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Introduction: Garden and Landscape Design, from Emotion to the Construction of Self

Michel Conan

Why is there so much silence with respect to the experience of motion in books on garden and landscape design? Is it even possible to experience a garden or a landscape without moving through it? Don't we move through a garden in response to its design? And why do design treatises pay so little attention to this? Probably because of difficulties describing any experience in words, and because the experience of motion is not only awkward to convey in plain English, but it also eludes consciousness. Yet motion is so central an aspect of landscape design, setting it apart from sculpture, painting, or literature, that one has to address motion, however uncharted the waters.

A further difficulty springs out of the elusiveness of the idea of motion itself. At a conference at Oxford in 1911, Henri Bergson (1859–1941)¹ remarked: “We think of motion as if it were made of stillness, and when we look at it, we reconstruct it with the help of moments of stillness. Motion for us comprises one position and then a new one, and so

¹ Bergson deserves the attention of readers of this book. He was hailed as a major philosopher during his lifetime by such men as John Dewey and William James, and he seems to have gone into oblivion with the onset of modernist thought for all but a few philosophers such as Jean Wahl, Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Gilles Deleuze. Several recent American books, however, have called the attention of scholars to Bergson's thinking. Mark Antliff, *Inventing Bergson: Cultural Politics and Parisian Avant-Garde* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), shows how important he was for the surge of creative artists in Paris at the beginning of the 20th century. Paul Douglass, *Bergson, Eliot and American Literature* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), recalls the import of his work for F. Scott Fitzgerald, Robert Frost, Willa Cather, Henry Miller, T. S. Eliot, and William Faulkner. More recently, *The New Bergson*, ed. John Mullarkey (Manchester, N.Y.: Manchester University Press, 1999) may be of immediate interest for landscape studies. Richard Cohen, “Philo, Spinoza, Bergson: The Rise of an Ecological Age” (*ibid.*, 18–31), shows in what sense Bergson's philosophy can be considered as the starting point for an ecological view that turns away from a scientific reconstruction of the world—seen as motivated by practical interests—toward a view of the world in terms of (1) interpenetrating flows, (2) cumulative growth, and (3) an unpredictable future that results from a growth process fueled by the intertwining of matter and spirit, *physis* and will, reality and desire, order and inspiration. In a letter to James in 1908, Bergson explained that he had been fascinated by the mechanistic theories of Herbert Spencer, and “[i]t was the analysis of the notion of time, as it enters into mechanics and physics, which overturned all my ideas. I saw, to my great astonishment, that scientific time does not endure” (in Douglass, *Bergson, Eliot and American Literature*, 7).

on indefinitely.”² This remark sheds light on a paradox of picturesque travel and, in a more pressing way, on the paradoxes of contemporary tourist travels. Travels through a landscape are thought of as a series of stopovers, moments of rest focused on the contemplation and aesthetic enjoyment of landscapes in perfect stillness, and the more there is motion in the landscape—tumbling waterfalls, sailboats turning a buoy in a regatta, or skiers crashing down a slope—the more aesthetic enjoyment seems to demand that we stand still in front of the landscape. Consequently, the motion of the traveler does not seem open to aesthetic appreciation in picturesque literature.

An example will help illustrate the further difficulties of studying human experiences of time. In 1819 Arsène Thiébaud de Berneaud (1777–1850) published a description of his travels on foot from Paris to Ermenonville in the company of his daughter Uranie³ after the death of his beloved wife Charlotte.⁴ They followed a road across the countryside, running from one small town to the next. Memories crowd the narrative, and landscape descriptions give way to a pageant of famous characters in a shadow-theater. The travel accounts describe the author’s experiences by relating his thoughts and emotions to the places and views he discovered. They give rise to a stream of landscape scenes that conjure up eventful moments in recent history: Saint Gratien calls to mind the wise Catinat, Soisy the general Kellerman, Eaubonne the poet Saint-Lambert and Benjamin Franklin; at Montmorency every place sings the memories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Fig. 1).⁵ Thiébaud de Berneaud might have readily subscribed to Gaston Bachelard’s profound remark: “In its countless alveoli space contains compressed time. Time serves that purpose!”⁶ He might have felt slightly at odds with it, however, because he knew and expressed the fact that time can be experienced according to several different temporalities. In his narrative they belong either to everyday life or to times past, to political history, to family remembrances, to mythical narratives, to travelogues, or to the discourse of science. The stillness of each landscape these two travelers crossed contrasts strikingly with the shifting horizons of temporality which the description of memories brought about by the sense of place the author experienced.

² Bergson, *La Pensée et le mouvant* (Paris: PUF, 1998), 161. This is a central aspect of Bergson’s thinking that introduces a critical appraisal of perception, as can be seen in this passage of *Matter and Memory*: “But we must not confound the data of the senses, which perceive the movement, with the artifice of the mind, which recomposes it. The senses, left to themselves, present to us the real movement between two real halts as a solid and undivided whole. See Bergson, *Matter and Memory* (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 189.

³ She was less than 10 years old at the time and his only child, since his first had died in 1808. Thiébaud de Berneaud, *Voyage à Ermenonville, contenant des anecdotes inédites sur JJ Rousseau, le plan des jardins, et la flore d’Ermenonville publiées pour la première fois par Arsène Thiébaud de Berneaud* (Paris: Imprimerie Dupont, 1819), 10.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 300.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 7: “When taking back my eyes onto the plain, I discovered with some pleasure that I was close to objects that bring back memories of Rousseau. Here are the horse-chestnut trees to which he paid such frequent visits; this bench of turf was the confidant of his thoughts, a witness to his loves; these stones, scattered at present, were part of the modest monument dedicated to him in 1791, that the ax of vandals destroyed almost as soon as it had been raised as a token of gratitude.”

⁶ Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, with a new foreword by John Stilgoe (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 8. [French original ed., 1958]



1. *Hermitage of Jean-Jacques Rousseau at Montmorency*

One wonders whether landscape stimulates the imagination of motion only when the traveler comes to a stop,⁷ and whether the same would apply to visiting a landscape garden.

Thiébaud de Berneaud and his daughter arrived in Ermenonville on 20 May 1818, exactly thirty years after Rousseau paid his first visit there, and they spent three days exploring the landscapes created by René-Louis Gérardin. A ramble through the woods that frame the four main large landscape scenes led visitors to discover a series of poetic landscape views of lesser dimensions. Gérardin had designed them to invite flights of imagination and to allow the visitor's mind to shuttle ceaselessly between time present and time past. Places follow one another without any particular sense of order. De Berneaud first discovered, when entering the south landscape facing the house's entrance, the grotto of the Naiads, the Gérardin memorial bench, Rousseau's tomb, the willow of romance, Meyer's tomb, the bench offered to family mothers, and the Tomb of the Young Unknown Lover (Fig. 2). Each of these places stimulates a literary development that bears the marks of the sorrows and concerns of Thiébaud de Berneaud after the death of his wife. Picturesque scenery brings about a fusion of some implied narrative and personal memories, but there is no link between these successive narratives that would stem from motion, the movement from one place to the other within this landscape garden. Thiébaud de Berneaud's grief at

⁷ Thiébaud de Berneaud, *Voyage*, 23: "Travels enchant life by maintaining it in a continuous state of restlessness." He goes on almost immediately to note that one should travel on foot to be free to stop at will in order to observe "the riches that the earth bestows upon the eyes" ("*les richesses que la terre prodigue à la vue*").



2. *Tomb of the Unknown Lover*
 (from *Alexandre de Laborde, Description
 des nouveaux jardins de la France et
 de ses anciens châteaux [Paris, 1808],
 pl. 35*)

the death of his wife Charlotte and his sense of care for his daughter Uranie are solely responsible for the deep sense of unity that develops in the text describing his reactions to the various landscape sceneries during those three days.

Since designers' attention to the experience of motion in their gardens is usually not recorded, its purpose remains open to interpretation. Gérardin focused attention on the physical experience of walking: he wanted visitors to walk along narrow paths that encouraged solitary meditation, and he set up many paths on sloping embankments forcing visitors to go up and down and to keep changing directions. He wanted the visitor to experience the landscape physically, but he does not mention this among his poetic intentions (Fig. 3). He only mentions the motion of waters and of merchants or local people traveling across the landscape on a road as a source of enjoyment for a visitor who admires the scenery from a fixed vantage point.⁸ He took great pains to inscribe well-framed views with poetic meaning, but the visitor's motion is never imbued with significance. Even though the picturesque landscape at Ermenonville was designed to excite the imagination and aesthetic appreciation of visitors, motion in the landscape was not acknowledged as a

⁸ Gérardin, *De la Composition des paysages* (Geneva: Delaguette, 1777), 64.



3. *View of path (detail) in Ermenonville with Rousseau's tomb on the poplars island (from Alexandre de Laborde, Description des nouveaux jardins de la France et de ses anciens châteaux [Paris, 1808], pl. 34)*

meaningful part of the experience of place. This may sound somewhat paradoxical. Yet even the celebrated path called Painters' Walk, which took the visitor on a one-hour ramble in a sandy wilderness,⁹ does not belie this remark. Thiébaud de Berneaud briefly alludes to his motion and his impressions as he walks up and down along that path and treads on moss carpets. But his attention is turned to swiftly passing scenes that prevent any thought from developing: an exotic plant he recognizes while walking, the song of a thrush heard for a short moment, a rabbit and then a squirrel that cross the path in front of his eyes and disappear, nothing else.¹⁰

Thiébaud de Berneaud's descriptions of his travels to Ermenonville provide a typical

⁹ Painters' Walk is no longer visible. It was traced in the "desert," a celebrated landscape at Ermenonville, among rocks and sandy tracts of land where nature was not landscaped to emulate painting but, to the contrary, was supposed to offer totally new models for painters to imitate.

¹⁰ Thiébaud de Berneaud, *Voyage*, 84–85: "I resumed my walk along the path at the point where it crosses a clump of pines, not very far from the grotto called the Wind's Hollow situated in an exciting location. For a whole hour I walked uphill and downhill. At times I only left a vale covered with sand and heather where melancholy alone broods to reach for high-standing rocks darkened by gales, where lives the solitary *érigéro*, which came from the New World in the 16th century; at other times I walked on carpets of thick moss across colorful bushes and crowns of flowery brambles, or I entered under high vaults of evergreen trees that the nightingale fills with her sweet moans. Everywhere on the rocky ground, shy rabbits were fleeing under the ferns, and nimble squirrels returned in haste to the tree in which is hidden their nest impenetrable to rain."



4. *Le Passe-Pied* by Rameau (from Pierre Rameau, *Abbregé de la nouvelle méthode dans l'art d'écrire ou de tracer toutes sortes de danses de ville* [Paris, 1725], pls. 18, 19)

account of the aesthetic of picturesque travel that was embraced by a large number of people in the nineteenth century. Even now, it heavily influences the contemporary aesthetics of tourism with its ceaseless quest for scenic views and unforgettable snapshots. Contemporary landscapes are scrutinized by tourists in search of cues telling about myth, history, present cultural concerns, or even objects of the natural sciences. All of these function as props for some personal fantasy that makes framed views into poetical landscapes. Should we conclude that landscape design cannot be an art of movement in the same sense as the art of dance, despite the fact that one has to move in order to discover and appreciate landscapes (Fig. 4)?¹¹

¹¹ Attending a dance gives an opportunity to ponder Bergson's remark that movement is not a series of immobilities, but rather a passage from one position to another that is reached by a mental synthesis, and thus cannot be located in space. We should not confuse the space covered by the body between 2 positions and the becoming of the person that we experience as spectators of the dance. Neither is the notation of a dance, as the ones provided by Pierre Rameau in his method for teaching dance of 1725, to be confounded with the movement it prescribes. If it were, we would not be captivated by the performance of some dancers and left indifferent by that of others. The notation may be useful for guiding the dancer into a new interpretation of the dance, but it is only by some kind of laziness that we allow ourselves to confuse notation and performance. They partake of different natures, and the greater our capacity to think in terms of notation, the more hidden to our consciousness becomes the act of performance. In a slightly different way, the more we attend to the letter of a text, the more it obscures our understanding of the movement of thought it is meant to produce.

A Criticism of Cognitivist Approaches to Movement through Landscapes

This is certainly not the case, and motion in the landscape has attracted the attention of behavioral and cognitive psychologists who produced some major works on motion through contemporary landscapes. *The View from the Road* by Donald Appleyard, Kevin Lynch, and John R. Myer¹² or *The Image of the City* by Lynch are still considered to be among the most important contributions to environmental design research. They have stimulated research on contemporary landscapes that is very difficult to emulate in historical research since the approaches depend upon either behavioral observations or systematic surveys of environmental cognition. The major issue, however, stems from a theoretical rather than methodological concern. These works totally neglect noncognitive aspects of human experience. By adopting a broader perspective we can examine more closely the criticisms that can be addressed to this contribution and bring to light hopes for a renewal of scholarship in this domain. Lynch (1918–1984) is still considered “the leading environmental design theorist of our times.”¹³ His studies of how people perceive and organize their environment culminated in a classic of twentieth-century planning literature, *The Image of the City* (1960), which relies on systematic attention to people’s movements in a city. Lynch felt that cities and even large metropolises must have a perceptible form in order for them to provide effective shelter for human activities. And he argued that “since individuals do in fact move and act frequently over metropolitan distances,”¹⁴ they must be able to perceive form on a metropolitan scale. All forms are not, however, equally effective, and Lynch expected that the knowledge of how form operated might open possibilities for improvements to city form. Thus city form was equated with an organization of a mental representation of the city or metropolitan space, which he called the “image of the city.”

Interestingly, one of the first publications to present Lynch’s study of urban perception, “where responses have been recorded while actually moving through the city itself,”¹⁵ was an article entitled “A Walk around the Block.” A sample group of people were taken on a walk around a block in downtown Boston after they had been instructed to report “the things you see, hear, or smell; everything or anything you notice.”¹⁶ The research was pursued by asking the respondents the things and events that they had noted, and they were given a set of photographs of buildings, street views, pavements, details to see which ones they remembered seeing during the walk. Surprisingly, the analysis grows out of an experience of movement but focuses entirely on the discovery of a set of discrete perceptions of things or events that seeks the sources of order in the resulting mental organization. The experience of moving around the block is not the topic being researched but rather a device to gather information about the mental image of the block.

¹² Appleyard, Lynch, and Myer, *The View from the Road* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964).

¹³ Tridib Banerjee and Michael Southworth, eds., *City Sense and City Design: Writings and Projects of Kevin Lynch* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990).

¹⁴ Lynch, “The Visual Shape of the Shapeless Metropolis,” in Banerjee and Southworth, *City Sense*, 66.

¹⁵ Lynch, “A Walk around the Block,” in Banerjee and Southworth, *City Sense*, 185; also in *Landscape* 8 (3) (1959): 24–34.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 184.

The same remark applies to *The Image of the City* and to its practical applications to several cities, such as the “Analysis of the Visual Form of Brookline, Massachusetts” in 1965.¹⁷ The topic, or the object of research, is a mental structure supposedly fixed in the mind of all inhabitants, the mental image of the city, which is thought to be a condition for efficient and meaningful use of the city in everyday life. It does not study the way in which motion within the city is experienced. Rather, it suggests that moving is experienced—more or less pleasantly—according to the legibility of the image of the city. The study of motion through the city was only a means to indirectly obtain knowledge of the mental representation of the city form, that is, of the fixed image assumed to underlie all cognitive appraisals directing motion through the city. Thus Lynch’s object of research seems quite different from the one we are addressing, the experience of motion. At least one study of the experience of motion with which he was involved made use of the same methodological and theoretical assumptions as *The Image of the City*, and it deserves careful attention since it has also been very influential in framing discussions of landscape architecture.

Appleyard, Lynch, and Myer’s alternate design for a proposed beltway in Boston in 1963 prompted an important book, *The View from the Road*, which opens with a study of the highway experience, calling attention to the different perspectives that are adopted by a tourist, a commuter, the driver, or a passenger.¹⁸ It stresses the importance of motion: “The sensation of driving a car is primarily one of motion and space. Vision, rather than sound or smell, is the principal sense. Touch is a secondary contributor to the experience via the response of the car to hands and feet.” This leads quickly to the conclusion that “the driving experience can now be described as being a sequence played to the eyes of a captive . . . audience, whose vision is filtered and directed forward.”¹⁹ A driver’s point of view is adopted, and it is asserted that “the driver is engaged in building a locational image of his environment, and in orienting himself within this environment” and that “movement along the road consists of a succession of approaches to goals. These are the prominent landmarks or focal points that the observer moves towards, attains, and passes by, or which represent his final destination.”²⁰

Thus the study concentrates on the reconstruction of the locational image a driver would derive from traveling along a particular stretch on an urban motorway which is assumed to be shared by “middle-class people to whom the road is not a matter of long habit,”²¹ and to most commuters, except at night and at rush hour. The research sought locations at which a driver’s attention is compelled to focus on a common object, by demanding from the subjects, driving a car with the observer, an outpouring of very fast reactions to the visual scenery, either in words or in crude sketches. It concluded that “the essential experience of the highway consists in the perception of roadside detail, the sense

¹⁷ Lynch, “An Analysis of the Visual Form of Brookline, Massachusetts,” in Banerjee and Southworth, *City Sense*, 287–315.

¹⁸ Appleyard et al., *The View from the Road*, 4.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

of motion and space, the feeling of basic orientation, and the apparent meaning of the landscape.”²² There is much in common between this study and the previous ones. Research method and object seem to form such a strong pair that it is not surprising that they have all been considered to be studies of the experience of motion through a city landscape. So let us proceed to a deeper questioning of their assumptions.

All of them build upon the assumption that environmental behavior is a function of the environment. They hold that motion in an environment is dependent upon identifying objects or events, seeking a goal, thinking, deciding. As a consequence, they construct methods of inquiry that ask the respondents to identify objects, spaces, and events; develop a representation of an itinerary; and imagine their choices along the way. They assume that motion depends on a mental image; they construct questionnaires that look for elements of an image in disconnected pieces of information provided by their informers. Then they use them to construct a shared mental image from the elements most commonly mentioned, unwittingly closing a circular piece of reasoning.²³ In doing so, they acknowledge only the kinds of motion that happen when a subject consciously attends to his movements. Yet most movements are accomplished in a habitual way, and, as David Seamon says, cognition plays only a partial role in everyday spatial behavior, many of our movements involve a prereflexive knowledge of the body, and this bodily knowledge is not a structure separate from the cognitive structure of spatial behavior but works in frequent reciprocity with it.²⁴

If you entertain any doubt about prereflexive knowledge of the body, try to explain how to knot a tie to a child who has one in his hands for the first time. You will discover that you cannot explain the motions he should perform when you are looking at him or at his tie, even though you can easily do them in front of him, without the help of a mirror, when the tie is around your own neck. It shows that your body does not rely upon a description of this action in terms of a sequence of decisions to perform the required gestures. Some actions can be performed in such a prereflexive way, others demand clear knowledge and decision making. We live in two different worlds: the lifeworld and the world of science and technology. In the first one we see the sun rise every morning above the surface of the Earth where we stand in perfect stillness; in the other one we know that

²² Ibid., 21.

²³ In a late reassessment of *The Image of the City* in 1985 (“Reconsidering *The Image of the City*,” in Banerjee and Southworth, *City Sense*, 248–49), Lynch shows that he was totally unaware of the circularity of reasoning in which his research was involved and insists, on the contrary, that “the existence and role of the place image, its basic elements, and the techniques of eliciting and analyzing it seem astonishingly similar in some very diverse cultures and places.” He continues by referring to the “true mental image, so deeply lodged in the mind.” This is somewhat surprising because in the same text (250) he states, “The study never proved its basic assumption, except indirectly, via the emotional tone of the interviews: the repeated remarks about the pleasure of recognition and knowledge, the satisfaction of identification with a distinctive home place, and the displeasure of being lost or of being consigned to a drab environment. Succeeding studies have continued to collect this indirect evidence.” It certainly shows that Lynch was not only a great innovator in methods and interpretation but also a very critical mind. Unfortunately he was not very interested in reading essays in psychology (ibid., 247–48), and he probably never pondered the phenomenology of perception.

²⁴ Seamon, *A Geography of the Lifeworld: Movement, Rest and Encounter* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), chap. 4, “Habit and the Notion of Body-Subject,” 38–45.

the sun does not move, but the Earth does and we do. Seamon's geography of the lifeworld deals at length with movement and proposes a method of inquiry that aims to describe the subjectivity at play in events or phenomena under scrutiny. It starts from a clear criticism of behaviorism and cognitivism in studies of motion²⁵ and introduces an alternative perspective inspired by Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*.²⁶

Merleau-Ponty's book, published in 1945 and translated only in 1962, provides a penetrating criticism of behaviorist and intellectualist perspectives—out of which cognitivism developed—as well as a phenomenological approach to perception.²⁷ His arguments build upon four different sources: Edmund Husserl's criticism of Cartesian metaphysics,²⁸ Bergson's criticism of dualism,²⁹ experimental Gestalt psychology,³⁰ and clinical observations of perception disorders linked to various pathologies. They provide a precisely documented criticism of the reductive view of human experience that grows out of the transportation of models from the empirical sciences into studies of human psychology. Let us highlight three points. To begin with, behaviorist and cognitive psychology are not dismissed, but rather shown to proceed from very particular horizons of understanding which frame specific horizons of perception. The knowledge gained from them may be valid with respect to the frames of experiment or scientific observation they have created, but they do not inform human perception when ordinary circumstances prevail, such as the different habitual perceptions in everyday life for people of various cultures, engaged in all sorts of activities and in different emotional contexts. Second, they assume that the object of perception is always clear, and that it may be fuzzy only because of a lack of attention. Instead, Merleau-Ponty insists that fuzziness and indeterminacy should be treated and studied as positive phenomena in human perception. Behaviorists entertain an image of man as robot (a reinvention of Descartes's man as machine), while cognitivists entertain an image of man as a cybernetic machine, failing to heed the profound remark by Norbert Wiener that computers, however much faster than human minds in dealing with logical calculus, were completely unable to process fuzzy ideas, a domain in which the human mind excelled.

Third, this entails a thorough criticism of associationism. The idea that a visual expe-

²⁵ Ibid., chap. 3, "Cognitive and Behaviourist Theories of Movement," 33–37.

²⁶ Ibid., chap. 5, "Merleau-Ponty and Learning for Body-Subject," 46–53.

²⁷ Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962).

²⁸ Merleau-Ponty gives references for 11 titles by Husserl, several of which he had consulted before publication. This was the case for vols. 2 and 3 of *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*, the first volume of which had been published in Belgrade in 1936. He mentions Husserl, *Méditations Cartésiennes* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1931), which is available in English as well: Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960).

²⁹ "The true ally of Bergson is of course neither Aristotle nor Hegel before him but Merleau-Ponty after him. The whole of his posthumous work, *The Visible and the Invisible*, published in 1964, for instance, is a working out, an elaboration and development of fundamental Bergsonian themes, the intertwining of sense and significance, mind and body, spirit and matter." Cohen, "Philo, Spinoza, Bergson," 27.

³⁰ Merleau-Ponty's bibliography gives a large number of references to publications on Gestalt psychology in German, English, and French; e.g., Wolfgang Kohler, *Gestalt Psychology* (London: Bell, 1930) and Kurt Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1935).

rience derives its meaning from its association with the meaning of a previous visual experience simply assumes an automatic linkage of present with previous experience. It implies that the mind functions like a computing machine that fails to know why its results are true. Moreover, it presupposes that we understand how the previous visual experience acquired meaning when this is exactly what it was supposed to explain for the present visual experience. “An experience can never associate itself to another impression by its own power. It no longer has the power to give rise to other impressions. This may happen only under the condition that it is first *understood* from the perspective of past experience in which it was sharing with the experience to be awakened.”³¹ Thus the relation between the past and present impressions depends upon the horizon of understanding with which we approached both of them. This horizon of understanding proceeds from the world environment within which we anchor our own bodily self. When sitting in a train running through a forest we see the inside of the carriage, the seats, the photographs hanging under the rack as perfectly still, while the forest trees outside are rushing backwards. On the other hand, if we move to the carriage door and allow ourselves to stand outside on the steps of the open door, the trees stand still and we can see and experience the train and our own self swiftly rushing ahead.

Thus movement is relative to our engagement with the world. “Once we are engaged in a world environment, movement appears to us in the absolute.”³² This illustrates that in order to understand the perception of motion, before we take into account any cognitive functions, we should understand the choice, much more secretly hidden from our conscious reflection, of the world environment into which we engage ourselves and from the vantage point of which we experience motion.³³ That is to say, to unravel the experience of motion we should first unravel the experience of the specific world from which it proceeds, which is selected from among all possible cultural or emotional worlds with which we can engage. This is a central question for the study of motion in gardens, because gardens offer themselves as small worlds in their own right, offering the possibility of shifting away from the topicality of the everyday world. This is also why the study of motion in gardens may help us learn something about the deeper life of consciousness that underlies perceptive activities. This volume offers a renewal of approaches to motion in gardens and designed landscapes by engaging broader aspects of human experience. Its preparation stemmed from the assumption that our everyday movements are prereflexive and involve a prereflexive knowledge of the body common to many phenomenological studies developed in the United States since the 1970s.³⁴

Phenomenology emerged out of a critical reading of Descartes’s “Discourse on Method”

³¹ Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), 25.

³² *Ibid.*, 324.

³³ For a more recent treatment of aesthetic engagement indebted to Merleau-Ponty, see Arnold Berleant, *The Aesthetics of Environment* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), and *Art and Engagement* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991).

³⁴ E.g., see Buttimer, “Grasping the Dynamism of Lifeworld,” *Annals of the American Geographers* 66 (1976): 277–92, and Yi-Fu Tuan, “Place: An Experiential Perspective,” *Geographical Review* 65 (1975): 151–65.

by Husserl. Descartes, in an effort to provide a firm foundation for his ideas, had begun by systematically calling into question his perceptions and his thoughts. He concluded that since we can only be certain that we think, we exist as thinking beings. *Cogito ergo sum*. Husserl wondered who was the subject who thought this idea. He assumed that there was a transcendental ego which made all men and women humans in the same prereflexive way, and that this discovery had escaped notice by Descartes himself. He further proposed to study how this transcendental subject engages in intentional relationships with the world in order to understand how perceptions and ideas are constituted. His approach involves only perception and imagination. Later phenomenologists gave precedence to language and speech. They nevertheless maintained an interest in the discovery of universal aspects of the mind that operate at a prereflexive level and upon which cultural differences and conscious ideas are predicated. In a very interesting remark quoted by David Seamon in his book on the geography of the lifeworld, Ann Buttimer clearly posed the reciprocity and the distinction between rest and movement, territory and range, community building and social organization, and suggested that “these experiences may be universal among the inhabitants of Planet Earth.”³⁵ The authors of this book, however, neither chose to privilege phenomenological approaches nor confirmed this universalism. Nor did they adopt a cognitivist stance. Instead they displayed a good deal of methodological ingenuity and showed how prereflexive ideas of self, space, time, or motion reflect cultural differences. The resulting analyses as a whole can read as a critical development of phenomenological approaches, opening a central discussion of intersubjectivity and of its role in the construction of individual experience. It certainly yields new insights into the relationship between landscape design and the experience of motion.

A Survey of the Contents

It would have been arbitrary to concentrate on one period or place in garden history in order to explore the variety of questions that may arise when studying the experience of motion and its relationship to garden design. This volume takes the opposite tack and embraces the challenges of cultural diversity. As a consequence, each contribution in this volume stands in some way apart from all others. It would be closer to the truth, however, to say that as a whole the contributions entertain a large number of relationships among them, clustering in different ways according to the question raised. The chapters of this volume are organized in order to answer the straightforward question: What do they contribute to an understanding of relationships between landscape design and the experience of motion?³⁶

The first part of this volume, “Beyond the Picturesque” (chaps. 1–3), demonstrates

³⁵ Seamon, *A Geography*, chap. 17, “Movement and Rest,” 131.

³⁶ The word *picturesque* derives from a technical word in Italian, *pintoresco* or *pittoresco*, which characterized an impressionist technique used by Venetian painters to paint natural backgrounds. It became used in English discussions of aesthetics to characterize the quality of paintings such as a Dutch farmyard or a hay wagon crossing a muddy field, which would not have been thought worthy of attention in the real world, and could not be qualified as either beautiful or sublime because they depicted scenes that would not have

vividly how much attention to the experience of motion rules out the still-dominant picturesque aesthetic in landscape design. It is somewhat astonishing to realize that this was already understood as a most central issue by Christian Cay Lorentz Hirschfeld at the end of the eighteenth century, and that it is at the heart of some new approaches in landscape design by Bernard Lassus in France and Patricia Johanson in the United States today. One may note, however, that rather than leading to a new style or a single new aesthetic, the contemporary attention to motion and the rejection of the picturesque may open many directions for the art of landscape design. The next four chapters in Part 2, “Modalities of Movement in a Garden and Their Representation,” concentrate on behavioral aspects of motion in designed landscape, revealing how culture impinges as much on behavior itself as on the experience of motion. It draws upon examples taken from the Roman Empire, Western societies since Byzantium, Japan in the Middle Ages, and Europe after the Industrial Revolution. The last three chapters in Part 3, “Culture and Meaning,” show that landscape design can provide definite experiences of motion that contribute to the development of important meanings in cultural life. They set out to explore how and under which conditions the experiences of motion created by landscape architecture play a role in these cultural changes. Let us turn to a closer examination of each chapter’s contribution to an understanding of relationships between landscape design and experience of motion (not to be mistaken for a summary). Then I will discuss some of the major contributions of this volume to Landscape Studies that emerge from dialogues and relationships among the texts rather than from the authors’ deliberate intentions.

Beyond the Picturesque

Linda Parshall shows that movement was central to garden creation and experience for C.C.L. Hirschfeld (1742–1792) in “Motion and Emotion in C. C. L. Hirschfeld’s *Theory of Garden Art*.” She stresses further that it led him to a radical criticism of comparisons between landscape gardening and landscape painting. According to Hirschfeld, gardens should be designed to imitate nature. They should also stir emotions, and this emotive

deserved attention in reality, and yet were pleasant in representation. William Gilpin (1724–1804), who was well versed in the appreciation of engravings, produced a study of picturesque beauty, as he called it, and published a series of illustrated narratives of his travels throughout various English regions in which he demonstrated how a tourist can look at scenic landscapes as if they were picturesque inkwashes or watercolors, and eventually make a sketch of them. It promoted a new type of aesthetic attention that was appropriated by English aristocrats in order to assault the Brownian aesthetic of landscape gardening and its most eminent representative, Humphry Repton. The picturesque aesthetic signals the triumph of a purely visual appreciation of landscape over poetical, idyllic, or mythical approaches that had been dominant in garden art since the Renaissance all over Europe. Frederick Law Olmsted created masterpieces of picturesque landscape architecture and helped establish its reign over U.S. landscape architecture for a century. Thus any natural-looking landscape can be said, at present, to be picturesque. Picturesque aesthetic, however, could apply to all sorts of objects besides paintings and natural landscapes, and it became applied during the 19th and 20th centuries to so many situations that the word *picturesque* has almost lost any clear meaning in common language. See, e.g., *Three Essays: On picturesque beauty, On picturesque travel, and On sketching landscape: to which is added a poem on landscape painting* (London: printed for Lamire, 1794; repr. ed., Farnborough: Gregg, 1972).

response should be brought about by the experience of moving through them. This sets gardens apart from landscape painting which imitates nature but into which one cannot move. As opposed to architecture or landscape painting, gardens also embody the motions of nature and of men through nature, and visitors who explore them are invited to respond through their affects and through their imagination. Gardens should allow their visitors to engage in dramatic encounters with nature. Thus Hirschfeld moved away from the picturesque aesthetics of English landscape gardening from which he drew his inspiration. Despite his interest in visual appreciation, it led his attention away from pictorial qualities toward situations allowing for an interplay of the senses and of imagination. He proposed a new perspective for the art of landscape design that is echoed throughout this volume: neither as a collection of picturesque views to be experienced in stillness, nor as a multiplicity of moving scenes to be experienced in motion, gardens as works of art should call upon the visitor's imagination to produce a sense of its dramatic unity. Thus narratives rather than pictures would appear as the best way for representing gardens.

Hirschfeld was far from insensitive to the picturesque in designed landscape, but he saw it as subordinate to a broader engagement of landscape beholders with nature. Stephen Bann moves his own criticism of the picturesque aesthetics for landscape design in a different direction in "Sensing the Stones: Bernard Lassus and the Ground of Landscape Design." Bann shows how recent works of Lassus, a contemporary French landscape designer, break away from deep-rooted visual habits that laid the groundwork for the primacy of a perspectival visual field. Rather than defending a narrative of progress, he wants to suggest that this new aesthetic—which is also at the root of Land Art—can be seen as a reinvention of artistic sensibilities of the early seventeenth century. It arises from a specific interest in the countryside as a source of local identity that can only be known through bodily and sensual exploration, as opposed to the city where visibility and cognition take precedence. The parallel with early seventeenth-century painting enables Bann to show how Lassus's work explores ancient sensibilities in a new key. Following Lassus's own description, for pedagogical purposes, of a walk in the gorges of the Aradin torrent, which contrasts the primacy of vision and intellect in city landscape with the primacy of tactile and bodily intelligence in rural landscape, Bann stresses how motion through two recent projects by Lassus yields new aesthetic experiences. In the Garden of Returns at Rochefort, Lassus creates visual obstacles and choices during a visit and stimulates meaningful tactile differences under foot. These aesthetic experiences invite a mental reconstruction of the site with its historical and cultural context. In the Crazannes project where stillness and motion allow and enforce the separation of tactile and visual experience, and where public space is designed to enhance privacy, the result is the invention of a new kind of place, obfuscating the limits of public and private.

Thus Lassus's works can be seen to contribute to a shift away from a three-hundred-year-long visual culture that recaptures more ancient attitudes and takes them in new directions. This shares with Hirschfeld a sense of the importance of memory and imagination when taking stock of the experience of motion through a landscape. The next chapter explores still another form of engagement with nature, taking visual culture in an alto-

gether different direction, bearing the mark of contemporary concerns in the United States.

Patricia Johanson's reflections upon her own design approaches, in "Beyond Choreography: Shifting Experiences in Uncivilized Gardens," display a central attention to motion and to possible shifts in its meaning. She draws upon some of her projects and realized works to provide a few clear-cut descriptions of the relationships between her design intentions and the twofold experience of motion she expects garden visitors to share. In the wake of contemporary discussions of ecology, Johanson sees all of nature in perpetual flux, animated by ecological cycles resulting from patterns and processes that are in motion themselves. She wants her own landscape designs to entice people into discovering landscapes that have their own integrity and to allow each visitor to venture into a deeper engagement with nature regardless of age, cultural background, or previous visits to the place. To that end Johanson aims to create an uncivilized landscape, centered neither on human values nor on any idealized ecological process, by allowing overlapping, discontinuous, and shifting patterns found in nature to produce the landscape display and its changing form and content over time. In order to entice visitors to explore this landscape, she usually creates some monumental pathway, borrowing structural features of a life-form that dwells there to give it an intriguing shape, to stimulate curiosity, and to invite exploration on foot. This is not, however, a stroll garden as defined by John Dixon Hunt in a later chapter, since it reaches beyond the satisfaction of aesthetic curiosity, toward a shift in the visitor's mindset. It capitalizes on the contemporary taste for picturesque wandering to lead visitors from movement into stillness and engagement with nature. Then in perfect stillness they can discover, according to the sophistication of their own ecological culture, that nature is in motion at any place. This is not a didactic landscape, however. To be precise, it aims to move a visitor's frame of mind from self-conscious observation of curiosities in the outside world to an attention to processes in nature and ways they can impinge upon one's life—hence the importance of the experience of danger in uncivilized nature.

Thus attention to the experience of motion in a garden or a landscape does not appear confined to academic interests, but turns out to be a central concern for contemporary landscape artists who explore the world beyond the limits set for their work by picturesque aesthetics. One notices also that these explorations do not proceed from a modernist will to erase the past but rather from efforts to express newly developing cultural attitudes toward nature, city life, and the senses, and that they force the reexamination of some of the tenets of Renaissance culture inherited from European and American elites. Thus the roles of individual visitors in the interpretation of place seem to become much more prominent, inviting artists to address not only all their senses, but their imagination and their memories as well, in such ways that they may engage in creative encounters with nature.

Modalities of Movement in a Garden and Their Representation

The second part turns to a study of behaviors in their cultural context. It presents different ways of moving through a garden that give rise to their own range of garden or landscape experiences. Very interestingly, it also shows how walks have been designed to represent other modes of motion in nature, such as swimming, boating, riding, or traveling

by train, disproving at once that the significance of motion could be reached by a purely behavioristic inquiry. Thus these four chapters introduce new approaches to the study of behavior, placing them in different cultural perspectives.

In the absence of written accounts of the experience of motion in the pools of Roman gardens, Ann Kuttner attempts to reconstruct the horizon of perception against which Roman courtiers or aristocrats could make sense of these experiences in “Delight and Danger in the Roman Water Garden: Sperlonga and Tivoli.” In order to breathe some life into a description of the iconography of these gardens, she weaves into her text three complementary studies dealing, first, with the sense and experience of nature in Roman culture, second, with experiences of water represented in Roman literature and the arts, and, third, with the role of water in private and public expressions of imperial propaganda. Then, moving among these sources of interpretation, she explores the two water gardens, at Sperlonga and Tivoli, in turn. Romans thought that nature, which included humans, was in a constant flux, being animated by the gods and many supernatural beings, and that some events could be generating agents for the natural landscape. So special places embodied supernatural forces that impacted history and landscape, and remained active as landscape agents. Kuttner shows how important and distinctive the role of water was for Romans in that context. She outlines in the two imperial water gardens the range of meanings and motions that were brought into play by representations of special places directly bound to powerful experiences of water. She shows in particular how swimming or walking in these gardens could stand for other motion in the seas. These ranges differ in the two gardens, but in each of them they offer emotions or meanings that our own culture keeps apart, such as eroticism, fantasy of decoration, and moral education. Within each of these gardens, hosts and visitors would have the possibility, as they moved on the water, into it, or alongside it, to engage with the representations of powerful places embodying natural forces. Kuttner proposes that the contrasting experiences of immediate pleasures and tragic memories of fateful events would procure a cathartic experience for the garden users, allowing them a cleansing from any sense of present exhaustion and protection from past or future anxieties.

In “Mountain, Temple, and the Design of Movement: Thirteenth-Century Japanese Zen Buddhist Landscapes,” Norris Brock Johnson strives to describe paths and movements and to give a sense of the radical difference between our own and a Zen Buddhist experience of motion in a designed landscape. He highlights a few features of two temple garden landscapes, *Zuisen-ji* and *Saihō-ji*, designed as places for training monks by a Buddhist monk, Musō Kokushi (1275–1357), to emulate his own exploration of mountains during his quest for enlightenment. Both comprise a lower level with a monastery, a lake, and its landscape, separated by steep paths from higher levels in the mountain. The ascending paths were designed to create a succession of different experiences: first, a sense of rising above the monastery heightened by the difficulty of the climb; second, an experience of awareness of the mountain nature to be reached through meditation in stillness. Thus motion seems to lead to contemplation in stillness. Such a clear-cut distinction between motion and stillness, however, does not apply here. The ascent was meant to stimulate an experi-

ence of contemplative motion, and some meditating places in the mountain were designed for contemplating experiences of motion through the mountains by Musō or his Chinese predecessors. The designed landscape offered props for engaging in a definite cultural quest, a personal movement toward enlightenment. Behavior derives its meaning from the quest for enlightenment. This is a serious game of emulation in which physical moves had no meaning of their own and made sense only from the perspective of the monk achieving them. Walking up into the mountain in these temple landscapes may be as important an activity as walking around the pools at Sperlonga or Tivoli, yet they seem hardly comparable activities.

Out of the apparently infinite variety of ways of moving on foot in a garden, John Dixon Hunt distinguishes three fundamentally different ones—the procession or ritual walk, the stroll, and the ramble—in “‘Lordship of the Feet’: Toward a Poetics of Movement in the Garden.” They result from different intentional approaches to the garden by visitors. The ritual walk or procession results from some cultural habit that imposes itself upon the visitor; the stroll from a will to achieve with some sense of purpose a final destination, while surrendering along the way to visual distractions offered by the garden design; and the ramble from a deliberate surrender of the visitor to the pleasures of unexpected garden experiences. This phenomenology of the will offers a starting point for further reflection upon garden poetics, warning against any simplistic account that would match a garden style to a kind of motion on foot. Examples ranging from the *sacri monti* of fifteenth-century Italy to contemporary gardens in California demonstrate how some garden forms and designed features may be more conducive than others to one kind of exploration on foot. The choice of walk also results from cultural interpretations that may make, for instance, almost any garden into a place for ritual exploration. In addition, gardens may have been designed for more than one kind of movement, or because of changes in cultural practice they may give rise to some kinds of motion they have not been designed for, thus altering deeply the way they are experienced even if they are maintained almost identically to the original design. This has been especially true for gardens attended by tourists who follow a guidebook, since at least the eighteenth century. Thus landscape design may simply aim to make walking, strolling, or wandering possible since these are intentional behaviors that can be engaged in within any culture and in any place. The next chapter goes one step further and suggests that landscape design may influence the experience of walking in even more subtle ways.

In “When the Railway Conquered the Garden: Velocity in Parisian and Viennese Parks,” Anette Freytag explores the impact of modern transportation upon the experiences of landscape, space, time, travel, and speed. The railway ushered in a new world created by modern industry, creating new relationships to the landscape, in ways that have been reflected in the works of landscape designers as well as painters. Two major public parks, one in Vienna the other in Paris, were designed in order to provide vicarious experiences of the new relationships to the countryside that the railway afforded. Both parks provided representations of a celebrated landscape made accessible by train, of the inscription of the railway—symbolized by elevated bridges—that created a harmonious image of modern industry and pastoral landscape, and they even integrated a train within the parks, bringing

closer the experience of riding the train. But, more interestingly, the design of pathways in the two parks themselves paralleled the differences between the experience of motion by train through the countryside and motion on foot in the country. Freytag proceeds, at the end of this chapter, to show that a new jump in train technology triggered new efforts in landscape design in Paris, to provide a simulacrum of the new relationships to distance and speed, for visitors to a garden in Paris above the Montparnasse railway lines that depart for the Atlantic coast. Thus the design of walks in a landscape may aim to simulate the differences between the physical exertion, the density of the visual field, and the sensual proximity of nature when riding, driving, or walking.

Freytag rejoins Kuttner when she shows that some walkways were designed to create vicarious experiences of different kinds of travel over a landscape. Their studies open a new direction for the analysis of the experience of walking, and they invite further investigation into the complex meanings that can be represented to the mind of a visitor by its motion through a garden.

Culture and Meaning

The last part of the book explores how experiences of motion—irrespective of a particular mode of movement, even though some kind of walk is prevalent—become meaningful, and it highlights very important cultural differences. Stanislaus Fung highlights some of the misunderstandings that result from a lack of attention to cultural differences in the study of the experience of motion in “Movement and Stillness in Ming Writings on Gardens.” Professor Chen Congzhou published in 1983 a short but influential text on Chinese gardens that claimed that the distinction between viewing in repose and viewing in motion must be the first and foremost consideration in the design of gardens. This has been understood by students of Chinese gardens as an invitation to study Chinese garden design in terms of organization of space, objects, and movement between them. Turning to a selection of Ming essays that account for Chinese ways of experiencing gardens and landscape, Fung exposes the misunderstandings behind this interpretation. They rest upon fundamental differences between Western and Chinese culture: Motion and stillness, full and empty, or object and void should not be conceived—in a Western positivistic way—as mutually exclusive categories, but rather as mutually embedded correlates. Besides, viewing in repose in gardens does not refer to appreciation of scenic compositions, but to self-cultivation and a quest for the fusion of self and object. Repeatedly Fung warns against the temptation to read Chinese culture in terms borrowed from a Western horizon of understanding, and he supports with examples his criticism of idealist, behaviorist, ecological, and phenomenological approaches.

These Ming gardens were designed by men seeking to achieve a sense of detachment from human desires. These gardens offered a means to engage with the natural forces immanent in the landscape: winding paths opening onto varied sceneries as a support for “pursuing depth of the heart,” and places for standing in stillness and developing “remoteness of the senses” while viewing the mountains, attending to the control of one’s breath, or engaging in scholarly activity. Thus the experiences of stillness and motion seem to be

paramount for Chinese garden design, as noted by Professor Chen, and yet to evade precise normative implications for physical design.

Michael Charlesworth provides a discussion of the experience of moving in the garden at Stourhead in “Movement, Intersubjectivity, and Mercantile Morality at Stourhead.” He wants to show, first, how a visitor is made to discover a fictional space, enter it, and discover himself as a subject in the corresponding fiction, and, second, how a classical topos—Hercules’ choice between vice and virtue—has been reappropriated as a statement in the bourgeois discourse of laziness and industry between mid-eighteenth- and mid-nineteenth-century England. This essay shows how movement in a garden which both represents and embodies the discourse of laziness and industry in the eighteenth century contributed to the development of a shared understanding of and intersubjective adherence to, mercantile morality in a way that still resonates today. It suggests that movement through a garden may induce special feelings or emotions when a succession of inscriptions compels visitors to become subjects within a discourse that links past and present culture and some of their own and the designer’s concerns. It calls for attention to cultural discourse rather than iconological interpretation and for structural analysis of texts in gardens as parts of a dialogue involving the reader rather than a reading of each emblematic inscription as a disembodied quotation to be understood by itself.

In “Landscape Metaphors and Metamorphosis of Time,” I pursue the discussion of relationships between cultural discourse and landscape design initiated by Charlesworth and take it in a slightly different direction, returning to the interest in landscape narrative to which Parshall calls attention in her chapter. This last chapter seeks to highlight and define a specific figure of landscape design that I call “the landscape metaphor.” It results from the interactions among certain designed features of a garden or landscape, a visitor’s memories of moving among them, and a cultural narrative it forcibly calls to mind, such as the choice between vice and virtue of Cardinal Hippolyte II at the Villa d’Este in Tivoli, or the sufferings of Christ on his way to Calvary in a pilgrimage to a *sacro monte*. In spite of important differences between these examples they share a central property: they rest upon a narrative well known by their intended audiences, and the motion through this landscape establishes a parallel between the visitor’s experience and this narrative. A study of several examples, culled from the Villa d’Este, the Labyrinth at Versailles, and several *sacri monti* shows how motions through these gardens or landscapes led visitors to experience a transformation of their own selves and of their horizons of temporality. This suggests that landscape metaphors provide garden designers with the extraordinary power to introduce visitors to an ontological transformation of time. The presentation, at the end of the chapter, of a contemporary French vernacular garden takes the study one step further in a discussion of a designer’s poetical use of a landscape metaphor to procure a metamorphosis of time.

Thus the whole volume demonstrates many ways in which landscape design builds upon the experience of motion. This was found to be central to an understanding of changes in contemporary landscape aesthetics, moving away from the dominating influence of the picturesque. Different experiences resulted from a large variety of modes of exploration, some very common across Western cultures and others to a large extent cul-

ture specific. Quite interestingly, this opened a new chapter in the study of mimesis in the arts, since a garden or a landscape could be designed to allow a mode of exploration—such as walking—to represent another mode of exploration—such as sailing a Roman boat or riding a train; even sitting in perfect stillness could stand for exploring the mountains on foot. It also became apparent that landscape design may imbue the experience of motion with some deep meanings. Such meanings, however, turn out to be framed by the metaphysical, cultural, or ideological contexts within which designers have been working, and are only accessible to visitors for whom they are part of their lifeworld taken for granted. This observation challenges the intuitive idea that moving through a designed landscape gives rise to universal experiences that can be appreciated by present-day visitors in the same way that they were appreciated by its patrons and their guests.

This remark may serve as an introduction to the presentation of two general themes in Landscape Studies to which this volume as a whole brings some grist to grind. They are to a large extent unintended results of this symposium. This is to say that they were neither addressed directly by the authors in their presentations, nor hotly debated during discussions. Yet, on a slow and silent reading, they pop out of the pages when the reader shuttles from one text to the next. At the same time that the authors were addressing the topic of the conference, they were responding to other issues which they have currently in mind or which are part of ongoing cultural debates. There are times when certain questions emerge in a domain of research and are discussed parenthetically before the questions are clearly formulated and then can be addressed frontally. It struck me that there were several themes that seemed quite distinct from the immediate topic of this volume which had been touched upon in a creative way by most or all authors. The presentation of each of them calls for an order of discussion that does not follow the chapters in the volume, and in order to avoid too many repetitions I shall keep the complementary discussion to a minimum.

First, it came as a surprise that beyond the playfulness of dramatic experiences of gardens and landscapes, there appeared a much deeper role for gardens in self-development. This may be somewhat obfuscated from contemporary attention because in Garden Studies we tend to think of gardens that we visit as tourists rather than of those in which we live. But as soon as we turn our attention toward gardens that were designed to procure significant experiences for people who dwell in them, even if for limited periods of time, we can see how the experience of motion is bound by culture to the development of self. Second, we can observe that all of these results rest upon studies of the reception of gardens, a direction of research little explored in spite of repeated calls in favor of it by some scholars during recent years.³⁷ Since past experiences are not open for direct observation, each author had to devise some way to interpret—falling short of any attempt at complete reconstruction—the reception of a landscape when moving through it. In spite of indi-

³⁷ Since 1995 Hunt at several conferences and Robert Riley in “What History We Should Teach and Why,” in *Landscape Journal* 14, no. 2 (1995), have stressed the need for garden historians to consider not only the intentions of garden designers and patrons, but also the various forms of the reception of gardens. Since 1998 applicants for Landscape Architecture fellowships at Dumbarton Oaks are encouraged to engage in research on “reception and experience of gardens and other designed landscapes.”

vidual differences, three kinds of methods can be distinguished that focus respectively on individual intentionalities, staged interactions, and changes in aesthetics and the arts. Let us turn to a quick survey of contributions to each of these themes in this book.

Garden Motion and the Development of Self

It was unexpected to discover that garden experiences have contributed to the development of self in many different historical circumstances. The observation of a clear relationship between personal change or development and the experience of movement in gardens certainly came as a surprise, not as an anticipated topic of discussion. I propose to review this briefly, starting with the earliest study of this phenomenon in the volume and proceeding historically, while stressing that even though the sense of self and the idea of a garden seem at great variance from one period to another, they have been tightly bound at completely different historical times. This is certainly of interest for contemporary landscape architects, since many aim to promote a new awareness of, and a new ethic toward, nature as might befit a decentered self.

You may wonder by what stretch of the imagination garden experiences contribute to self-development. Kuttner makes a somewhat less bombastic, but also more precise, statement when she concludes her chapter with the idea that images and topographies restaged grave challenges that Roman aristocrats might have met in life, thus offering beautiful and safe garden scenery meant to help them achieve catharsis for any past or anticipated anxiety. She even describes how a visit to the gardens at Tivoli might have helped Hadrian work through his grief over the death of Antinous. Of course, this was a personal event and the gardens were also experienced by many other members of the Roman aristocracy. Kuttner demonstrates how water gardens at Sperlonga and Tivoli allowed visitors to engage in games of make-believe, casting themselves in the roles of mythical voyagers who had suffered great pains before contributing to the grandeur of their nation. These myths could serve as allegorical descriptions of the naval battles that issued from the civil war, or of more personal memories of dangers experienced during the voyages a high-ranking official had to accomplish as part of his civic duties in overseas provinces. To reach personal accomplishment, a Roman aristocrat had to identify with some of the founding heroes of Rome and its world. Thus self-development was achieved throughout the course of life and aimed to demonstrate civic virtues at the risk of many perils. Their replay in beautiful settings, in allegorical forms, free from personal danger, would help build up identification with the Roman state and civic heroes—that is, reaching an ideal sense of community and enjoying catharsis from past anxieties and memories of mourned companions. This sense of self-achievement is as foreign to us as the scenes enacted and the emotions pursued by imperial guests in these gardens. This should not surprise us, since we define our personality in different ways according to the cultural horizons within which we mature, and we also relate very differently to others and to nature. This is a source of difficulty and excitement for scholars engaged in Garden Studies, as soon as they choose to use an understanding of garden design as a key to historical research on human cultures.

Johnson's contribution on the experience of motion in two Zen Buddhist landscapes

takes us into an even more unusual mind-set. The gardens under discussion were designed and built by a Zen Buddhist monk around monasteries to support Buddhist monk trainees in their quest for enlightenment, and they were maintained and later rehabilitated with the same purpose. Enlightenment may be reached at any moment when one, having forgone desires and the belief in the reality of human selfhood, suddenly achieves the experience of “being fully present to existence itself.”³⁸ The Western sense of self as an entity we experience as real and ontologically different from our environment, be it natural or social, is completely alien to the sense of self that these monk trainees yearn for. This search for an egoless self is rooted in a religious tradition of exploring mountains for meditation in China, with which Musō and his followers were conversant. His monastery landscapes allowed the trainees to engage with their cultural world by emulating these explorations in landscapes with purposely strenuous paths climbing up and down a nearby mountain. In a way reminiscent of Kuttner’s analysis of landscapes of catharsis, Johnson shows how the Zen gardens with their ascending paths and their places for meditation in nature’s quietness allow the believers to live, in their own terms, through highly significant experiences of members of a community to which they aspire to belong. Motion through natural landscapes is part of the cultural interworld that fashions the trainees’ experiences, and thus the design of the gardens that allows the quest for enlightenment plays a significant role in the assumption of an egoless self. It is all the more obvious that the experience of motion is crucial to self-development rather than a necessary aspect of the Buddhist life—like, for instance, peregrination for begging orders—since once enlightenment has been achieved, we are told, the difference between motion and stillness becomes irrelevant. The gardens are meant to disenfranchise and allow a new self to emerge.

My own essay pursues the study of landscapes designed to support the achievement of some personal epiphany. Believers arrive at the pilgrimage site that is designed to represent a place of holy experience on *sacri monti* with a shared knowledge of the Crucifixion and Resurrection narratives and of their emotional and ontological significance. Also, they all engage in similar behaviors and go through some identification process with past figures and with one another. Monks at *Zuisen-ji* and *Saihō-ji* go through a similar process, even though the narratives, ontological background, specific behaviors, and landscape forms are different. The similarity rests upon the process that links the experience of motion in a landscape and the quest, and sometimes achievement, of an epiphany. I have called this process a landscape metaphor because the landscape design allows visitors to experience a displacement of meanings attached to their personal life. It can only take place when the landscape design is steeped in a narrative interworld that has a firm hold on the imagination and concerns of the audience. On the other hand, all experiences of motion through a landscape do not give rise to such an ontological transformation or even to a transformation of self. We cannot account for the experience of motion by a mechanical response,

³⁸ See Johnson, “Mountain, Temple, and the Design of Movement: Thirteenth-Century Japanese Zen Buddhist Landscapes.”

either to material design features as Hunt vividly demonstrates, or to a cultural design figure such as the landscape metaphor. Cultural changes may alter the reception of gardens beyond recognition, and this makes even more intriguing the questions raised by continuities and changes in the appreciation of historic gardens.

Fung's study of the experience of motion in Ming gardens moves us closer to the present and again presents a different quest for self-development despite some obvious affinities with the process described by Johnson. In both cases the experience of the landscape is geared to the attainment of an egoless self beyond the trappings of human secular desires, and it rests upon meditation practices that play upon motion and stillness as correlated meanings rather than separated and opposed ones. Yet there are major differences, since the making of the landscape is part of the experience of motion both in the landscape and in the quest of the Way, and these two differ in Johnson's and Fung's accounts. In addition to the intertextuality brought about by studying ancient texts, naming of garden buildings and sites and writing about garden experiences leads Chinese literati toward a personal construction of the ideal of self with little reference—beyond the implicit reference to Confucius—to a common ideal character with which all wise men might identify. This distinguishes Chinese from Japanese experience and allows an idiosyncratic quest for an egoless self compatible with one's engagement in civic duties contributing to the administration of the empire. It should also be noted that the Japanese and Chinese design cultures do not simply differ in their design vocabularies, but more importantly in the difference in their attention to verticality.

Parshall accounts for Hirschfeld's explanations of garden reception. Hirschfeld shares some of the reverence for nature that was cultivated by Chinese literati, even though the metaphysical and practical contexts of Ming literati's and Hirschfeld's thinking are at total variance. Hirschfeld thought that unmediated experiences of motion through nature would insure men's moral improvement since they would be exposed to its immanent beauty and harmony. Moreover, he thought that landscape design should aim to choose scenes of nature to ensure that "a harmonious sequence of different emotions will result."³⁹ Garden guests, while recalling their motions through the garden, would then be able to reach from these feelings and their own power of imagination a moral ideal for themselves, and internalize it. This leads to the solipsistic view of self that Husserl wrestled with later in the "Cartesian Meditations," but it is not as mechanistic as one would think, since even though the string of feelings experienced through motion seems to result in deterministic fashion from being within natural scenes, the flow of associations results from personal memory and the construction of a moral ideal from personal imagination. Thus the experience of motion through a skillfully designed landscape should, according to Hirschfeld, create a possibility for moral redemption of all human visitors.

This grandiose view of the influence of landscape, allowing humans to develop a

³⁹ See Parshall, "Motion and Emotion in C.C.L. Hirschfeld's *Theory of Garden Art*."

virtuous self by immersion in nature, was further elaborated and propagated by the Transcendentalist philosophers in the United States, putting the wilderness (nature untouched by human intentions) in place of the willful selection of natural scenes called forth by Hirschfeld. These ideas found some of their most fascinating expressions in Frederick Jackson Turner's thesis about the role of the frontier in the formation of the American citizen,⁴⁰ and in the hopes for social improvement by the development of varied public parks under federal direction during the Depression.⁴¹ Johanson takes this hope in a new direction, aiming for ethical revolution rather than moral improvement. The parks she designs aim to captivate visitors' visual curiosity for spectacular inventions, so as to attract them to unexpected encounters with nature. She does not say how they are affected by the cultural horizon of perception they bring to these encounters—even though she does not expect untutored children and trained ecologists to reach into the same imaginary representations of cyclical or catastrophic change—but she clearly expects the experience itself to awaken emotions and feelings that allow a decentering of self, a construction, enhanced by ritualized visits to the park, of a new ethical view of nature where human beings stand mutually bound with other living species rather than “as their master and owner,” to quote a celebrated simile by Descartes. Johanson's design strategy to this end is very personal, but the expectations it raises for landscape architecture are widely shared in the United States and other industrialized countries. It sets as high a goal for landscape architecture as Musō Kokushi did for his temple landscapes, while asking for less effort from its contemporary audience than he implied for Buddhist trainees. More research would be needed to understand the extent to which these self-transformations, following experiences of motion in gardens or designed landscapes, are effective.

The study of the experience of motion in gardens has led us so far to a discussion of its role in the development of self which rested upon highly different ways of conceiving the self according to the cultural world under study. We now move to a much more general discussion of methods for the study of garden reception, which in turn will call our attention to the role of garden experiences in mediating cultural changes. This may be seen as an interesting departure from historicist approaches to garden and landscape history which deserve attention in their own right. This results in the acknowledgment, common to other domains of reception studies, of the mutual embedding of landscape design and reception within a broader context of cultural change.

Toward a Methodology for the Study of Garden Experiences

Attention to garden experience has called for some methodological ingenuity in the study of garden reception which was motivated by the need to attend in particular to the

⁴⁰ Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Dover, 1996).

⁴¹ Gregory T. Cushman, “Environmental Therapy for Soil and Human Erosion: Landscape Architecture and Depression-Era Highway Construction in Texas,” in Michel Conan, ed., *Environmentalism in Landscape Architecture* (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 2000), 45–70.

experience of motion, but raised broader questions about the understanding of all sorts of human experiences. Thus this volume provides a few tentative examples of studies of garden reception that could be used for experiences other than motion. This move toward studies of the aesthetic of reception follows in the wake of earlier attempts by Hans Robert Jauss⁴² (1970) and Wolfgang Iser (1979) to discover, in the words of Karl Kosik, that “each work of art has a double character within an indivisible unity: it is the expression of reality, but it also forms the reality that exists not next to the work, not before the work, but precisely only in the work.”⁴³ The discussion of reception theory, its methods, and its results has for the most part been confined to literary history, with a few notable exceptions in the visual arts.⁴⁴ Yet given the context of new developments in the social sciences, the methods proposed in this symposium resulted more from the specific questions addressed to garden history than from any deliberate effort to transfer methods from literary criticism to Landscape Studies. The difficulties prompted by the lack of well-articulated accounts of the experience of gardens by their owners and their guests, or even by casual visitors, demand an indirect approach of some sort. And, in order to circumscribe or reconstruct the phenomena to be studied, it is necessary to adopt, at least implicitly, some definition of the notion of experience. Three strikingly different approaches can be recognized. The first one locates the experience of the garden within a strictly individual response; it identifies the experience of a garden with a specific way of establishing a personal relation to a garden. The second describes the experience of a garden as a cultural construct resulting from staged interactions between a subject and some real or fictional others; in this sense the garden is seen as introducing an interworld. The third approach seeks to identify the new aesthetic response that is called for by an artistic innovation, thus specifying the experience of a garden as a contribution to cultural changes concerning aesthetic judgment. In brief, experience is conceived either in terms of intentionality or intersubjectivity, allowing a study of relationships between constructions of self and culture; or in terms of mediation between artistic innovation and cultural change, allowing for a study of the process of cultural change itself.

Landscape Experience as Shared Intentionality

Following closely in the footsteps of Hirschfeld, whose ideas she presents, Parshall traces the experience of motion in the garden to the garden guest’s emotional response to

⁴² Jauss, *Toward an Aesthetic of Reception*, trans. Timothy Bahti, intro. Paul de Man (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴⁴ Michael Holly has conveniently summarized the main questions raised by reception theory: “Why do some stories of the past match their artifacts better than others? Why do figural patterns of meaning intrinsic to the work become extrinsic? What is the recipient’s role in completing art as a performance? In what ways do the text’s rhetorical conventions enunciate such a powerful convention of reading and writing? In short, what is the process that perpetually unsettles the apparently stable relationship between subject and object, perceiver and perceived, present and past?” See Holly, *Past Looking, Historical Imagination and the Rhetoric of the Image* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 196.

an artfully presented nature. Hirschfeld stresses the individual nature of this response. It surges as an immediate reaction to the flow of perceptions from the flickering changes of a stretch of nature, carefully selected for its power to evoke a mood. The guest is invited to fall under its spell, but the emotions to be experienced are further defined by the associations that he may bring to its unfolding. Thus the experience unfolds from the world of emotions as a result of the dialogue among an intentional work of landscape art bringing to a rare intensity the affective content of nature, changing aspects of nature that reflect its own life, and personal memories of emotions associated with similar events in the guest's life. This makes each experience of a garden so highly personal that one may wonder how two visitors could share the same experience or even come to know each other's experience.

This puzzle is less apparent in Hunt's analysis of the experience of walking, since he takes as his departure three fairly broad types of behavior, each of which could be collective as well as individual. In fact, this latter distinction does not apply to the analysis at all because it does not aim to capture the richness of the experience in its complexity as Parshall's explanation proposes, but rather to isolate a specific feature of personal responses to garden and landscape architecture across centuries and continents. The strength of this analysis arises from its concentration on a single aspect of human experience, making no claim for its relative importance except that it can be deliberately acted upon by landscape architects, thus revealing that if painting expresses a lordship of the eye, daily experience a lordship of the hand, landscape architecture can afford a lordship of the feet: it can direct a garden guest's will to discover. Of course, this will is personal and it is experienced as an individual response to a designed landscape. The analysis does not stop at this point, however, since it points to the possible mediation of cultural artifacts, such as signage, guidebooks, or outright commands that may contradict and override the intended will to explore inscribed into the landscape by its designer. Thus the genuinely personal experience can be altered by some institutional power to which the visitor is subjected within this landscape. But even though the experience of motion through a landscape is shown to depend not only on a designer's intention but also on institutional demands, it remains an individual response to the outside world. This shared aspect of experience may impose a similar type of behavior on a large number of people. Yet it leaves other aspects of the experience of motion, such as emotions or meanings attached to events encountered during exploration of the landscape, completely open.

This limited claim of the role of landscape architecture is heartily embraced by Johanson, who predicates her own attention to the experience of motion when designing upon a way of thinking that comes close to Hunt's analysis. She aims in her designs to lead guests who explore her landscapes from a processionlike entry into the landscape to a pure ramble in total oblivion of any place to be walked to, opening them to a highly personal experience of nature wherever they are on the site. Thus she fully endorses the limited role assigned to landscape architecture in directing the experience of motion through a designed landscape. This proximity between the transhistorical proposition of Hunt and a designer's account of a highly idiosyncratic design attitude must be noted, since it suggests the possibility for landscape architects to compose in many creative ways with the three

modes—walk, stroll, ramble—that Hunt proposes. It must also be noted that the end result, and the major effect, of Johanson’s design tends toward a very complex and personal experience of nature, in which the emotional experience of a sense of immersion in nature is derived from the different memories of past attention to nature that each individual brings to his meditation.

We are very far, however, from Hirschfeld’s interpretation of landscape experience, since in Johnson’s projects emotion arises in stillness when the alienating experience of movement has been overcome, and yet we can see that for both authors the emotional response to place and memory accounts for the variety of individual experiences. And of course in similar fashion their lines of explanation raise the questions: can these experiences be shared? By whom, and under which conditions? One may scoff at these questions. Is it not possible for any visitor to a landscape by Johanson to see how different people behave and to derive from the fact that he walked, roamed the paths, slowed down and squatted, or sat down gazing at the same places as others, that he is sharing the same experiences?

This answer to the question about intersubjective communication, which is raised by any account of a reduction of perception to individual experience, falls unfortunately short. It suggests that each person can think of all others along the pattern of his own experience; it fails to establish that these patterns are not all different. It seems very odd, however, to think that we may have such difficulties in accounting for the possibility of sharing our experiences of a landscape, since so many famous gardens or landscapes are visited by large crowds in search of a specific experience of being there. Could such a sense of sharing an experience with others always be an illusion, or should we look for another way of accounting for garden reception?

Landscape Experience as Participation in an Interworld

Kuttner follows a suggestive approach. She does not attempt to reconstruct a single model or even a limited number of typical models that would account for the experience of moving in an imperial water garden in Roman times, but rather proposes an infinite range of possible responses that can be characterized by the internal contradictions of Roman culture from which they arise and the cultural function of catharsis that they satisfy. Experience is certainly achieved by individuals, but it arises from the embodiment of a cultural narrative by the particular person who is subjected to the experience. The two water gardens Kuttner studies introduce their guests to the possibilities of engaging with three different domains of culture that predated their own birth—the sense and experience of nature in Roman culture, experiences of water in Roman literature and the arts, and the role of water in public and private expressions of imperial propaganda—and which have contributed, along with the Latin language, religion, and their sense of duty and privilege in a stratified society, to the formation of their sense of self. So each of these cultural interworlds precedes the existence of individuals and gives rise to the individual’s capacities to engage with others, to make sense of their life, and to contribute to the life of culture itself. Thus the gardens invite their guests to take the initiative of some movements and

behaviors they experience as sources of sensation, meaning, and emotions according to cultural codes pertaining to the interworlds rendered present by the garden design and its decor. In this perspective, experiences can be shared within the same limits as meaning of sentences. Because acts and mental content derive from interworlds, they give rise to the same activity of interpretation for different people, and thus give a sense of shared experience. Yet because they play upon different hermeneutics at the same time, each of which have some level of ambiguity, and because individual intentions cannot be ascertained from the observation of behavior, they remain a source of individual differences and misunderstandings. So the analysis cannot reach a reconstruction of individual experiences and must be satisfied with an understanding of a culturally specific domain of experience.

Johnson also insists on the origins of the experience of moving through the Zen monastery landscapes within an interworld, the Zen culture of the quest for enlightenment, and on the inescapable variety of individual experiences. This variety, however, is not within reach of untutored efforts, and the garden through its design embodies several aspects of this interworld—it belongs to its respective material culture—and supports the quest for a better approach to the quest for an egoless self. Even though this is not stressed very much in Johnson's chapter, it should be noted that in several instances the guest or trainee is invited by the garden features and the tradition of interpretation to engage in the pursuit of an imaginary dialogue with Musō, the garden founder, and beyond, with the ancient wise men Musō himself addressed in his meditation. Thus the individual experience of nature rests upon the meditation of an imaginary dialogue with others; it is cut from the cloth of intersubjective experiences.

Charlesworth proceeds from a similar perspective when he chooses to explore how the garden design at Stourhead availed itself of the intersubjectivity built up within structures of interlocation. This approach to the garden experience of motion seizes experience at the confluence of the cultural intentionality acted upon by the designer, the course of action engaged in by the garden guest, and the interworlds at his command from which he borrows a capacity to make sense of it. Thus the garden reception can be seen either as a pedagogical phenomenon through which some historical cultural attitudes are transmitted from garden designer to guest, as a moment of self-development when the garden guest is led into self-reflection about his course through the garden, or as a process of cultural change forcing new interpretations of a cultural tradition to be shared. This brings the discussion of the experience of motion in gardens very close to the perspectives opened for literary studies by Jauss in *Toward an Aesthetic of Reception*.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Jauss, *Toward an Aesthetic*, 21. In the commentary to his thesis 1, Jauss writes: "A literary work is not a work that stands by itself and that offers the same view to each reader. It is not a monument that monologically reveals its timeless essence. It is much more like an orchestration that strikes ever new resonances among its readers and that frees the text from the material of the words and brings it to a contemporary existence: '[W]ords that must, at the same time that they speak to him, create an interlocutor capable of understanding them,'" in Gaétan Picon, *Introduction à une esthétique de la littérature* (Paris: Gallimard, 1953).

My own contribution falls along the same lines of interpretation, seeing experience as a mental state that plays upon widely shared cultural contexts to frame a reflection upon a string of bodily encounters with nature. It suggests a further differentiation among garden experiences that give rise to reflection upon some widely shared cultural narrative, thus inviting even more fine-grained differences in the dynamics of garden experience. It makes a difference whether one enters the visit with a clear understanding of the narrative that unfolds in the landscape or whether it is to be discovered in the visit or in retrospect when puzzling upon some conundrum set by the visit. These differences may be of great interest for landscape designers because they invite creative interplay between narrative and landscape forms. The study of a few examples shows, moreover, that landscape design can suggest an experience of living simultaneously in the present and in another time frame. It was very well known that landscape architecture could transform a visitor's experience of space (one may think of the writings of F. Hamilton Hazlehurst on André Le Nôtre,⁴⁶ for instance); this shows that it can also transform the experience of time by making inescapable a mutual relationship between the designed landscape and a fictional place from the visitor's cultural heritage. It again stresses the intersubjective content at the source of the individual experiences, and yet the individual response remains unpredictable in its full content.

Landscape Experience as Aesthetic Response to an Artistic Innovation

Thus we may come to see landscape designs as predisposing their "audiences to a very specific kind of reception by announcements, overt and covert signals, familiar characteristics or implicit allusions,"⁴⁷ to borrow the words of Wolfgang Iser and displace them from literary theory to landscaping. In this perspective the experience derived from a work of art contributes to the creation of a new interworld. The experience of a work of art belongs then to a social process of cultural production which cannot be studied by addressing only the reception of a work of art, but demands an understanding of the relationships between its production and its reception. Three chapters of this book demonstrate different reasons for exploring this understanding of experience of motion in gardens as part of a broader structure of landscape creation. Strikingly enough, each of them introduces and discusses another domain of artistic creation in addition to landscape architecture.

Fung seeks to disentangle the study of Chinese garden history from the aporia introduced by assuming that there is no difference between a Western and a Chinese experience of a garden. He shows how literary accounts of gardens designed by literati during the Ming period stress the role of the garden in the pursuit of a neo-Confucian ideal of immersion of the self in the flow of Nature's changes. The pursuit of scholarly life in the garden, the design of the garden, and the writings which represent both of them to a larger

⁴⁶ Hazlehurst, *Gardens of Illusion: The Genius of André Le Nôtre* (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1980).

⁴⁷ Iser, "The Current Situation of Literary Theory: Key Concepts and the Imaginary," *New Literary History* 2 (1979): 19.

audience all contribute to the dissemination of this neo-Confucian interworld. But the literary work should not be seen only as a way of disseminating the garden experience, since this would leave the intersubjective origin of this experience undefined. It feeds into an intertextual Chinese literary tradition that binds together poems, philosophical texts, chronicles, and essays and which is itself the source upon which literati may base their attempts at distancing themselves from another interworld, the desires, passions, and ambitions of political life, in which Confucian ideals are paid lip service.

Freytag wants to highlight the role of urban parks in a cultural development that arose from a shift in the significance of time, space, and speed with the advent of the Industrial Revolution. The two urban parks in Paris and Vienna that she presents in greatest detail are shown to contribute, together with Impressionist paintings, to the development of the cultural interworld of modernity ushered in by the introduction of the railway, a technological device that offered a completely new possibility for fast transportation to urban dwellers, and thus triggered the invention of a new city culture, distancing in a new way rural and urban culture, which enabled urban dwellers to colonize parts of the rural world. A new kind of leisurely practice, the journey to the seaside from Paris and the journey to the mountains, which were both made possible by the construction of railways, procured a number of new experiences of travel, walk, landscape appreciation, and leisure that were made available to larger crowds by these urban parks. Freytag shows that the experience of motion in the landscape park aims only to reproduce different experiences during a day trip by train away from the city.

Bann wants to explain a different dynamic of aesthetic innovation. While the generalization of rail transport has made the experience of a day in the countryside by train so banal as to be taken for granted, the works by Lassus that Bann analyzes aim to introduce a new aesthetic predicated upon the creation of landscape design proposed to pursue leisure practices within a new horizon of perception. Each of the landscapes presented by Lassus offers a genuinely new experience that allows cultural practices that were kept separate (driving the motorway, discovering the rural world it crosses, picnicking in a safe and quiet place, for instance) to be enjoyed as a whole through a succession of experiences of the same landscape. Several aspects of the experience depend upon the commonly shared practical culture of visitors, but the landscape design within rests upon aesthetic choices that break away from the tenets of the dominant visual culture of landscape. Bann insists, by introducing a study of a pre-Claudian landscape painter and of a pedagogical text by Lassus on a tour in the gorges of a torrent, upon the role of landscape architecture in a contemporary renewal of aesthetic attitudes toward nature, showing how experiences of motion can be both familiar and radically new.

To conclude this methodological survey of the contributions to this book, we can distinguish three different methods for the study of the reception of gardens according to the approach it offers to landscape experiences. The first method privileges one aspect of the relationship that develops between an individual visitor and the landscape. The second seeks to establish the conditions and the forms of visitors' participation in the cultural interworlds that contribute to the formation of the variety of possible experiences of a

landscape. The third seeks to replace the landscape experience within a study of the dynamics of a cultural interworld, by highlighting the role of reception in the dissemination of new aesthetics and the role of artistic creation in their invention.

Conclusions: Garden Studies in a Multicultural World

We have moved a long way from the chilling impression that studies of the experience of motion in a garden were so poorly documented that they would lead to outright inconsequential discussions or would be impossible to conduct. We have discovered instead that garden scholars approached the experience of motion in innovative ways. They have demonstrated that this was an important aspect of contemporary changes in landscape aesthetics and have forced a critical examination of the worn-out picturesque aesthetic. They have offered different accounts of the experience of motion in specific landscapes that show their grounding in specific cultural contexts and their contribution to studies of the dynamics of cultural change. They have also shown how deliberate forms of garden or landscape design have allowed people, albeit in culturally very different ways, to achieve or seek experiences significant for their own self-development. Instead of borrowing cognitivist, behaviorist, or phenomenologist methods, they have invented an array of methods for reception studies. In conclusion, we may try to clarify their departure from phenomenology, and show why Garden Studies might contribute significantly to cross-cultural studies.

The notion of experience is both vague and familiar. When we casually say, “I experience a vague uneasiness in front of this or that particular question,” we simply mean that the “vague uneasiness” to which we refer is a mental content we entertain as individuals confronted by an external object, the question. In this sense, experience is a mental thing we entertain about the outside world, as individuals. This is one among many possible mental states that we may entertain about the world. We experience, for instance, perception, belief, fear, emotions, will, taste—that is, the whole range of mental states John Searle calls intentionalities.⁴⁸ Several authors in this book have concentrated their attention for the visitor’s response to gardens on some aspect of intentionality, thus providing conceptual analysis that confirms the commonly held intention that experience belongs to the inner workings of individual minds. This leads, however, to a well-known problem with which phenomenologists have wrestled since Husserl raised it: if we know the world through an immediate experience that is strictly personal, how can we know the other? If our experience is the result of an individual presence in the world, as Husserl proposes, this assumption begs two questions: can we know other humans’ intentionalities, and how do we share our own experience with them?

Of course we can experience other humans as objects, but this would lead us to ignore them as subjects in their own right. Hence we should ask: How do men achieve a common culture about the world they live in? This is known as the question of

⁴⁸ John R. Searle, *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

intersubjectivity.⁴⁹ Husserl proposes that since we recognize others as looking like us and behaving like us, we perceive them as human subjects like us. This argument falls short of its goal, since we would only know others as we imagine ourselves, not as others embodying another subjectivity different from our own. Several phenomenologists have proposed a different solution to the dilemma posed by Husserl's answer to the question of intersubjectivity. Merleau-Ponty's study of perception has led him to a premise that perception is not an experience of objects but rather an opening to the world, a way for the embodied person to enter into a communion with the world. Thus there is no dilemma of intersubjectivity, since perception is the process shared with all others through which humans engage worldly matter through their bodies.⁵⁰ This could offer an opening for further studies on gardens by inviting a careful attention to the multiple aspects of bodily engagement of people in a garden or a landscape.

It leaves out any explanation of different perceptions of the same landscape, and of the production of a new vision of landscape, such as the one that was introduced by the English garden, or more recently by landscape environmentalism. Merleau-Ponty intended to show "how communication with others, and thought, take up and go beyond the realm of perception which initiated us to truth,"⁵¹ but he died prematurely. Other phenomenologists have engaged in a more differentiated approach of social and cultural life, but have not addressed perception as well as he did.⁵² A very different solution to the problem of intersubjectivity has been proposed by American sociologists who formed the interactionist school, inspired by works of John Dewey (1859–1952) and George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) in particular: they took the self to arise from social experience.⁵³ It is quite fascinating to observe that this is the horizon of research that most authors in this book have adopted without any explicit reference to this school of thought. So their studies imply, to a large extent, a criticism of the universality of the prereflexive mind that is postulated by phenomenology because they set side by side studies of the same question in different cultural contexts. One could say that they demonstrate that phenomenology was not reaching "for

⁴⁹ Nick Crossley, *Intersubjectivity: The Fabric of Social Becoming* (London: Sage, 1996).

⁵⁰ "The unprejudiced study of perception by psychologists has finally revealed that the perceived world is not a sum of objects (in the sense in which the sciences use this word), that our relation to the world is not that of a thinker to an object of thought, and finally that the unity of the perceived thing, as perceived by several consciousnesses, is not comparable to the unity of a proposition, as understood by several thinkers, any more than perceived existence is comparable to ideal existence." Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History, and Politics*, ed. with an intro. by James M. Edie (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 12. This volume contains an interesting development of his ideas for the study of the philosophy of art and the humanities.

⁵¹ "An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty: A Prospectus of His Work," trans. Arleen B. Dallery, in Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, 3.

⁵² Crossley, *Intersubjectivity*, chap. 4, "Concrete Intersubjectivity and the Lifeworld: On Alfred Schutz," 73–98.

⁵³ Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Perigee Books, 1980 [1934]); Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934). See also Randall Collins, *Four Sociological Traditions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 257.

the things themselves,” as phenomenologists like to say, but rather for a cultural world that underlines the development of cultural systems of signs and communication. It seems to indicate that studies of garden experience offer a very interesting domain for research on intersubjectivity. Thus cross-cultural studies of garden appreciation and design might lead to an understanding of some fundamental cultural differences and of the cultural constructs that result from their encounters.

Reading this book along these lines, we have seen that many gardening or landscape gardening traditions have been predicated upon the power of landscape experience to contribute to development of this self, however differently the self was understood in each culture. This raises important questions about the contribution of garden design to garden experience and beyond, to changes in mentalities, morals, or ethics according to the definition of the self at issue. Of course we are born in a language and a culture that demands that we achieve some sense of self, of moral responsibility, of individual autonomy. And we find it very difficult to reflect upon the cultural processes through which we differentiate from a cultural womb and remain attached to it by the most fundamental aspects of interworlds that we take for granted and upon which we build our sense of self and reality such as our ideas of time, space, rest, movement, self, and nature.

This volume also suggests that cross-cultural comparisons of the experience of gardens may offer insights into the contribution of gardens to the grounding of subjective experiences in culturally defined interworlds. This may sound obscure because it suggests a new direction for attention to Garden Studies that is unfamiliar. We are all used to thinking that time and space are constitutive of all our experiences and yet cannot be experienced directly. So we are willing to accept Kant’s view that these are a priori categories of thought that are given to all people in every culture. This is an idea that is challenged by several authors in this volume on empirical grounds. They show that time, space, movement, and stillness have been conceived from incommensurate points of view in different cultures from Roman imperial times to the present, and that they are also amenable to change under the influence of technological change and artistic innovation. Thus categories of time, space, motion, self, and nature have to be studied from the relevant cultural perspective, taking into account the intertextuality at work in the reappropriation of other cultures within any historical one. It helps us remember that assuming the existence of a neutral, objective, or universal point of view exposes cross-cultural studies of gardens to drastic misunderstandings and even to charges of cultural imperialism.