the Crusades*, 6. A. M. Stahl (“The Circulation of European Coinage in the Crusader States,” in V. Goss, ed., *The Meeting of Two Worlds: Cultural Exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades*, *Studies in Medieval Culture* 21 [Kalamazoo, Mich., 1986], 85–102, at 86) mentions the hoard of 1,600 coins found in 1884 in Zombor, Croatia, as belonging to the First Crusade, but the hoard has been dated to the Second Crusade. Another 3,000 coins found in Hungary may be datable to the Second Crusade. A very large hoard of 7,700 coins and ingots (with, unfortunately, an unknown find-spot) has been associated with a member of Frederick Barbarossa’s army during the Third Crusade: see Metcalf, *Coinage of the Crusades*, 7–10.

an indication that the Crusaders' coins were routinely and quickly melted down by the Byzantines, perhaps to be reminted; if so, there must have been some sort of government service that bought the coins from the citizens.<sup>67</sup> Similarly, the fact that coins were minted very soon after the conquest of Syria and Palestine suggests that Western coins were not originally well received in the East.<sup>68</sup> After 1140, the Crusader states began to mint silver pennies. Before and after, there was a heavy flow of silver to the East.<sup>69</sup>

Once the members of the First Crusade reached Constantinople, their money supply began to become replenished through imperial gifts of cash, and the problem of exchange was eased to some extent, though only partially. Large gifts of gold and silver on the part of Alexios to the Crusader leaders put Byzantine money into circulation: Fulcher of Chartres reports that after the Crusader leaders had taken the oath of fealty, Alexios gave them “de numismatibus suis,” clearly coined gold and perhaps silver.<sup>70</sup> Anna Komnene speaks of huge gifts to Bohemond, including gold and silver coins.<sup>71</sup> There were also gifts of smaller coins. After the fall of Nicaea, the emperor distributed to the leaders gold, silver (“de auro suo et argento”),<sup>72</sup> as well as other precious things, both from the spoils and from his treasury. The rank and file—the foot soldiers—received distributions “de sumis suis aeneis quos vocant tartarones.”<sup>73</sup> The tetarteron in question here is Alexios' tetarteron, made first of lead, then of billon, then of copper.<sup>74</sup> Small-scale transactions, at a time when markets were pretty well established outside Nicaea, were made possible with these coins. In 1101 Alexios distributed boatloads of tetartera, according to Orderic Vitalis.<sup>75</sup>

When the Crusaders began to be victorious over the Muslims, gold came their way; some undoubtedly was minted gold, as we know for the case when the governors of the towns of Syria and Palestine offered the Crusaders tribute—or gifts with which they bought immunity—not to mention the ghoulish recovery of bezants from the inside of the corpses of slain Turks.<sup>76</sup> It is telling that the leaders, when they were in Syria and Palestine, still had substantial sums of money, in marks of silver, even after the long trip.<sup>77</sup>

Only two rates of exchange are mentioned in the sources of the First Crusade, and

<sup>67</sup> Metcalf, *Coinage of the Crusades*, 3–11, gives a list of the coins that belong to the first three crusades.

<sup>68</sup> The princes of Antioch and the counts of Edessa seem to have struck almost immediately copper coins imitating the Byzantine follis of the late 11th century. See Metcalf, *Coinage of the Crusades*, 22–23, 31 ff.

<sup>69</sup> Stahl estimates a total of ca. 1 million kg of silver = 1,000 tons throughout the crusading period: “Circulation of European Coinage,” 97.

<sup>70</sup> According to William of Tyre, after his accord with Godfrey of Bouillon, Alexios sent him every week, between Epiphany and Ascension, as many gold coins (“auree monete”) as two strong men could carry, and 10 *modioi* of copper coins (“de ereis vero denariis X modii”), to be distributed among his nobles and the plain soldiers: William of Tyre, 2.12 (1:176 ff).

<sup>71</sup> *Alexiade* 10.11.5 (ed. Leib, 2:233).

<sup>72</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 333–34. Is the “silver” coin the *electrum trachy*?

<sup>73</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 333–34; Stephen of Blois boasted to his wife that he doubled his worth in gold and silver: RHC, HOcc 3:886.

<sup>74</sup> M. F. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy c. 300–1450* (Cambridge, 1985), 515.

<sup>75</sup> Orderic Vitalis, 5.334, says that the tetartera were as current as bezants in transactions in Thrace and Bithynia.

<sup>76</sup> E.g., Raymond d'Aguilers, ed. Hill, 111: 15,000 aureos from the governor of Tripoli; *Gesta Francorum* 80.

<sup>77</sup> See, e.g., *Gesta Francorum* 97; Raymond d'Aguilers, ed. Hill, 111–12.

they are not for small coins, but rather for gold hyperpyra or dinars exchanged for silver (billon) deniers. One is the rate of 8 hyperpyra for 120 soldi (1 soldo, a unit of account = 12 deniers), outside Antioch, at a time of famine: “vendebant [the Syrians and Armenians] onus unius asini octo purpuratis, qui appreciabantur centum viginti solidis denariorum,” that is, 1 hyperpyron for 15 soldi, or 1 hyperpyron for 180 deniers.<sup>78</sup> This is high in terms of the approximate intrinsic value of the coins in question.<sup>79</sup> It represents a rate of exchange for poor Western coins in times of famine. The other rate of exchange is not with the hyperpyron but rather with the gold coin of Tripoli: “Valebat quippe unus aureus eo tempore octo vel novem solidos monetae nostri exercitus,” says Raymond of Aguilers, and continues with the famous list of seven coins that he considered to be the army’s money (or at least the money of the army of Raymond of St. Gilles).<sup>80</sup> Of these coins, the denier of Le Puy is said by Raymond of Aguilers to have been worth only half the value of the others.<sup>81</sup> One wonders whether the difference in fineness was as obvious to the locals as it was to Raymond of Aguilers and is to modern numismatists. In any case, if the gold coin in question was the normal dinar, the Crusaders got approximately double what they had received outside Antioch. The rate of exchange with the dinar seems normal, and therefore the Byzantine one was very detrimental to the Crusaders. Gold and silver were apparently exchanged on the basis of intrinsic value. Outside Antioch, the exchange was between hyperpyra and billon deniers, and was heavily influenced by the Crusaders’ need.

More interesting phenomena start with the Second Crusade. The Second and Third Crusades were different from the First in the matter of exchange as in other matters. All the kings who planned to go through the Byzantine Empire asked not only for markets but for fair exchange; and undoubtedly Manuel I was as interested as they were in some kind of regularization of the currency exchange, without which the problem of provisioning was bound to become exacerbated. Also, the participants of these better-organized expeditions seem to have carried considerable amounts of money with them.

It is also with the Second Crusade that Western sources begin to show an evident concern with problems of currency exchange, and there are strident complaints from the pen of Odo of Deuil.<sup>82</sup> The complaints, and the situation to which they refer, repay close examination.

The members of the French army had brought both silver deniers (presumably the denier Parisi, which I will take as the basis for calculations) and marks of silver (it is not clear which mark is meant). The money, as far as we can tell from the complaints, was not accepted as means of payment in the local markets. The insistence of Louis VII on *concambium competens* also suggests that coins were exchanged, as does Choniates’ state-

<sup>78</sup> *Gesta Francorum* 33. I am very grateful to Philip Grierson and Cécile Morisson for their valuable help with this section. According to Michael Hendy, the “purpuratus” is the nomisma trachy, 20.5 carats fine, introduced by Alexios I: Hendy, *Coinage and Money*, 34–35. Throughout this section, the reader should consult the table and Cécile Morisson’s appendix.

<sup>79</sup> See the appendix below.

<sup>80</sup> Raymond of Aguilers, ed. Hill, 111–12.

<sup>81</sup> Metcalf, *Coinage of the Crusades*, 13.

<sup>82</sup> Odo of Deuil, 40, 66.

TABLE 1  
EXCHANGE RATES

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Early 1098

1 hyperpyron = 15 soldi = 180 deniers<sup>1</sup>

Second Crusade

*In the Balkans*

1 stamenon = 5 deniers<sup>2</sup>

[1 hyperpyron = 240 deniers]

144 stamena = 1 mark of silver<sup>3</sup>

[3 hyperpyra = 1 mark of silver]<sup>4</sup>

[Official value of the billon trachy in 1136: 1/48 hyperpyron]<sup>4</sup>

*In Constantinople*

1 stamenon = less than 2 deniers

396 stamena = 1 mark of silver<sup>5</sup>

Third Crusade (Treaty of Adrianople, 1190)

5.5 hyperpyra = 1 mark of (pure?) silver<sup>6</sup>

3 hyperpyra = 1 mark of (impure?) silver<sup>7</sup>

120 stamena = 1 hyperpyron<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Gesta Francorum* 33.

<sup>2</sup> Odo de Deuil, 41.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> For the official value, see Dmitrievskii, *Opisanie*, 689 (as in note 86). The equivalences 1 hyperpyron = 240 deniers and 3 hyperpyra = 1 mark of silver are not mentioned in the sources for 1147–1148. They are theoretical and derive from the official value of the billon trachy.

<sup>5</sup> Odo de Deuil, 89–90.

<sup>6</sup> Ansbert, 66.

<sup>7</sup> Hampe, “Ungedruckter Bericht,” 400.

<sup>8</sup> Ansbert, 66.

ment—unless it is rhetorical—that people cheated the participants of the Second Crusade of their gold and silver.<sup>83</sup> On what basis did the exchange take place?

We note, first, that Odo of Deuil quotes the exchange rates as between the denier and the mark of silver and the “stamenon,” that is, the petty Byzantine coin, not the gold hyperpyron. The stamenon, a corruption of the rare Byzantine term *histamenon*, is the billon trachy (“aspron trachy”), a billon coin, mostly copper, with, at that time, 6.3

<sup>83</sup> Choniates, ed. van Dielen, 66. See also P. Grierson, “A German Crusaders’ Hoard of 1147 from Side (Turkey),” in *LAGOM: Festschrift für Peter Berghaus* (Munster, 1981), 195–203. The West had no gold coinage yet; Choniates may be referring to either unminted gold or Byzantine gold coins acquired by exchange. C. Morrisson and Marc Bompaire suggest that by “concombium competens” Louis VII may have meant that the French coins should be exchanged on the basis of their intrinsic value plus a corresponding premium. According to M. Bompaire, such a practice is attested in French documents of the late 12th century for coins circulating outside the territory where they were legal tender and where they had a nominal value higher than their real value. Cf. M. Castaing-Sicard, *Monnaies féodales et circulation en Languedoc, XIIe au XIIIe siècle* (Toulouse, 1961). I am grateful to M. Bompaire for this information and for the reference.

percent silver.<sup>84</sup> The Crusaders refer to it as a copper coin, as, to all intents and purposes, it was. Thus they suffered a first, psychological, shock, at the exchange of silver for copper.

Within the Byzantine Empire, the billon trachy functioned as a virtual token or quasi-token coin.<sup>85</sup> Its equivalence to the hyperpyron was legislated, and, in 1136, it was worth 1/48 of an hyperpyron, that is to say, one gold coin was worth 48 billon trachea or stamena.<sup>86</sup> The intrinsic value of the billon trachy (based on its silver content) would have been much lower. It was, then, against this token coin that the denier and the mark were exchanged.

The question arises whether the exchange was based on the intrinsic value of the coins or not. M. Hendy has suggested that the Crusaders would have expected an exchange based on the intrinsic value of each denomination, while the Byzantines would have insisted on the official (partly token) value of the billon trachy.<sup>87</sup> This is a highly plausible hypothesis and may well help interpret some of the complaints of the Western sources; but by itself it does not suffice to explain the actual exchange rates.

Odo of Deuil mentions three exchange rates, two in the provinces and one in Constantinople. The rates in the Balkans and in Asia Minor were very close to each other, and very different from that in Constantinople.

According to Odo of Deuil, when the Crusaders first entered the Byzantine Empire, they bought 1 stamenon for 5 deniers, “et pro duodecim solidis [earum] marcum triste dabamus vel potius perdebamus,” that is, they bought 144 billon trachea for one mark of silver.<sup>88</sup> In Asia Minor, three days’ march away from Constantinople, the exchange rate was almost exactly the same.<sup>89</sup>

This exchange rate was very unfavorable to the Crusaders, whether the exchange was

<sup>84</sup> Hendy, *Coinage and Money*, 21, 31. The billon aspron trachy, with a “pronounced silvery surface” (on which see M. F. Hendy and J. A. Charles, “The Production Techniques, Silver Content, and Circulation History of the Twelfth-Century Byzantine Trachy,” in Hendy, *The Economy*, no. XII), would not have been mistaken for a silver coin.

<sup>85</sup> Copper money was almost always a token coin in Byzantium. The billon coin is called by C. Morrisson “‘fausse monnaie’ ou monnaie fiduciaire au sens large”: “La monnaie fiduciaire à Byzance, ou ‘vraie monnaie,’ ‘monnaie fiduciaire’ et ‘fausse monnaie’ à Byzance,” *Bulletin de la Société française de Numismatique* 34 (1979): 615–16.

<sup>86</sup> The rate is given in the typikon of the monastery of Pantokrator in Constantinople: A. Dmitrievskii, *Opisanie liturgiĭskikh rukopisei, hranyaščihysya v bibliotekah pravoslavnogo Vostoka*, vol. 1 (Kiev, 1895), 689. See the Table, above.

<sup>87</sup> Hendy, *Coinage and Money*, 21. Cf. above, note 82.

<sup>88</sup> Odo of Deuil, 41. The part about the exchange rate of the mark has been misunderstood by Chalandon, *Les Comnènes*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1900–1912), vol. 2, *Jean II Comnène (1118–1143) et Manuel I Comnène (1143–1180)*, 298–99 n. 2, and, following him, by the most recent editor of Odo of Deuil. The correct interpretation was suggested to me by Philip Grierson and hinges on the fact that the “duodecim solidi” means 12 units of 12 stamena, i.e., 144 stamena. There is a further uncertainty concerning the mark, which had different weights in different parts of Europe. I assume that, unless the sources explicitly state otherwise, when they mention marks they refer to pure silver weighing one mark. On the circulation of unminted silver, traveling in bars of ingots of a standard fineness and “frequently of a standard weight,” see P. Spufford, *Money and Its Uses in Mediaeval Europe* (Cambridge, 1988), 209–24. I owe this reference to C. Morrisson. On the ingots in the “Barbarossa hoard,” see below, note 100.

<sup>89</sup> Odo of Deuil, 66: they bought one stamenon for 5 or 6 deniers and paid one mark of silver for 144 deniers.

based on the nominal value of the billon trachy or on the intrinsic value of the coins.<sup>90</sup> If, indeed, the equivalence in the Byzantine Empire was 1 hyperpyron = 48 billon trachea, the Crusaders paid 240 deniers for 1 hyperpyron (and 1 mark of silver for 3 hyperpyra), much more than in the First Crusade or in the negotiated settlement of 1190.<sup>91</sup> This shows that, if the calculations are made on the basis of the hyperpyron, the Crusaders would have lost even more money than would be expected by an exchange on the *nominal* value of the billon trachy.

They lost considerable money also if the exchange was in terms of the intrinsic value of the coins. It is very difficult to figure the intrinsic value of such coins, but an exercise might be interesting. The denier Parisiis at the time of Philip Augustus weighed approximately 1 gram, and contained 36–37 percent silver, thus having about 0.4 g silver. The billon trachy weighed around 4.30 g and its fineness was 6.3 percent silver, therefore its silver content was about 0.27 g.<sup>92</sup> The difference was visible to the naked eye. The silver content of the billon trachy was less than that of the denier Parisiis both absolutely and relatively, and any exchange rate that quoted the billon trachy in multiples of the denier Parisiis was bound to be excessive.

A fair exchange, in the eyes of the Crusaders, was what they got in Constantinople, after an agreement with the emperor: 1 stamenon for less than 2 deniers,<sup>93</sup> and 396 stamena for 1 mark of silver.<sup>94</sup> If we translate that into hyperpyra, and assume a nominal value of 1/48 hyperpyron for the stamenon, the Crusaders would have bought 8.25 hyperpyra for 1 mark of silver in Constantinople, a rate much more favorable to the mark than at the time of Frederick Barbarossa. The implied gold–silver ratio would be 1:7.86, very weak for Byzantium.

Certain observations are in order. The exchange rate between the stamenon and the denier, as that between the stamenon and the mark of silver, is consistent, *grosso modo*, with an exchange based on the *nominal* value of the stamenon, which normally was overvalued by something like 2.5 times its intrinsic value.<sup>95</sup> If the Crusaders then bought hyperpyra with their stamena, the gold–silver ratio would have been 1:8. It is, however, much more likely that the conversion of stamena to hyperpyra was either impossible or extremely limited, since both the fiduciary nature of the stamenon and the cheap rate that would result for the hyperpyron argue against it.

The difference in exchange rates between Constantinople and the provinces is striking indeed. In part, it reflects the real problems of exchanging money in the provinces. The presence of large Crusader armies would mean a sharp rise in demand and a shortage of Byzantine coins, thus making them expensive. Add to this the cost of metallic exchange to the money changer. The result was high rates and a psychological shock to the Crusaders, who exchanged silver for what looked to them like copper.

In Constantinople, Manuel seems to have insisted on the nominal value of the sta-

<sup>90</sup> See the Table, above.

<sup>91</sup> The difficulty with the mark, mentioned in note 88, must be kept in mind. For 1190, see below, 175.

<sup>92</sup> See the appendix below.

<sup>93</sup> Odo of Deuil, 66; cf. Chalandon, *Jean II Comnène*, 298–99 n. 2.

<sup>94</sup> “[E]arum triginta tres solidos propter marcam,” i.e., 33 units of 12 stamena for one mark of silver.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. the appendix below.

menon, a deal that the Crusaders also considered to be fair. He may also, however, at the same time, have devalued the stamenon given to the Crusaders, as Choniates charges, taking with one hand what he had given with the other. Hendy discounts the possibility that Manuel had minted debased billon trachea specifically for the Crusaders, as charged by Choniates: ἀργύριον ἀδόκιμον εἰς νόμισμα κόπτεται καὶ τοῦτο προβάλλεται τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ τῶν Ἰταλῶν στρατεύματος ἀποδόσθαι τι θέλουσι.<sup>96</sup> Numismatic evidence, it seems, indicates that the debasement of the billon trachy (the stamenon) took place much later, and, it would appear, very fast. Yet it is not impossible that Manuel may have done exactly what Choniates accuses him of, that is, minted a debased billon trachy (with more copper) precisely to defraud the Crusaders and for use in Constantinople.

One other point is worth noting. None of the sources for the Second Crusade mentions an exchange rate for the hyperpyron, although we are told that in Constantinople the Crusaders did, in fact, exchange silver, both minted and unminted, for gold.<sup>97</sup> This suggests that the negotiated rates involved only the petty Byzantine coin and did not extend to gold-silver exchanges. In this case, the rate of exchange for gold and silver would have been negotiated on the ground, leaving open the possibility that the Crusaders overpaid for Byzantine gold, according to their need.

This hypothesis finds some corroboration in a wonderful story, related by Odo of Deuil, which also shows how the exchange took place. In Constantinople the Crusaders could exchange money on board the food ships and also “ante palatium vel etiam in tentoribus,” that is, the money changers came to them at the site of the camp; or they could change money in the money changer’s shops.<sup>98</sup> Once the Crusaders had left the city to cross over to Asia, they were attended by food ships, on which there were also money changers (*cum cambitoribus*). The money changers disembarked and set up their benches, which *fulgent auro*. Here came the Crusaders to exchange money as they needed to. Odo of Deuil speaks of the silver vessels that the money changers had bought from the Crusaders; so they also exchanged unminted metal for coin. A fairly orderly procedure, except for the fact that there were some heroic Crusaders who thought this a good occasion for plunder. A riot ensued, where the money changers lost their money and fled to Constantinople. Eventually Louis VII made restitution, and the money changers returned. But this is a rare picture of how operations took place: the money changers were right at the place where the food was, and the currency exchange went hand in hand with the purchase of necessities.<sup>99</sup>

How such transactions were carried out in the provinces is less clear; in fact, we have no information. One can imagine, however, that part of the business of creating a market included setting up facilities of exchange. Indeed, it is almost necessary to posit this, and it is not at all a far-fetched supposition, since we know that at Byzantine fairs credit transactions also took place; so the money changers were used to being at fairs. Nor

<sup>96</sup> Choniates, ed. van Dieten, 67; cf. Hendy, *Coinage and Money*, 22, 170–71.

<sup>97</sup> Odo of Deuil, 66.

<sup>98</sup> Odo of Deuil, 66.

<sup>99</sup> Odo of Deuil, 75.

would the money changers have been averse to setting up business on the route of the Crusaders: even if Manuel had not debased the coinage (indeed, *especially* if he had not debased the coinage), they stood to gain quite a lot in their transactions with people in need who had money of which to be relieved.

By the time of the Third Crusade, the balance of blackmail had changed, so that Frederick Barbarossa was able to exert great political and military pressure on the Byzantines.<sup>100</sup> The exchange agreements between the German emperor and Isaac II, in 1190, were highly sophisticated. The Treaty of Adrianople quotes both the exchange rate of the mark of silver, in hyperpyra, *and* the equivalence between the hyperpyron and the billon trachy. One mark of (pure) silver would sell at 5.5 hyperpyra, each hyperpyron to be counted as being worth 120 stamena, whether these were old or new stamena.<sup>101</sup> Thus no one could play games by giving different rates for hyperpyra and stamena. According to another Western source, the exchange rate between the mark and the hyperpyron varied according to whether the mark was *non examinata* or *examinata*, that is, non-assayed or assayed, with a control stamp, in other words, impure or pure. In the first place, the exchange rate would be 3 hyperpyra to the mark, in the second, 5 hyperpyra to the mark.<sup>102</sup> The distinction may well have been made on the insistence, not of the Germans, but of Isaac II or, more likely, the money changers of Constantinople, who would otherwise have assumed the risk involved in changing impure silver ingots into gold hyperpyra. The rate offered for the impure mark represented considerable compensation for the risk of the money changers.

The rate of exchange between the hyperpyron and the pure mark of silver seems to be within the normal boundaries of the gold-silver ratio. The growing sophistication of exchange transactions is indicated by the fact that the treaty states the equivalences between the hyperpyron and the billon trachy. The equivalence 120 new (debased) stamena to the hyperpyron implies the overvaluation of the stamenon and thus its fiduciary nature. When the same equivalence is applied to the old stamenon, however, then the fiduciary nature of the coin is undermined, and the emperor abandons part of his seignorage, that is, the state's premium, the buying power that is over and above the intrinsic value of the coin. One may suppose that this latter equivalence was a special arrangement extracted by Frederick I and did not obtain in normal transactions in Constantinople.

Later in the century, in 1199, Pisan notarial records give the rate of 184 stamena to the hyperpyron.<sup>103</sup> This was undoubtedly the market (exchange) value current in Constantinople. There may have been a further devaluation of the billon trachy between

<sup>100</sup> Barbarossa's army must have brought quite a lot of money. The "Barbarossa hoard" contains 7,700 coins as well as ingots: Metcalf, *Coinage of the Crusades*, 8–10. The Byzantines, too, had learned that their coins were much sought after: as Frederick Barbarossa attacked the area of the monastery of Bačkovo, in the fall of 1189, its treasurer buried part of the annual budget: M. F. Hendy, "The Gornoslav Hoard, the Emperor Frederick I, and the Monastery of Bachkovo," in *idem*, *The Economy*, no. xi.

<sup>101</sup> Ansbert, 66; Hendy, *Coinage and Money*, 21–22. Hendy posits a devaluation of the billon trachy, which would have been the reason for this last provision.

<sup>102</sup> Hampe, "Ungedruckter Bericht," 400.

<sup>103</sup> Müller, *Documenti*, no. XLVII, p. 77; Hendy, *Coinage and Money*, 22.

1190 and 1199, although the coins of Alexios III do not show lower silver content than those of Isaac II.<sup>104</sup> But devaluation is not really what makes the difference between the negotiated rates of 1190 and the attested rates of 1199. Rather, the difference is due to a revaluation down of the billon trachy, to reflect a demand that would bring it closer to its intrinsic value, probably as a result of the double pressure of foreign merchants and Crusaders. Thus the highly overvalued equivalences mandated by the state in the 1130s were no longer effective, even though the face value of the stamenon remained lower than the nominal value; that is to say, the overvaluation of the billon trachy continued, but at lower levels than had obtained earlier. A hundred and fifty years later, Pegolotti wrote of the stamenon: “ma a questi stammini non si fa nullo pagamento se none in passaggio di Gostantinopoli per lo paese, e per erbe e cose minute.”<sup>105</sup>

In their exchange transactions with the Crusaders, the Byzantines seem to have made good money and shown considerable knowledge of monetary matters. The merchants must have played an important role in transactions on the ground, if only because exchange was so closely tied to the purchase of merchandise on the part of the Crusaders. Those merchants who had activities both with the countryside and with Constantinople would have profited very considerably, especially given the unequal exchange rates obtaining in the capital and in the provinces. The merchants would have acted also as money changers.

There are indications of such a development in the exceptional importance assumed by merchants and money changers in late twelfth-century Constantinople. The Treaty of Adrianople provides a first glimpse into this development, but it is a striking one. The treaty was guaranteed not only by the oaths of representatives of the two emperors and the confirmation of the patriarch, but also by the oaths of large numbers of their subjects. In the case of the crusading army, the oath was taken in Adrianople by 15,000 *milites*, in the presence of Byzantine ambassadors.<sup>106</sup> This was given in exchange for an oath taken in Constantinople, in the solemn precincts of Hagia Sophia, by “500 men of the marketplace and the court” (ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων καὶ τῆς βασιλείου ἀύλης),<sup>107</sup> who swore “that the emperor would keep the treaties inviolate and would give the leaders of the Germans safe passage and provisions.”<sup>108</sup> This is an unprecedented event in Byzantine international relations, with obvious constitutional overtones. The oath was undoubtedly demanded by Frederick Barbarossa, as Ansbert’s text suggests; and the men who took it, whom another source calls “quingenti de melioribus terrae,” were understood to have sworn “quod ipse rex Grechie concanbium bonum et forum rectum et omnium suorum tutelam sine mala fraude ineundo et redeundo postaret.”<sup>109</sup> The latter source is a letter, by an unknown author, that reports on the terms of the treaty as he heard them

<sup>104</sup> Hendy explains the drop in the value of the billon trachy between the time of John II and the end of the 12th century by the decline in fineness: *Studies*, 518. However, his own figures show that the rate of decline in fineness is *less* than the rate of decline in value.

<sup>105</sup> Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, *La pratica della mercatura*, ed. A. Evans, Medieval Academy of America Publication 24 (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), 40.

<sup>106</sup> Ansbert, 66.

<sup>107</sup> Ansbert, 66, calls them “quingenti homines meliores civitatis et imperii.”

<sup>108</sup> Choniates, ed. van Dieten, 411.

<sup>109</sup> Hampe, “Ungedruckter Bericht,” 399.

from “*cives noti qui . . . Constantinopoli fuerunt*”; the editor of the letter suggests, very plausibly, that the *cives noti* were (Italian) merchants.<sup>110</sup> These Italian merchants, then, understood that their equivalent Byzantines, the very men who would have been engaged in trade and money changing, were made to guarantee the Treaty of Adrianople. Was their oath (along with that of some of Isaac’s aristocrats) demanded by the German emperor because he was used to dealing with the “best men” of cities? Or were the “best” businessmen of Constantinople playing a new role in relations with Westerners, merchants, and states?

Here we must recall the near-contemporary affair of the piratical attack of summer 1192 and the subsequent negotiations, with which we began, and Isaac II’s efforts to get reparations for the goods of “the first among the merchants of Constantinople,” in whom it is legitimate to see a subgroup of the *meliiores terrae* of the Treaty of Adrianople.<sup>111</sup> It is pertinent to our discussion that it was these merchants (and money changers too, undoubtedly) who functioned as guarantors (ἐγγυηταί) of the goods of Genoese and Pisan merchants held in deposit. Thus they engaged in money business as well, a phenomenon already mentioned above in connection with the probable role of merchants in money transactions during the Crusades.<sup>112</sup> John Oxeobaphopoulos, who returned the deposit to the Genoese, bears a name that clearly connects him to the marketplace, for it means the “‘red’ purple dyer”; whether he was a silk manufacturer or a silk merchant, or both, or whether his was a family name, cannot, of course, be determined. Kalomodios, the one great merchant and money changer whose name and profession are explicitly attested, lived in the same period, during the reign of Alexios III. We also know that during Alexios III’s reign, cloth merchants and money changers and other tradesmen were able to buy honorific titles: οἱ ἐν τριόδοις καὶ ἀγοραῖς καὶ κολλυβισταὶ καὶ πραταὶ τῶν ὀθονῶν σεβαστοὶ ἐτιμήθησαν.<sup>113</sup>

The important and complex role of the Constantinopolitan merchant and banker is the result of many developments: the extensive commercial activity of the Byzantines in the twelfth century; the development of Byzantine-Italian relations, which, on the institutional front (and I mean legal and economic institutions), was proceeding at a rapid pace and creating new situations; and undoubtedly to some extent it was also due to the active role of the merchants and money changers in the negotiations with Crusaders and in the implementation of agreements. The Treaty of Adrianople did not create this group. But it gave its existence a certain solemnity; and it may have contributed something to this group’s apparently significant power in Constantinople, and so to the fact that its interests were very much taken into account in the state relations between the empire, Genoa, and Pisa—and in the discussion of the terms in which both trade and piracy were to be conducted. The expanded role of the merchants and money changers, which recalls the earlier developments of the eleventh century, was cut short by the events of 1204.

Would these developments have been different in degree or in kind without the pas-

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., 400 n. 5.

<sup>111</sup> Above, 157–59.

<sup>112</sup> Above, 176.

<sup>113</sup> Choniates, ed. van Dieten, 523–24, 483–84.

sage of the Crusader armies? One does not wish to engage in counterfactual argumentation. What may be stressed is the fact that relations between Crusaders and Byzantines, especially during the Second and Third Crusades, were arrangements between states. Thus they ratified and confirmed developments that may already have been taking place.

In sum, the Crusades (always speaking of the first three major movements) had a number of influences on the Byzantine terms of trade with Westerners. Sometimes the connection is obvious: thus the first Pisan commercial privileges incorporate a clause that anyone who travels on Pisan ships to Jerusalem “against the pagans” will suffer no impediment in terms of passage, or of *dapanai* (*stipendia* in the Latin text), which is not really the equivalent of *mercatus*, although it does refer to provisions, or in terms of their military equipment.<sup>114</sup> This guarantee of safe-conduct applied only to those Crusaders who would swear an oath to the Pisan ship captain not to harm the Byzantine Empire—hence R.-J. Lilie’s correct interpretation that those who did *not* swear not to harm the Byzantine Empire would not be guaranteed safe passage, and thus that there was a partial Byzantine boycott of the transport of Crusaders. These provisions bear considerable substantive similarity to the terms on which Bohemond had been allowed to recruit soldiers from Western Europe to Antioch, terms included in the Treaty of Devol, three years earlier.<sup>115</sup>

The connection between the two events is real at the political level. Since 1099 Alexios had been in conflict with Pisan and Genoese ships sailing to the Holy Land, absolutely parallel to the skirmishes and sometimes overt hostilities that took place with the passage of Crusader armies over land.<sup>116</sup> After Bohemond went west to raise troops for an anti-Byzantine crusade, Alexios tried to include the Pisans (as well as the Genoese and the Venetians) in his system of defense against Bohemond; the Pisans had engaged in hostile piratical action in the wake of the war with Bohemond (in 1111).<sup>117</sup> There is also a diplomatic connection, or a formal, institutional connection, since similar provisions found their way into commercial privileges very early indeed, and in treaties with the Crusaders (and Bohemond), almost from the beginning.

Such connections, however, I have not discussed, preferring instead to concentrate on other issues. Sometimes the crusading arrangements and those with Italian city-states were based on different principles: a combination of statism and free trade in the case of some arrangements with the Crusaders regarding markets and exchange rates, versus the free trade agreements that characterized, to a significant extent, the commercial privileges, and that created a market response to currency exchange rates in Constantinople. Sometimes the two form part of a developing global pattern, as was the case with repara-

<sup>114</sup> Müller, *Documenti*, no. xxxiv, pp. 44 and 53. This is the privilege of 1111, inserted into the treaty of 1192. Cf. R.-J. Lilie, *Handel und Politik: Zwischen dem byzantinischen Reich und den italienischen Kommunen Venedig, Pisa und Genua in der Epoche der Komnenen und der Angeloi (1081–1204)* (Amsterdam, 1984), 69 ff.

<sup>115</sup> *Alexiade* 13.12.17 (ed. Leib, 3:133): Bohemond agrees that all who cross the Adriatic with him will swear δουλείαν to the empire, in the person of a man whom Alexios will send to Italy (the equivalent of swearing an oath to the ship captain—in both cases, before departure): εἰ δ’ ἀποπηδῶσι τὸν ὄρκον, μὴ ἄλλως ἐᾶσαι διαπερᾶν ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ φρονεῖν ἡμῖν ἀπαναινομένους.

<sup>116</sup> *Alexiade* 11.10, 11 (ed. Leib, 3:42–48); Heyd, *Histoire du commerce*, 1:190–91.

<sup>117</sup> *Alexiade* 12.1.2, 14.3 (ed. Leib, 3:54, 154 ff). The Genoese had also participated in the piratical attacks.

tions and reprisal arrangements. Thus there were new ways of dealing with the Westerners in commercial matters; and this went in tandem with dealings with the Crusaders, one set of arrangements reinforcing the other.

Similarly, the bilateral agreements, confirmed by oaths, which we see most clearly in the Treaty of Adrianople, are a part of an evolving pattern of relationships with Western powers, primarily the crusading sovereigns and the maritime cities of Italy. Here, too, the Crusades are inscribed in a larger pattern of evolution, which includes the first bilateral state agreements (with Venice in 1186–87, with Pisa in the treaty of 1192, and with Genoa in 1155).<sup>118</sup> Scholars have pointed out that the chrysobull issued by Isaac II in February 1187 differs in form from earlier privileges, for it is clearly bilateral, incorporating, on the one hand, the obligations of the Venetians, and on the other hand, and in exchange, the concessions given by the Byzantine emperor.<sup>119</sup> This document preserves the traditional form in one important way: that the Venetians swear by oath to keep their promises, whereas the emperor's word is his chrysobull. The Treaty of Adrianople, on the other hand, is a bilateral convention in this also: that both parties swear an oath through their representatives and an exchange of presents, bilateral in Choniates,<sup>120</sup> unilateral in Ansbert.<sup>121</sup> Of constitutional significance for Byzantium, this conjunction of bilateral arrangements also suggests a pattern of international agreements between states, whether crusading or mercantile, agreements that undoubtedly reinforced each other.

## II. "International" Commercial Institutions

In political terms, we can detect in the Byzantine Empire a certain dissolution of native institutions regarding aspects of trade and the exercise of the merchant's profession. These then reappear in more general, Mediterranean, forms. In the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, one may see the elaboration of similar general provisions and institutions throughout the eastern Mediterranean, in the trade relations between Byzantines, other Christians, and Muslims.<sup>122</sup> In some instances, the first stages of

<sup>118</sup> Lilie, *Handel und Politik*, 82.

<sup>119</sup> M. Pozza and G. Ravegnani, eds., *I trattati con Bisanzio, 992–1198, Pacta veneta* (Venice, 1993), p. 80, and doc. 8, pp. 90 ff.

<sup>120</sup> Ed. van Dieten, 411.

<sup>121</sup> Ansbert, 64, 66; Choniates (ed. van Dieten, 411) says the "emperor and the king renewed their oaths"; Frederick's magnates gave the oath, and Isaac gave hostages. He then moves into the discussion of the oath taken in Constantinople.

<sup>122</sup> S. D. Goitein ("Mediterranean Trade in the Eleventh Century: Some Facts and Problems," in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, ed. M. A. Cook [London, 1970], 51–62) has argued that already in the 11th century, and before the Crusades, the "Mediterranean area gave the impression of a free-trade area." Here I argue that the Crusades and the Crusader states were instrumental in the development and spread of institutions that facilitated Mediterranean trade. Many important topics, for example, the institutional impact of Western trading stations in Egypt on the development of Italian trading colonies in Constantinople, are necessarily left out of this discussion. I also do not discuss the Amalfitan and Venetian trading stations in Constantinople. These predate the crusading period, but neither their existence nor their evolution is critical to the topics elaborated below.

development took place in the Byzantine Empire; in other cases in the Crusader states; in all cases the Crusader states played a pivotal role in this development.

In general terms, it may be argued that states give up some prerogatives in the general trend toward the free and safe movement of men and merchandise—as was also the case with the freedom from, or the reduction of, the *commercium*. This is a very rich topic, with many aspects to it. I should like to examine one example only: the law of salvage, which is connected with the law of reprisals and seems to be developing together with laws regarding the disposition of the goods of merchants dying in a host country. The first two have to do not only with the normal risks run by merchants who carried out their business at the mercy of the elements, but also with piracy, increasingly a problem in the Mediterranean in the twelfth century and after.<sup>123</sup> I will not deal with the evolving laws on reprisals here.

### *Salvage*

In the case of salvage, one must begin with the Byzantine law, which derived from but became stricter than the Roman (i.e., Justinianic) law of salvage. There are two aspects to the question: who has the right to salvaged goods, and what penalties there are for those who pilfer them. As to the first point, Justinianic law, repeated in the *Basilics*, is quite clear: the goods belong to their owner; there is no time limitation on his rights; and what he can salvage he may keep.<sup>124</sup> The Rhodian Sea Law adds some practical provisions that give a reward to those who help salvage the ship or the goods it carries, presumably in an effort to avoid looting: the people who help salvage a ship or parts of a ship are entitled to 1/5 of its value; if they find goods on land and return them, they get 1/10 of the value; and if they dive to salvage gold or silver or anything else, they are entitled to 1/3 or 1/2, depending on the depth.<sup>125</sup>

As for penalties for those who seize the goods of shipwrecks, while the Rhodian Sea Law does not mention any, in the *Basilics* there were very high financial penalties: within the first year, the pilferers had to restore to the owners the goods at their value in quadruple; after the first year, there was simple restitution.<sup>126</sup> This was the Roman, Justinianic, provision. But the *Procheiros Nomos* stated that after the first year the goods should be restored at double their value.<sup>127</sup> Custom, apparently, was even stricter than the law. A novel of Leo VI mentions the custom that mandated the death penalty for those who hid goods lost in shipwreck, for it was deemed a sin to deprive individuals of their wealth.

<sup>123</sup> The connection has been made by H. Ahrweiler, "Course et piraterie dans la Méditerranée orientale aux IV<sup>ème</sup>–XV<sup>ème</sup> siècles (empire byzantin)," in *Course et piraterie: Etudes présentées à la Commission Internationale d'Histoire Maritime à l'occasion de son XV<sup>e</sup> colloque internationale pendant le XIV<sup>e</sup> Congrès International des Sciences Historiques, San Francisco, 1975*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1975), 1:10, 16, 17–19. Salvage is connected with jettison, on which see O. R. Constable, "The Problem of Jettison in Medieval Mediterranean Maritime Law," *Journal of Medieval History* 20 (1994): 207–20.

<sup>124</sup> Bas. 53.3.23 = D 41.2.21, §§ 1.22 jo. D 16.3.18; Bas. 53.3.15 = D 14.2.7.

<sup>125</sup> Bas. 53, appendix, pt. 2, nos. 45, 46, 47. The Rhodian Sea Law has many other provisions regarding shipwreck, but they deal with the respective rights of the captain and the merchants aboard the ship. See, e.g., nos. 27, 29, 37, 40.

<sup>126</sup> Bas. 60.20.1 = D 47.9.1; cf. Cod. 4.2.18.

<sup>127</sup> Pr. 39.25 (= *Eisagoge* 40.28), in Zepos, *Jus* 2:218, 361.

The emperor delivered himself of a somewhat rhetorical argument by analogy, to show that the death penalty was too heavy a punishment for a sin that is, after all, a crime of property: it is not just, he argues, to take an immaterial and immortal thing, one's soul, in compensation for material and perishable things.<sup>128</sup> Instead, the emperor restored the Roman penalty of a fine at four times the value of the objects in question, payable to the owner, although he gave no limitation of time, that is, the fine was not reduced after one year had elapsed.

However, it would seem that all of this legislation applied only to Byzantine subjects, not to foreigners. What happened in the case of foreigners in the early and middle Byzantine period is not clear. The question of salvage came up in the Russo-Byzantine treaty of 911, where the Rus and the Byzantines engaged themselves to help each other's ships during a tempest; if there was a shipwreck, and the goods were pilfered or the sailors/merchants were murdered, the penalties for theft and murder would apply.<sup>129</sup> In the twelfth century, it would seem that the goods aboard the ships of foreigners not covered by treaties and wrecked in Byzantine waters were considered to belong to the fisc: indirect evidence to that effect is to be found in the chrysobull for Pisa (1111) and in an incident ca. 1200.<sup>130</sup> The Seljuks and the Latin rulers of Cyprus in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century apparently also considered that such goods belonged to the fisc.

Quite early in Byzantine relations with the Westerners, clauses referring to shipwreck and salvage were incorporated in Imperial privileges. The treaties with Venice did not incorporate any such clauses, presumably because the Venetians, treated as Byzantine subjects, were covered by Byzantine law. Pisa was another matter. The chrysobull of 1111 was the first commercial privilege granted to an Italian power whose friendship was not a given, and with which, indeed, there had already been hostilities at sea. The Pisans requested and received a privilege regarding both piracy and shipwreck.<sup>131</sup> It constitutes a key text in some respects. The emperor promised that if there was shipwreck in Byzantine waters, the Pisans could have without impediment their salvaged goods (the implication is that until then they could not). If some Byzantines helped salvage goods, the Pisans were allowed to keep those too, after making payment "according to the custom of the place, or according to any agreement they may have made." While this was less than what had been agreed with the Rus, since no help was promised, it did lift the impediments on the recovery of shipwrecked goods. The Pisans retained the ownership of salvaged goods and had to pay those who helped recover them. But the emperor did not guarantee the safety of these goods.

This is a highly simplified and attenuated form of the Byzantine law on salvage. We next find legislation on salvage in the privileges granted to Italian merchants in the vari-

<sup>128</sup> P. Noailles and A. Dain, *Les Nouvelles de Léon VI le Sage* (Paris, 1944), novel 64.

<sup>129</sup> I. Sorlin, "Les traités de Byzance avec la Russie au Xe siècle," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 3 (1961): 334, 357; in 944 the Rus engage themselves not to harm shipwrecked Byzantine ships; those who steal goods will be judged according to Byzantine law: *ibid.*, 4 (1961): 450, 461.

<sup>130</sup> Below, 184.

<sup>131</sup> Müller, *Documenti*, no. xxxiv, p. 44. The clause on piracy says that if a Pisan ship is seized in Byzantine waters and goods are taken by Byzantine subjects, the emperor will examine the matter and do the right thing, at the right time.

ous Crusader states, where they appear in a simple but significantly stronger form. The first mention is in the privilege granted to the Venetians by the king of Jerusalem in 1123, as repayment for their help in the siege of Tyre: “Si vero aliquis Veneticorum naufragium passus fuerit, *nullum de suis rebus patiatur dampnum*.” Significantly, this is followed by the clause “si naufragio mortuus fuerit, suis heredibus aut aliis Veneticis res sue remanentes reddantur,” that is, the heirs of the shipwrecked person or other Venetians retained their rights on his property.<sup>132</sup> Exactly the same clause was inserted in the privilege given by Baldwin II, king of Jerusalem (1118–31) to the Venetians; Renault of Châtillon, regent of Antioch, and Bohemond III gave similar privileges in 1153 and 1167, respectively.<sup>133</sup> There was an implicit guarantee given in these treaties, certainly greater than the mere permission to recover their goods that Alexios I Komnenos had given to the Pisans. Although no penalties are mentioned for those who seized goods, the state did promise their safety, a clause almost certain to eventually lead to reprisals.

Some years later, the Byzantines also gave new guarantees to Italian merchants; in substance they are similar to the implicit guarantees given by the Crusader states, but in form they are more developed. In 1169 Manuel I was trying to bring Genoa into an anti-German alliance and was also negotiating a commercial treaty. He stated that in case of shipwreck, if goods were seized by someone, he, the emperor, charged himself with avenging the ill done and restoring the goods to the Genoese: “fiat de his vindicta a majestate mea et restauratio hujusmodi rerum” (“My majesty will give satisfaction and restore these goods”).<sup>134</sup> This clause was incorporated in the treaty of 1192, which states: καὶ ἐὰν πλοῖον Γενοῦτικὸν ἀφ’ οἰουδήτινος τόπου ἐρχόμενον εἰς Ῥωμανίαν κινδυνεύσῃ καὶ συμβῆ τινὰ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πραγμάτων ἀφαιρεθῆναι ὑπὸ τινῶν, ἵνα γένηται πρὸς ταῦτα τῆς βασιλείας μου ἐκδίκησις καὶ ἐπανάσσωσις τῶν τοιοῦτων πραγμάτων.<sup>135</sup>

There seems to be a development that would bring the treatment of shipwrecked Italian ships closer to that of Byzantine subjects; in 1169 Manuel, unlike Alexios in 1111, guarantees the return of the merchandise of the Genoese, and if the penalty of the quadruple does not appear, the word *vindicta* in the text suggests punishment. Like the privileges granted earlier by the Crusader states, this is, I believe, partly an effort to preclude

<sup>132</sup> The privilege also is the first one to state that if a Venetian dies in Tyre, his property goes to the Venetian authorities: William of Tyre, 12.25 (1:577 ff); cf. G. L. F. Tafel and G. Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig*, Fontes rerum Austriacarum, Diplomataria et acta 12–14, 3 vols. (Vienna, 1856–57), 1:79 ff.

<sup>133</sup> Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden*, 1:92, 134, 148–49. Cf. also the privilege of Renault of Châtillon to Pisa in 1154, with return of goods to heirs: Müller, *Documenti*, no. iv; privilege to Pisa by Bohemond III in 1170, with return of goods to heirs: Müller, *Documenti*, no. xiii; cf. Venice and the Seljuks, Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden*, 2:484–86 (1254). On the early privileges granted to Italian merchants in crusader Syria and Palestine, cf. M. Balard, “Les républiques maritimes italiennes et le commerce en Syrie-Palestine (XIe–XIIIe siècles),” *Anuario de estudios medievales* 24 (1994): 313–48, and J. Riley-Smith, “Government in Latin Syria and the Commercial Privileges of Foreign Merchants,” in *Relations between East and West in the Middle Ages*, ed. D. Baker (Edinburgh, 1973), 109–32.

<sup>134</sup> Bertolotto, *Nuova serie*, 351; Balard, *La Romanie génoise*, 1:28 ff.

<sup>135</sup> Miklosich and Müller, 3:36.

reprisals. But one may also suggest that the Italians, having received a greater guarantee from the Crusader states, returned to Byzantium asking here, too, for better guarantees.

In the 1180s, Andronikos I passed a measure of exceptional harshness toward those who pilfered shipwrecks. Choniates, who reports the measure, informs us that from time to time Byzantine emperors passed laws on salvage, although, after the Rhodian Sea Law, the only extant legislation, to my knowledge, is the Macedonian one, including Leo VI's novel. But he also says that the laws were not applied and complains that there was a long-standing custom, found only among the Byzantines, that ships that foundered or were cast ashore were not helped by the inhabitants; rather, the natives seized anything that the sea did not.<sup>136</sup> Andronikos' measure is not transmitted in the form of a novel, but is rather in that of an *entole*, an order addressed to his relatives and the imperial officials.<sup>137</sup>

The emperor begins by saying that he believes his predecessors were incapable of exacting obedience to their laws because they only pretended to wish to put a stop to this evil; if they had really wanted to, they would have punished it with the death penalty. He himself wants to stop practices that harm the commonweal, especially the custom of seizing the cargo of shipwrecks and sometimes even demolishing the ship. The penalty he decrees is harsh: those who do not heed his orders will be hanged from the ship's mast or will be impaled on the coast, so that they will be visible from afar and become a lesson to those who see them. Andronikos holds responsible not only those who physically plunder the ships, but also the imperial officials who govern the area, as well as the landlords whose tenants engage in such activities. Given Andronikos' reputation as a man of his word, Choniates tells us that the officials wrote to those who ruled the provinces in their names, and the landlords to their agents, not to harm the shipwrecks. As a result, nothing was stolen, no ships were destroyed, no anchors taken away, and the people of the coastlands as well as the officials helped the shipwrecked sailors and merchants to recover all their possessions.<sup>138</sup>

Choniates relates this imperial order at some length, using it as the single detailed illustration of his general statement that Andronikos tried to ease the lot of the poorer people, partly by insisting on fair and predictable taxation (no multiplication of dues), and partly by stopping the sale of offices and by appointing officials who would not use their office to enrich themselves. It is thus presented as part of the populist policy of this otherwise hateful (at least to Choniates) emperor. But it is, in fact, much more than that.

It is a stage in the development of a law of the sea, established in a harsh and inelegant way, to be sure, that aims to protect merchants and to minimize claims. Although noth-

<sup>136</sup> Choniates, ed. van Dieten, 326: ἔθους . . . ἀλογωτάτου. Interestingly, Hugh I of Lusignan, in his treaty with the sultan of Konya (1216), also mentions that such an unjust custom prevailed in Cyprus (κατὰ τὴν ἐπικρατήσασαν ἄδικον συνήθειαν)—from Byzantine days? See S. Lambros, “Ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ ὡς ἐπίσημος γλώσσα τῶν Σουλτάνων,” *Νέος Ἑλλ.* 5 (1908): 49. A much later text, from the 1320s, gives details about people who cause shipwrecks in order to steal the goods aboard ship—a simple form of piracy: Theodoulos Monachos, *Περὶ βασιλείας*, PG 145:481–84; cf. Ahrweiler, “Course et piraterie,” 17 ff.

<sup>137</sup> Dölger, *Regesten*, no. 1566, s.a.

<sup>138</sup> Choniates, ed. van Dieten, 326–39; Skoutareiotos in K. Sathas, *Μεσαιωνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη*, vol. 7 (Paris, 1894), 350; cf. A. Laiou, “Byzantine Traders and Seafarers,” in *The Greeks and the Sea*, ed. S. Vryonis Jr. (New Rochelle, N.Y., 1993), 89–90.

ing in the text suggests that this was prompted by foreign merchants or was to apply to them, the international implications are clear. Even Choniates' opening statement, that this was "an extremely irrational custom that is practiced only among the Romans" suggests that international concerns were present. Andronikos' measure was made necessary both because of the increased volume of maritime trade and because the increased presence of foreign merchants created a situation where the emperor was responding to pressures for safety in sailing, pressures coming not only from his own subjects but also from foreigners. The measure carries imperial orders one step further: people are to help salvage goods. And it is general enough to be applicable to both Byzantine and foreign shipping, despite Andronikos' well-known hostility to the Latins.

Indeed, a number of incidents in the Black Sea at the turn of the century show both the need for a proper law of salvage and the fact that the powers of the area still considered that, in the absence of treaties to the contrary, salvaged goods belonged to the fisc. One incident implicated merchants both Byzantine and Turkish. Around 1200,<sup>139</sup> Alexios III sent to the Black Sea a certain Constantine Frangopoulos, ostensibly to examine the cargo of a ship sailing from Phasis and shipwrecked near Kerasous—a clear indication that the fisc was claiming goods salvaged from foreign ships.<sup>140</sup> The man, perhaps on imperial orders, perhaps (as Alexios later claimed) not, plundered merchantmen sailing to and from Constantinople, near Samsous, it seems,<sup>141</sup> and killed some of the merchants. The loot—or part of it—came to Alexios who added it to his treasury, oblivious to the complaints of the merchants. But some of them were subjects of the sultan of Konya. Since this happened at a time when a treaty (or the renewal of a treaty)<sup>142</sup> was being discussed, the sultan tied the treaty negotiations with the reparation demands of the merchants. Eventually, the sultan got, along with other things, "50 pounds of silver" as damages for his merchants.<sup>143</sup> The other incident happened in 1223 and involved Russian merchants fleeing Sudak and shipwrecked near Sinope. The Turks claimed the right to keep salvaged goods, "according to a custom with regard to a place where there existed no concessions."<sup>144</sup>

The laws on salvage, which began in the Byzantine Empire, developed significantly in the Crusader states and returned to Byzantium to develop further. They spread all over the eastern Mediterranean in the thirteenth century, in one form or another, depending on the model that was being followed.

The treaties between the sultan of Konya Kaikaus I and Hugh I of Lusignan of Cyprus in 1216 contain clauses on both piracy and salvage, as does the Byzantine-Genoese treaty

<sup>139</sup> Dölger, *Regesten*, no. 1658 (1201); cf. C. Cahen, *La Turquie pré-ottomane*, *Varia turcica* 7 (Istanbul-Paris, 1988), 64, 122–23.

<sup>140</sup> Similar rights were claimed by Kaikaus in 1216; cf. below, 184–85.

<sup>141</sup> Samsous had fallen to the Turks shortly before 1194; Cahen, *La Turquie pré-ottomane*, 64.

<sup>142</sup> There were earlier treaties with Kaikaus I of Konya, which Alexios broke (perhaps in 1198), again by attacking the properties (merchandise and animals—ὑποζύγια) of Greek and Turkish merchants, subjects of the sultan: Choniates, ed. van Dieten, 493–94.

<sup>143</sup> Choniates, ed. van Dieten, 529: εἰς ἀπόδομα ᾧν οἱ ἔμποροι ἀφῆρέθησαν. Dölger, *Regesten*, no. 1658 (the sultan was Rukn al-Din). Reparations for goods seized by the fisc were also given to the Venetians, after the seizure of their goods by Manuel I in 1171—again, a parallel development.

<sup>144</sup> Cahen, *La Turquie pré-ottomane*, 125. The quotation is from Cahen.

of 1192. In both states it seems that salvaged goods of foreigners were seized; the treaties put an end to that, promising the return of the surviving men and their merchandise.<sup>145</sup> Hugh I promised that if pirates attack and pillage a ship and its merchandise and go to Cyprus, the spoils will be returned to the rightful owners, if the king captures the pirates. And in cases of shipwreck, “the surviving men as well as the salvaged goods shall be kept safe and restored, and not seized as per the prevailing unjust custom”; similar provisions, although somewhat differently worded, were included in the sultan’s letter to Hugh, which repeats and confirms the terms of the treaty.<sup>146</sup>

A few years later, in 1220, Alaeddin Kaikobad, sultan of Konya, signed a treaty with Jacopo Tiepolo, *podestà* of the Venetians in Constantinople. A lengthy clause addresses the issue of salvage and, in vaguer terms, of piracy (or rather, of Venetian ships being chased by ships of other powers). On the issue of shipwreck, the sultan promises not only that the goods of Venetians would be restored, but also that his subjects would help the Venetians recover them—a clause that appears only in the Russian–Byzantine treaty of 911 and implicitly in Andronikos’ measure.<sup>147</sup>

The same privilege was given to the Venetians by the lord of Rhodes, the Caesar Leo Gabalas, in 1234: “et omnes a gente mea habebunt subsidium et favorem.”<sup>148</sup> The privilege granted by Theodore I Laskaris to the Venetians (Jacopo Tiepolo again) in 1219 contains two clauses that make reciprocal arrangements for ships and merchants of the two powers, to return their property to the men who survive the shipwreck. The Venetians are given the added privilege, contained already in the Byzantine privilege of 1198, but appearing for the first time in the *Pactum Warmundi* in 1123, that the goods of Venetians who died in the Empire of Nicaea would revert to their heirs.<sup>149</sup> Italian treaties with Egypt, after the middle of the thirteenth century, also incorporate clauses promising safety for men and goods in case of shipwreck.<sup>150</sup>

What all of this indicates is that a law of the sea was developing in the twelfth century and into the thirteenth, which regulated certain important matters and which eventually applied to all merchants active in the area and to the states whose subjects they were.

<sup>145</sup> Lambros, “Ἡ Ἑλληνική,” 48–50; A. Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East: Its Relations with the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum in Asia Minor, the Armenians of Cilicia and the Mongols, A.D. c. 1192–1237*, Byzantina keimena kai meletai 17 (Thessaloniki, 1981), 141–42; C. Cahen, “Le commerce anatolien au début du XIIIe siècle,” in idem, *Turcobyzantina et Oriens Christianus* (London, 1974), no. XII, 93.

<sup>146</sup> Lambros, “Ἡ Ἑλληνική,” 52.

<sup>147</sup> Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden*, 2:223; the reciprocal privilege to the sultan’s men is found on pp. 223–34; it includes a clause that, if the man dies, his property will be given to his heirs, which harks back to the Venetian privileges in the *Pactum Warmundi* and the Byzantine treaty of 1198 (Pozza and Ravegnani, *I trattati*, doc. 11, p. 136). The sultan also promises that any Crusaders found on Venetian ships will not be imprisoned but will be freed. There do not seem to be extant privileges to the Genoese: Cahen, “Le commerce anatolien,” 98–99.

<sup>148</sup> Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden*, 2:321–22; cf. M. Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea, 1204–1261* (London, 1975), 114. Again, no privileges to the Genoese seem to have been issued.

<sup>149</sup> Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden*, 2:206–7.

<sup>150</sup> See, for example, the treaty with Venice, in 1254, Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden*, 2:484: “et omnes Veneti sint salui et securi in personis et hauere et toto suo navigio.” Cf. the treaty of 1290 with Genoa, and of 1281 with Byzantium (below, 189–91).

Italian merchants, Byzantines, and Turks were all covered by the same protections, at least in the law of salvage. Crusader states, the sultanate of Konya, the Byzantine Empire, and then the Empire of Nicaea, and Egypt, incorporated in their agreements with each other the same or similar arrangements. There are intriguing connecting lines between some of these agreements: for example, the occasional appearance in this connection of the guarantee of the inheritance of merchants dying abroad; the similarities in phraseology between the treaties of Hugh of Cyprus and Kaikaus I on the one hand, and Manuel I's agreements with the Genoese on the other. Most important, not in any intrinsic way, but for our topic, is the similar concern expressed by Andronikos I and Hugh I of Cyprus regarding the "unjust custom" (ἐπικρατήσασαν ἄδικον συνήθειαν) (Hugh I) or the irrational custom (ἔθους ἀλογωτάτου) (Andronikos I) of plundering shipwrecks. Both men opposed this custom, and treaties incorporated clauses that forbade the seizure of goods and sometimes pledged help for their recovery. There was, thus, an effort throughout the eastern Mediterranean to improve the conditions of trade and travel, an effort that almost certainly originated with the concerns of Western merchants and Crusaders, who plied these seas, but that led to measures that became generally adopted. Political considerations connected with the politics of crusading and the Crusader states were important indeed for the adoption and spread of such institutions, but the motive force behind them was commercial. The old Byzantine laws regulating these issues became simplified as their substance was generally adopted. Gone is the distinction between the first year of the seizure of goods and subsequent years; gone also the obligation to return the goods in quadruple for the first year; these elements had disappeared already at the time of Andronikos I, but equally, his extremely severe measures were unique to him. Complex arrangements would have been impossible to implement in this mobile world, hence the simplicity. The simplification is evident as early as the Pisan privilege of 1111, which, along with the *Pactum Warmundi*, is the basic document.

The law of the sea and mercantile law were also constantly evolving, as may be seen from the provisions regarding the goods of men dying outside their own country, whether with a testament or intestate. While this issue cannot be examined here, it may be noted that the process of its development is very similar to that of the law of salvage. The principle of the devolution of property to a man's heirs or his fellow nationals, rather than to the fisc of the country in which he died, a very important principle for merchants, appears first in the privilege granted to the Genoese by Baldwin I of Jerusalem (1105)<sup>151</sup> and the *Pactum Warmundi* in 1123. It then took the form of the return of the goods to Venetian authorities, but by the middle of the twelfth century, in the Crusader states, the right devolved to the heirs.<sup>152</sup> In the Byzantine Empire such certainly was not yet the practice in 1165–66, when the considerable property of the Pisan merchant Signoretto, who was also a *burgensis*, was claimed by the fisc.<sup>153</sup> It appears for the first time in the treaty of 1198 with Venice. There can be no doubt that this principle devel-

<sup>151</sup> C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, ed., *Codice diplomatico della repubblica di Genova*, 3 vols., Fonti per la storia d'Italia 77, 79, 89 (Rome, 1936–42), 1: no. 15, pp. 20 ff.

<sup>152</sup> See above, note 129.

<sup>153</sup> Müller, *Documenti*, no. x, pp. 11–13.

oped in the Crusader states, traveled to Byzantium some ninety years later, and became generalized in the eastern Mediterranean, including Egypt, in the course of the thirteenth century.

### III. Trading with Muslims

Regarding Byzantine trade with the Muslims during the period of the Crusades, the available information is sporadic and can perhaps best be understood in the light of what has already been said regarding the institutional and structural changes in the conditions of trade in the Byzantine Empire and in the eastern Mediterranean generally.<sup>154</sup> Quite as was the case with Western merchants, the ideology of Holy War did not interrupt trade between the Byzantines and the Muslims; the opposite in fact was the case with Western merchants,<sup>155</sup> whose presence and business in Egypt increased in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, with a short interruption for a few years after 1187. Byzantine trade with Egypt continued in the course of the twelfth century, as we know from the testimony of Benjamin of Tudela,<sup>156</sup> as well as from a few narrative and documentary sources such as the affair regarding the piratical activities of Guglielmo Grasso and his fellow corsairs. However, S. Goitein's statement that the Geniza documents show a shift of importance, suggesting an increased presence of Western merchants relative to the Byzantines, must stand.

Some other observations may also be made. The relations of the Byzantines with Muslim powers had always had a strong political and military component, which overwhelmed private and commercial relations, existent but difficult to discern in the sources. The statement has been made by M. Canard with regard to the tenth century.<sup>157</sup> It remains true in the twelfth century and then again in the second half of the thirteenth and the fourteenth century, for the Byzantines not only had political and ceremonial relations with the Muslim rulers of Egypt, but also considered themselves and were considered by others as having a special role to play in the protection of the Christian populations of the Egyptian state. As a result, virtually all of the commercial contacts that are visible to us from Byzantine or Muslim sources appear in the context of political relations. It is primarily the Geniza documents that show an ongoing commercial activity of the Byzantines in the eleventh and twelfth centuries that is quite independent of official exchanges of embassies.

<sup>154</sup> On the topic generally, cf. S. Labib, "Egyptian Commercial Policy in the Middle Ages," in Cook, *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East* (as above, note 122), 63–77, and idem, *Handelsgeschichte Ägyptens im Spätmittelalter, 1171–1517*, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Beihefte 46 (Wiesbaden, 1965).

<sup>155</sup> D. Jacoby, "Les Italiens en Égypte aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles: Du comptoir à la colonie?" in *Coloniser au Moyen Âge*, ed. M. Balard and A. Ducellier (Paris, 1995), 78 ff.

<sup>156</sup> Benjamin bar Jonah of Tudela, *The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela*, trans. M. Adler, A. Asher, ed. M. Singer (Malibu, Calif., 1993), 70.

<sup>157</sup> M. Canard, "Deux épisodes des relations diplomatiques arabo-byzantines au Xe siècle," in idem, *Byzance et les musulmans du Proche Orient* (London, 1973), no. XII, p. 51. On trade see, among others, P. von Sivers, "Taxes and Trade in the Arab Thugur, 750–962/133–351," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 25 (1982): 71–99.

An interesting mention of Byzantine merchants in the early twelfth century shows them having quite a prominent position in Alexandria. The information comes from Orderic Vitalis, who notes, in 1102, the presence in Cairo of merchants from Constantinople, *multimodis mercimoniis*. He says that, according to the laws of the people (or of nations—*leges gentium*), they paid the required taxes and stayed there for some time. They were very rich, and during their stay they visited churches, the poor Christians, and the Latin captives who had been brought to Cairo after the fall of Ramleh. They are credited with persuading Alexios I to blackmail the sultan into releasing Arpin of Bourges, under the threat that otherwise he, Alexios, would “have all the Egyptian factors and mercenaries in the whole Empire of Constantinople arrested” (“omnes Babilonicos institores et stipendiarios per totum imperium Constantinopolitanum comprehendere iuberet”).<sup>158</sup> According to this account, Byzantine merchants seem to have been visiting Cairo in a routine fashion, staying for certain periods of time; they paid commercial duties, and their movements, at least within the city, were not restricted. Anna Komnene mentions that the emperor heard of the imprisonment of many famous Crusader knights and sent “a certain Vardales” and gave him letters to the sultan along with a great deal of money.<sup>159</sup> The phrase *τινὰ Βαρδαλῆν* suggests that this was not a prominent courtier and may, indeed, have been a merchant.

In the course of the twelfth century, trade with Egypt seems to have been connected, to some extent, with political relations intimately related to the Crusades: the clearest example is the combined ambassadorial and trade mission to Saladin in 1192, which had the unhappy end that we have mentioned.<sup>160</sup> Its main purpose had been diplomatic, while trade (and gift exchange) played an important but secondary role.

There were also changes in the commercial relations between Byzantines and Muslims during the period in question. The Fourth Crusade reoriented the trade of the Byzantines (the Empire of Nicaea) with the Muslims. Relations with Egypt were interrupted. Very few embassies (I count two) are attested from the Empire of Nicaea to Egypt, and their object was either ceremonial or unknown to us.<sup>161</sup> There are no indications anywhere of continuing trade relations with Egypt; the inward-looking policy of the Nicene emperors and the sumptuary laws passed by John III Vatatzes<sup>162</sup> would suggest that the absence of information is not a matter of chance but reflects the reality of very limited relations. On the other hand, political contacts with the sultanate of Konya were frequent, and, although there is again very limited information about trade relations, one may assume that they existed; their extent is impossible to recover. In the late twelfth century, there had been an active trade between the sultanate of Rum and Constantinople, through the Black Sea.<sup>163</sup> But we have little information regarding Black Sea commerce between 1204 and 1261. We find here Venetians and Turks, with the

<sup>158</sup> Orderic Vitalis, 5.351–52. Arpin may have been the prior of Charité-sur-Loire: *ibid.*, p. 350 n. 1. Albert of Aix attributes Arpin's release to a Byzantine knight: RHC, HOcc 4:594.

<sup>159</sup> *Alexiade* 11.7.3 (ed. Leib, 3:33); cf. Dölger, *Regesten*, no. 1216.

<sup>160</sup> Ibn al-Athīr also mentions Greeks, along with “Franks,” in Acre in 1187: RHC, HOrient, vol. 1 (Paris, 1872), 689.

<sup>161</sup> Dölger, *Regesten*, nos. 1713a (1226) and 1763a (after 13 Aug. 1238).

<sup>162</sup> Dölger, *Regesten*, no. 1777 (early 1243).

<sup>163</sup> See above, 184, during the reigns of Andronikos I and Alexios III.

Empire of Trebizond fighting to retain some control. Trade with Constantinople would have bypassed the Nicene Empire. The sultans of Rum had developed a very significant trade network including central Anatolia and the ports of the southern coasts and the Black Sea coast, cemented by the capture of Sinope (1214) and Attaleia (1207) and the establishment of a Seljukid protectorate in Sudak in 1225.<sup>164</sup> How much this commercial flourishing involved the Empire of Nicaea is not certain; it has been suggested that commercial relations between Nicaea and Konya increased after the Mongol invasion of Asia Minor in 1243.<sup>165</sup>

What is certain is that at least at one point, at a time of famine in the Seljuk state, there were massive exports of grain, sheep, goats, oxen, and other foodstuffs from Nicaea to the Seljuks; according to Gregoras, all the wealth of the Turks, in gold, silver, precious textiles, and other luxury objects, was drained into the coffers of both the state and private individuals.<sup>166</sup> The export of wheat, forbidden in Byzantium for centuries,<sup>167</sup> seems to have been entirely free in this instance.

With the recovery of Constantinople, there was, once again, a political and to some degree economic reorientation toward Egypt. Of primary importance to the Mamluks, and also important for the nexus of relationships between the Byzantines and the Muslims, was the slave trade, which brought to Egypt slaves for its armies from the Crimea through Constantinople. Almost immediately after the recovery of the capital, Emperor Michael VIII and the Egyptian sultan Baibars exchanged embassies regarding the importation of slaves from the Black Sea.<sup>168</sup> Relations with Egypt went through ups and downs after 1264–65, but in 1281 there was, once again, a treaty between Michael VIII and the new sultan, Qalawun. This was the time when Michael VIII was engaged in full-scale hostilities with Charles of Anjou, and the original plan of the treaty incorporated a clause that would have guaranteed that Michael VIII would have denied free passage to anyone who wanted to go through his state to attack the Egyptians.<sup>169</sup>

The treaty of 1281, which has been published and analyzed by Canard, embodies some elements important to our topic. It should be read in conjunction with the treaty signed in 1290 between Qalawun and the Genoese,<sup>170</sup> and against the background of

<sup>164</sup> Cahen, "Le commerce anatolien," 94–95.

<sup>165</sup> Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile*, 115–16.

<sup>166</sup> Nikephoros Gregoras, *Byzantina historia*, ed. L. Schopen and I. Bekker, 3 vols. (Bonn, 1829–55), 1:42–43.

<sup>167</sup> Cf. Leo VI's novel 63, Noailles and Dain, pp. 231–33 (but it does not mention grain specifically; it deals with punishment of export of *kekolymena* generally).

<sup>168</sup> George Pachymeres, *Relations historiques*, ed. A. Failler (Paris, 1984), 234; cf. 243, relations with Nogai. Gregoras (Bonn ed.), 1:101–2, makes the explicit connection with the Egyptian need to sail to the northern coast of the Black Sea once a year, to procure slaves. Cf. Dölger, *Regesten*, nos. 1902–4 (Nov. 1261–Nov. 1262); M. Canard, "Le traité de 1281 entre Michel Paléologue et le Sultan Qala'un," *Byzantion* 10 (1935): 669–80.

<sup>169</sup> Canard, "Le traité," 679. Canard thinks that this clause was dropped because Charles of Anjou reached an agreement with Qalawun. It may be noted that Michael VIII, despite a treaty with Baibars in 1261, renewed in 1267, had undertaken the obligation of joining a crusade against Egypt in 1274–76: D. J. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West: A Study in Byzantine-Latin Relations* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 285–94.

<sup>170</sup> Latin text published by Antoine Isaac Sylvestre de Sacy, *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi* (Paris, 1827), 33–52 (p. 42); 33, 40: reciprocal vs. simple guarantee of shipwrecked goods; p. 38 on the goods of merchants dying abroad. The Arabic text is translated by P. M. Holt, "Qalawun's Treaty with Genoa in 1290," *Der Islam* 57 (1980): 101–8.

other treaties signed between the Egyptians and the maritime cities of Italy in the course of the thirteenth century. Such a reading reveals the following. The treaty of 1281 includes reciprocal clauses guaranteeing the free access of the merchants of both countries to the markets of both countries, against payment of the appropriate dues. Such a clause is usual in all treaties of the period.<sup>171</sup> Other clauses, which had been general in the Mediterranean since the thirteenth century, include the statement that neither state would take reprisals against the merchants of the other for piratical activities undertaken in its territorial waters or by people who claimed to be its subjects; reprisals could only be taken against the individuals guilty of the act of piracy.<sup>172</sup> A clause that is unique to this document has to do with the right of the Byzantines to buy off Christian slaves and the right of freed Christian slaves to sail to the Byzantine Empire. The treaty allows the Egyptians to export Byzantine wheat: an interesting clause because the Palaiologan emperors tried mightily to restrict the export of Byzantine wheat by Western merchants: in the treaty of 1265 with Venice, export was permitted only after its price in Constantinople was under 50 hyperpyra per kentenarion, which rose to 100 hyperpyra in the treaty of 1277, while treaties with the Genoese allowed export only after specific imperial permission.<sup>173</sup> The reciprocal privilege allows Byzantine merchants to buy thoroughbred horses in the Egyptian possessions. The principle of free access to markets and merchandise extends even to the controlled wheat trade.

On the other hand, this treaty lacks the very detailed provisions regarding residence, the payment of duties, exemption from forced purchases, relations with customs officials, relations with the fisc (what happens to the property of foreign merchants dying in the state), and relations between individuals (resolution of private disputes and debts) that appear in the treaties between the Italian maritime states and Egypt or Byzantium. What this suggests is that the commercial relations between Egypt and the Byzantines, which we know existed,<sup>174</sup> were nowhere nearly as extensive as those of the Italian merchants and these two states. Thus the same general principles of trade existed between the Byzantines, the Christian merchants, and the Muslims (and similarly between the Egyptians and Byzantine and Western merchants), but the realities of trade were that Byzantine relations with Egypt were much more heavily political than economic/commercial in nature.

What distinguishes Michael VIII's treaty with Qalawun from most others is the insistence of the Egyptians to have freedom of access to the Black Sea area ("le pays de

<sup>171</sup> Cf., e.g., Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden*, 3:68 (treaty between Michael VIII and Venice, 1265); cf. *ibid.*, 141–43, 146 (treaty of 1277). Similar though not identical provisions in the Arab text of the treaty between Genoa and Qalawun in 1290: Holt, "Qalawun's Treaty," 106.

<sup>172</sup> Canard, "Le traité," 677–80. There is, however, nothing on shipwreck, which, on the contrary, appears in both Venetian-Byzantine treaties and treaties between the Egyptians and Western maritime cities. See, for example, Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden*, 3:73, 144 (with Byzantium, 1265, 1277), and 2:338–39, 484–85 (Venetian-Egyptian treaties of 1238 and 1254). Cf. Holt, "Qalawun's Treaty," 102.

<sup>173</sup> A. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 65, 73; eadem, "The Byzantine Economy in the Mediterranean Trade System," in eadem, *Gender, Society and Economic Life in Byzantium* (Hampshire, 1992), no. vii, 213. On the grain trade see also J. Chrysostomides, "Venetian Commercial Privileges under the Palaeologi," *StVen* 12 (1970): 267–356.

<sup>174</sup> See, for example, Bertolotto, *Nuova serie*, 521 (ca. 1290), and Theodore Metochites, *AASS*, Nov. 4: 672.

Sudaq”), for the specific reason of buying slaves, with the proviso that they not be Christian slaves. This was, in fact, the major interest of the Egyptians in the Byzantine Empire and the principal reason why this treaty was concluded. And it was intimately connected with the politics surrounding the crusading movement as it developed after the Fourth Crusade, that is, in this specific case, with the plans of Charles of Anjou and the fate of the last remaining outposts of the kingdom of Acre.

In their formal aspects, that is, in the matter of treaties and official agreements, Byzantine trade relations with Egypt remained connected with political concerns and with the concerns of the Byzantine emperors for the non-Latin Christians of the East. This was so in the late thirteenth century and remained so in 1348/49, in the negotiations of John VI Kantakouzenos with Malik Nasir Hasan, in which the security of Byzantine merchants in Egypt is embedded in discussions regarding the Christians of the Mamluk empire.<sup>175</sup> While the formal relations were embedded in politics, the general conditions and mechanisms were similar to those between Byzantine and Western Christians, following the general lines elaborated in the twelfth century.

After 1291 and the fall of Acre, we know that there were repeated calls in the West for a boycott of trade with Egypt. This did not involve Byzantium; on the contrary, some of the plans for a boycott of Egyptian trade included, as a side effect of the eventual rearrangements in the eastern Mediterranean, the reconquest of Byzantium by the Crusaders.<sup>176</sup> Interestingly, however, there were, in the early fourteenth century, some vague and some not-so-vague mutterings in Byzantium against the continuation of good relations with Egypt: vague in the comments of Theodore Metochites, who, in his Oration to the neo-martyr St. Michael, somewhat sheepishly and defensively explains that the Byzantine emperor was in the habit of sending frequent embassies and friendly messages to the “impious ruler . . . not because of some need,” since they were not contiguous neighbors and thus did not have the close contact of contiguous neighbors, but because the emperor always did everything in his power for the protection and well-being of Christians in the Mamluk possessions.<sup>177</sup> In a much more explicit manner, George Pachymeres criticized in no uncertain terms the policy of Michael VIII that “opened the way” to the Egyptians toward the “Scythians,” that is, the Cumans of the Black Sea. He

<sup>175</sup> *Ioannis Cantacuzeni eximperatoris historiarum libri quattuor*, ed. L. Schopen, 3 vols. (Bonn, 1828–29), 3:90–104; cf. M. Canard, “Une lettre du Sultan Malik Nâsir Hasan à Jean VI Cantacuzène (760/1349),” in *idem, Byzance et les musulmans du Proche Orient* (as above, note 157), no. x, 29–52.

<sup>176</sup> This includes the early plans of Marino Sanudo, ca. 1306–12: A. Laiou, “Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks: The Background to the Anti-Turkish League of 1332–1334,” *Speculum* 45 (1970): 374–92. On the crusading plans of this period, see S. Schein, *Fideles Crucis: The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land (1274–1314)* (Oxford, 1991).

<sup>177</sup> *AASS*, Nov. 4: 672–73. Dölger thinks the embassy in question may have been the one dated 1311–13: *Regesten*, no. 2326. This text also provides important information regarding Byzantine trade relations with Egypt. According to Metochites, Alexandria is always full of people—among them, Byzantines—who go there for trade and other reasons (676D). At the time of the martyrdom of St. Michael, there were, in the city, both Byzantine ambassadors and Byzantine merchants (673A, 676E). The ambassadors seem to have sailed on a Byzantine ship, for Michael, a captive in Alexandria, tried to escape on this ship by disguising himself as one of the passengers or crew who were to sail back to Constantinople (673C). This incidental information suggests that even in the early 14th century there were Byzantine ships sailing these seas and that the Italian control of shipping in the eastern Mediterranean was not absolute.

connected that with the Egyptian offensive against the last remaining Crusader possessions in Palestine (1268–91); he lamented the fall of these possessions; and he ended this narrative with the statement: “This is the profit to Christendom wrought by our imprudence and our ungoverned impulsive actions and appetites.”<sup>178</sup> Pachymeres, clearly, would much rather have seen a Christian economic and political alliance that would have kept the Egyptians out: something like the boycott advocated in Western Europe. Thus, after a very long time, the Byzantines themselves connected the Crusades and the fate of the Crusader states with the trading policies of the Byzantines and the Muslims.

To the modern scholar, the connections between the crusading movement and the Byzantine commercial relations with Christians and Muslims appear much more complex. The complexity is partly the result of the fact that with the Crusades the entire political scene of the Middle East changed; and with the expansion of Italian merchants the economics of the area changed as well. These are long-term phenomena, and there is a broad and long-term connection between political and economic affairs. There are also short-term and immediate connections between specific crusading efforts and matters affecting commerce, for example the grant of specific charters of privilege. I have tried to focus on the phenomena that lie between the long term and the short term and to point out some of the structural and institutional developments that may be considered to have occurred because of the Crusades wholly or, more often, in part. The development of exchange mechanisms and mechanisms of negotiation in Byzantium were connected both to specific events, the Second and Third Crusades, and to the evolving presence of Western merchants. The terms of trade with Christians and Muslims, in the exemplar case of the law of salvage, have been seen to have evolved over the entire eastern Mediterranean, in response to both political events and economic necessities, the evolution starting in Byzantium and making the rounds of the Crusader states and Egypt, becoming reinforced on the way. In the case of Byzantine trade relations with the Muslims, the Crusades appear to have imposed two successive reorientations—and political and economic affairs were closely intertwined. In sum, in my view, the Crusades and the existence of the Crusader states played a much greater role than modern scholars tend to allow, not only in the general patterns of trade in the eastern Mediterranean but also in the conditions and mechanisms of trade between the Byzantines and the Muslims, and especially between the Byzantines and the Western Christians.

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<sup>178</sup> Ed. Failler, 241, 243; cf. *Georgii Pachymeris de Michaelis et Andronico Palaeologis libri tredecim*, ed. I. Bekker, 2 vols. (Bonn, 1835), 2:87, 456–58. Cf. A. Laiou, “On Political Geography: The Black Sea of Pachymeres,” in *The Making of Byzantine History*, ed. R. Beaton and C. Roueché (London, 1993), 110–11, 119.

## Appendix by Cécile Morrisson

### 1. Comparison of the Known Exchange Rates from the First Crusade (comments on pp. 169–70)

The exchange rate deduced from the *Gesta Francorum* (1 hyperpyron = 15 soldi = 180 deniers) is evidently one obtaining in an exceptional context (famine and the presence of a huge army). The intended coins are obviously, on the one hand, the hyperpyron, although the *Gesta* provides, to my knowledge, the only occurrence of the form *purpurati*.<sup>1</sup> The Crusaders may have coined this name by identifying hyperpyra with “imperial” coins, as *purpuratus* had primarily this meaning. On the other hand, which deniers the author of the *Gesta* may have had in mind is not clear. His South Italian origin could have made him allude to the deniers from Pavia, Lucca, Venice, and Rouen,<sup>2</sup> which are attested there by textual and archaeological evidence in the late eleventh century. Or he might simply have alluded to the various French and Italian deniers that the Crusaders brought with them.

Little is known of the silver fineness of these,<sup>3</sup> and we have to be content with mentioning figures for royal French deniers of the late eleventh century. The deniers Parisis

The tentative estimates of coins’ real values given here are, it must be stressed, based on average values of weights and metal contents and should not be taken as absolute values but as indications of order of magnitude. The reliability of the figures is even less for Western denominations, namely deniers, than it is for Byzantine coins because of the great variety of issuing authorities, the scattered nature of the data, the virtual absence in the 12th century of surviving monetary specifications, and the small number of available analyses. I am most grateful to Marc Boinpaire for advice on Western European numismatics and for communication of his and Maria Guerra’s forthcoming article (M. Boinpaire and M. Guerra, “Analyse de monnaies françaises du XIe siècle: Le problème du zinc,” in *Actes du XIIe Congrès international de numismatique, Berlin, 1997*, ed. B. Kluge). The results obtained for silver fineness are not commented upon there but show great variety in time and space.

<sup>1</sup> The only reference in Du Cange, *Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis* (Paris, 1937–38), is to the *Gesta* and its various versions or compilations. This source and coin name are not mentioned by B. Koutava-Delivoria, “Les *chichata*, les *protocharaga* et la réforme monétaire d’Alexis I Comnène,” *RBN* 141 (1995): 13–36.

<sup>2</sup> See L. Travaini, *La monetazione nell’Italia normanna* (Rome, 1995), 362–94, esp. 394; J.-M. Martin, “Le monete d’argento nell’Italia meridionale del secolo XII secondo i documenti di archivio,” *Bollettino di numismatica* 6–7 (Jan.–Dec. 1986): 85–96, at 86; F. Dumas and J. Pilet-Lemière, “La monnaie normande, Xe–XIIe siècle. Le point de la recherche en 1987,” in *Les Mondes Normands (VIIIe–XIIe s.): Actes du IIe Congrès International d’Archéologie Médiévale, Caen 2–4 octobre 1987*, ed. H. Galinje (Caen, 1989), 125–31.

<sup>3</sup> The denier of Pavia in the early 12th century (ca. 1102) contained some 0.5 g fine silver, according to C. Brambilla quoted by C. Cipolla, “Currency Depreciation in Medieval Europe,” *EcHistR* 15 (1963): 413–22, at 24. Such a *poids de fin* is very close to that of the contemporary denier Parisis that I use in the following estimates. One denier of Rouen of the late 11th century with a fineness of some 40–49% contained ca. 0.3–0.7 g (F. Dumas, “Les monnaies normandes (Xe–XIIe s.) avec un répertoire des trouvailles,” *RN* 21 [1979]: 84–140, at 103).

of Philip I (1060–1108) were struck at 1/312 or 1/324 to the pound (1.30–1.26 g) and had a fineness of 40 percent.<sup>4</sup> Alexios I's hyperpyra, weighing ca. 4.30 g, are, according to the latest analyses,<sup>5</sup> some 82 percent fine. The comparison of these average intrinsic values,  $\pm 3.74$  g fine gold = 90.7–93.6 g fine silver,<sup>6</sup> entails a gold-silver ratio of 1:24 to 1:25, apparently excessive but understandable in the circumstances.

The rate of 1 "aureus" to 8 or 9 soldi (96–108 deniers) appears to be a more "normal" one. In fact, the contemporary Tripoli dinar had, like the other Fatimid dinars, a very high purity (ca. 97%).<sup>7</sup> Reckoning a denier with some 0.5 g silver fine, the comparison becomes:  $\pm 4.07$  g fine gold = 48–54 g fine silver, entailing a gold-silver ratio of 1:11.8 or 1:13.2, more usual in an eastern Mediterranean context.<sup>8</sup> Michael Metcalf is therefore right when he comments on this famous statement of Raymond of Aguilers and concludes that "eight or nine shillings does not sound in any way extortionate as an exchange-rate against the Islamic gold dinar."<sup>9</sup>

## 2. Intrinsic Value of Coins Exchanged during the Second Crusade (comments on pp. 170–75)

The exchange rate in the Balkans of 1 stamenon to 5 deniers, in terms of the intrinsic values involved, implies equating ca. 0.27 g fine silver in the Byzantine stamenon<sup>10</sup> to the 2 or 1.9 g represented by 5 deniers Paris of the time.<sup>11</sup> The denier's real value was thus grossly underestimated (by about 7 to 8 times). As A. Laiou points out (p. 173), "any exchange rate that quoted the billon trachy in multiples of the denier Paris was bound to be excessive."

The other equivalence between 1 mark of silver and 3 hyperpyra (144 stamena rated

<sup>4</sup> J. Lafaurie, "Numismatique: Des Carolingiens aux Capétiens," *CahCM* 13 (1970): 117–36, at 136. The figures given by Lafaurie imply some 0.5–0.52 g fine silver in a denier.

<sup>5</sup> C. Morisson, et al., *L'or monnayé*, vol. 1, *Purification et altérations. De Rome à Byzance*, Cahiers Ernest-Babelon 2, CNRS (Paris, 1985), 154 and 232.

<sup>6</sup> Estimating at 87.2% the fine content of a hyperpyron weighing ca. 4.3 g (containing 86.4% Au and 10% Ag reckoned as equivalent to 0.84% Au at a 1:12 gold-silver ratio).

<sup>7</sup> According to reliable specific gravity measurements. See A. S. Ehrenkreutz, "Studies in the Monetary History of the Near East in the Middle Ages—the Standard of Fineness of Some Types of Dinars," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 2 (1959): 128–61, and W. A. Oddy, "The Gold Contents of Fatimid Coins Reconsidered," in *Metallurgy in Numismatics*, vol. 1, ed. D. M. Metcalf and W. A. Oddy (London, 1980), 98–118.

<sup>8</sup> The calculations of the gold-silver ratio and the identification of its nature (ratio for unminted metal, market ratio for coins, etc.) are, as is well known, tricky. See A. M. Watson, "Back to Gold—and Silver," *EcHistR* 20.1 (1967): 1–34, at 33. In what follows I have relied on Watson's results (23–29). Neither the details of his calculations nor their sources could be given in his article.

<sup>9</sup> Metcalf, *Coinage of the Crusades* (above, note 65), 12.

<sup>10</sup> A "billon trachy" of some 4.45–4.30 g with a 6.3% silver content; see Hendy and Charles, above, note 84. The average fineness is that of Manuel's first and second coinages.

<sup>11</sup> Louis VII's (1137–80) deniers were struck at 1/240 or 1/250 to the mark (1.01–0.97 g) and had a fineness of ca. 39.8%, according to Lafaurie, "Numismatique," 136 n. 6.

at 48 to the hyperpyron) implied the following approximate intrinsic values: 234.4 g fine silver<sup>12</sup> = 10.86 g fine gold.<sup>13</sup> This entails an excessive gold-silver ratio of 1:26.

The rate in Constantinople of 1 stamenon to less than 2 deniers amounts to equating the Byzantine billon coin containing 0.28–0.26 g fine silver with two Western silver ones containing 0.8–0.76 g silver. It implies overvaluing the stamenon nearly three times (2.8–2.9) and agrees with M. Hendy's conclusion, on a different basis, that "the overvaluation will have been something in the order of 2 1/2 times the bullion value of the trachy."<sup>14</sup>

The other Constantinopolitan exchange rate of 396 stamena for 1 mark of silver leads to roughly the same result:  $396 \times 0.27 \text{ g} = 106.9 \text{ g}$ , being considered equivalent to the 234.4 g fine silver in a mark, which implies an overvaluation of the stamenon of some 2.1 times.

The more favorable rating of the mark may be attributed to its guaranteed, or easily assayable, fineness and to its mere bulk (important absolute value) compared to retail exchanges dealing with small sums in all sorts of deniers of varying fineness.

### 3. Intrinsic Value of Coins Exchanged during the Third Crusade and the Exchange Rates (comments on pp. 175–76)

The 1190 treaty probably involved the Cologne mark, which was slightly lighter and contained some 231 g of highly pure silver. The rate of 5.5 hyperpyra for an assayed (*examinatum*)<sup>15</sup> mark amounts to equating some 19.7 g<sup>16</sup> fine gold to 231 g fine silver and implies a gold-silver ratio of 1:11.8.<sup>17</sup>

The difference between *examinata* and *non examinata* (the latter rated 1.8 times less than the former, at 3 hyperpyra) seems at first very high, but must have incorporated an important premium for risk. Moreover, it is known that "all of the surviving German

<sup>12</sup> A Troyes mark with a weight of 244.7 g and a fineness of 12d in argent-le-roi (95.8%). If the mark were one of pure or nearly pure silver, the silver weight would be ca. 240 g and the ratio 1:21.87. The order of magnitude is the same.

<sup>13</sup> Manuel's hyperpyron with a weight of 4.3 g and a fineness of ca. 85% (84.2% Au and 12% Ag) would amount to 3.65 g fine (see above, note 5).

<sup>14</sup> M. F. Hendy and J. A. Charles, "The Production Techniques, Silver Content, and Circulation History of the Twelfth-Century Byzantine Trachy," in M. F. Hendy, *The Economy, Fiscal Administration, and Coinage of Byzantium* (Northampton, 1989), 18.

<sup>15</sup> "Examinatum" is clearly a technical word for assay. In the late 12th century, the mint of Melgueil, for instance, had two *gardes*: one in charge of the custody of dies and the other in charge of *issag*, i.e., the punch used to certify the testing of the ingots' fineness.

<sup>16</sup> Isaac II's hyperpyron with a weight of 4.3 g and a fineness of ca. 83.3% (82.2% Au and 14% Ag) would amount to 3.58 g fine (see above, note 5).

<sup>17</sup> Watson, "Back to Gold," 23: "before Europe returned to gold the ratio in most parts of Europe was generally between 9 and 10." See P. Spufford, *Money and Its Use in Medieval Europe* (Cambridge, 1988), table 2, p. 272.

ingots that have been analyzed have proved to be of various poor qualities of *argentum usuale*.<sup>18</sup>

The official value of 120 stamena to the hyperpyron equates the ca. 12 g silver contained in the now debased billon coin<sup>19</sup> with ca. 3.58 g fine gold. The implicit gold-silver ratio is three times less than the one derived from the exchange rate of the assayed mark and three times less as well than the one assumed to have prevailed in the eastern Mediterranean. This is a good index of the persisting overvaluation (partly token nature) of the billon denomination.

In 1199 the decreasing value of 184 stamena to the hyperpyron deduced from Pisan documents equates ca. 14.7 g silver with 3.6 g fine gold. The implicit gold-silver ratio is 21 percent higher than the 1190 one and confirms the downward trend of the stamenon overvaluation emphasized above (p. 175).

It should be pointed out that comparisons between the metal contents of the stamenon and the hyperpyron as well as the implicit derived ratios are very unreliable for two reasons: first, the uncertainty of metrological figures, but above all the limits certainly fixed to the exchange of stamena into hyperpyra, as is always the case with token coinages.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Spufford, *Money*, 221, quoting A. [von] Loehr, "Probleme der Silberbarren," *NZ* 64 (1931): 101–9, with illustrations. The figures given by von Loehr (p. 106) for ingots of the early 13th century vary between 85.4% and 79.8% fine.

<sup>19</sup> Assuming 120 stamena of 4–3 g with a fineness of 2.5% (0.1 to 0.07 g fine silver), equating a hyperpyron of 3.58 g. Henty and Charles, "Byzantine Trachy"; T. Bertelè, *Numismatique byzantine* (Wetteren, 1978), 77.

<sup>20</sup> To the observation of Pegolotti mentioned above (176 n. 105) might be added the fact that the Nea Logarlike, according to my interpretation at least, only accepted the (electrum) aspron trachy and not the stamenon in payment of taxes (C. Morrisson, *Monnaie et finances à Byzance* [Aldershot, 1994], no. vi, 460–64).